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decision-making (CDM) tools to minimize costs associated with aircraft delays.  
Embracing a lean approach to operational management, the commercial sector has 
refined communications between air carriers, airport operators, ground handlers, and air 
traffic control. This study suggests applying commercial CDM frameworks to all of 
Naval Aviation to increase efficiency and operational effectiveness.  Specific analysis 
includes the impact of ground resource capacity management, airfield demand analysis 
(slot arrival system) and demand management cost analysis on F/A-18 Hornet squadrons. 
vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 
1. Department of Defense Energy Strategy ...........................................2 
2. Naval Aviation Energy Conservation (Air-ENCON) .......................5 
3. Incentivized Energy Conservation (i-ENCON) .................................7 
B. CONTEXT ........................................................................................................9 
1. Current Naval Aviation Organizational Structure ...........................9 
2. Current Scheduling Process ..............................................................12 
3. Type Wing Leadership ......................................................................15 
C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY .......................................................................17 
D. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW .................................................................19 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................................21 
A. AIRFIELD DEMAND MANAGEMENT ....................................................21 
1. Slot Management and Compression Algorithms ............................21 
2. Managing Aircraft Arrival Uncertainty ..........................................23 
3. De-peaking through Slot Management ............................................25 
4. Delay Propagation ..............................................................................27 
B. COLLABORATIVE DECISION-MAKING (CDM) .................................29 
1. Traffic Flow Management .................................................................30 
2. Aviation Decision Support Systems ..................................................32 
3. United Airlines DSS Case Study .......................................................34 
C. AVIATION ENERGY CONSERVATION RESEARCH ..........................35 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis of F/A-18 Refueling Operations ..................36 
2. Improving Refueling Operations Ashore.........................................37 
3. Cold Truck and Hot Pit Refueling: Ratio Analysis ........................39 
D. ADDITIONAL READING ............................................................................39 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................41 
A. SIMULATION ...............................................................................................42 
1. Objective .............................................................................................44 
2. Level of Detail .....................................................................................45 
B. APPROACH ...................................................................................................47 
1. Collecting Input Data ........................................................................47 
a. Planned Flight Data................................................................47 
b. Actual Flight Data ..................................................................48 
c. Cost Data .................................................................................49 
d. Airfield Data ............................................................................51 
e. Refueling Data ........................................................................52 
2. Building the Model .............................................................................53 
3. Validating the Model .........................................................................56 
4. Conducting Experiments ...................................................................56 
a. Slot Management Policy .........................................................56 
viii 
b. Ground Turnaround Time Policy...........................................59 
c. F/A-18EF Transition ..............................................................61 
C. MODEL SCOPE AND DEFINITION .........................................................63 
1. Model Entry ........................................................................................63 
2. Wave Timing Logic ............................................................................66 
3. Operational Processes ........................................................................71 
4. Model Exit...........................................................................................76 
5. Cost Drivers ........................................................................................77 
IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS ...................................................................................83 
A. EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW .......................................................................83 
B. SLOT MANAGEMENT EXPERIMENTS .................................................84 
1. Question ..............................................................................................84 
2. Setup ....................................................................................................84 
3. Results .................................................................................................91 
C. GROUND TURNAROUND TIMING EXPERIMENTS ...........................99 
1. Question ..............................................................................................99 
2. Setup ....................................................................................................99 
3. Results ...............................................................................................104 
D. F/A-18EF TRANSITION IMPACTS .........................................................108 
1. Question ............................................................................................108 
2. Setup ..................................................................................................108 
3. Results ...............................................................................................109 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER STUDY ...........................113 
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................113 
B. FURTHER STUDY .....................................................................................116 
C. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................117 
APPENDIX A. MODEL SPECIFICATION ............................................................119 
A. AIRFIELD ....................................................................................................119 
1. Runway .............................................................................................119 
2. Taxiways ...........................................................................................119 
B. AIRCRAFT ..................................................................................................120 
1. Engine Burn Rate .............................................................................120 
2. Fuel Flow...........................................................................................121 
3. Average Fly Days per Year .............................................................121 
4. Flight Composition...........................................................................122 
5. Flight Time .......................................................................................123 
6. Maximum Number of Waves ..........................................................124 
7. Aircraft Mix ......................................................................................126 
8. Squadron Execution ........................................................................127 
9. Aircraft Ready for Tasking Limitations ........................................129 
C. VARIATION IN AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL RATE .....................................130 
D. GROUND TURNAROUND TIMING .......................................................140 
E. TRUCK REFUELING ................................................................................145 
1. Level of Service ................................................................................145 
ix 
2. Truck Refuel Demand .....................................................................146 
3. Fuel Truck Decision Criteria ..........................................................148 
4. Fuel Truck Fill Stand Demand .......................................................150 
F. HOT SKID REFUELING ...........................................................................152 
1. Level of Service ................................................................................152 
2. Hot Skid Refuel Demand .................................................................152 
3. Historical Usage ...............................................................................155 
G. HOT BRAKE CHECK ................................................................................156 
H. LINE OPERATIONS ..................................................................................157 
I. HOT BRAKE CHECK ................................................................................159 
J. COST .............................................................................................................160 
K. SIMIO MODEL PROCESSES AND OBJECTS ......................................161 
1. Processes ...........................................................................................161 
2. Objects ..............................................................................................164 
APPENDIX B. CDM TOOLBOX .............................................................................167 
A. CDM APPLICATIONS ...............................................................................167 
1. SHARP: An Operational DSS ........................................................167 
2. Aircraft Carrier Air Plan Model ....................................................168 
3. Surface Movement Advisor .............................................................170 
4. Implications of Military DSS ..........................................................171 
5. Range Scheduling DSS ....................................................................172 
B. CULTURAL CHANGE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES ......173 
APPENDIX C. SIMIO DOCUMENTATION REPORT ........................................177 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................179 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet Organizational Chart .............10 
Figure 2. Naval Aviation Squadron Organizational Chart....................................................11 
Figure 3. Notional FRTP Funding Profile and Total Flight Hours per Squadron ................13 
Figure 4. Notional FRTP Funding Profile and Required RFT Aircraft ................................14 
Figure 5. 2012 F/A-18 Flight Hours .....................................................................................18 
Figure 6. Simio Facility View of Airport Simulation ...........................................................42 
Figure 7. Daily Aircraft Arrival Patterns ..............................................................................43 
Figure 8. Variation in Aircraft Arrival Rates ........................................................................44 
Figure 9. NAS Lemoore Hangar, Line, and Spot Layout .....................................................46 
Figure 10. Defense Logistics Agency Standard Fuel Price (JP-5) ..........................................51 
Figure 11. Google Earth Distance Calculator Screenshot (From Google, 2010) ...................52 
Figure 12. Ground Operations Process Overview ..................................................................55 
Figure 13. Minimize Sampling Error through Replication .....................................................56 
Figure 14. Ground Turnaround Timing for Slot Management Experiments ..........................58 
Figure 15. Slot Management Objective Function ...................................................................59 
Figure 16. Ground Turnaround Timing Example ...................................................................60 
Figure 17. Wave Timing Example ..........................................................................................67 
Figure 18. Hot Skid Refueling Operations (Simio screenshot) ..............................................72 
Figure 19. Line Operations .....................................................................................................74 
Figure 20. Aircraft Ground Idle Timing Logic .......................................................................77 
Figure 21. F/A-18E Hot Skid Refuel Demand........................................................................80 
Figure 22. F/A-18E Truck Refuel Demand ............................................................................80 
Figure 23. Pre-flight Planning of Aircraft Ground Turnaround Time ....................................81 
Figure 24. Reducing Standard Deviation of the Mean of Arriving Aircraft per Hour ...........85 
Figure 25. Planned Base-wide Flight Schedule Variation (August 2012) ..............................86 
Figure 26. Slot Management Planned Ground Turnaround Time ..........................................88 
Figure 27. Wave 1 Arrival Variation ......................................................................................89 
Figure 28. Arrival Variation When Launching on Time ........................................................90 
Figure 29. Arrival Variation When Launching 11–15 Minutes Late ......................................91 
Figure 30. Slot Management Variation Impacts on Time per Aircraft ...................................93 
Figure 31. Incremental Change in Total Fuel Consumed (Slot Management Policy) ............95 
Figure 32. Incremental Change in Total Aircraft Operating Cost  (Slot Management 
Policy) ..............................................................................................................96 
Figure 33. Flight Profile Relationships .................................................................................100 
Figure 34. Planned Ground Turnaround Time (Status Quo) ................................................101 
Figure 35. Planned Ground Turnaround Time (20% < 60 mins) ..........................................102 
Figure 36. Planned Ground Turnaround Time (10% < 60 mins) ..........................................102 
Figure 37. Planned Ground Turnaround Time (FCLP Only < 60 mins) ..............................104 
Figure 38. Ground Turnaround Timing Impacts on Time per Aircraft ................................105 
Figure 39. Incremental Change in Total Fuel Consumed (Ground Turn Policy) .................107 
Figure 40. Incremental Change in Total Aircraft Operating Cost (Ground Turn Policy) ....108 
Figure 41. Flight Line Transition Comparison: Average Time per Aircraft ........................110 
xii 
Figure 42. Flight Line Transition Comparison: Fuel Consumption .....................................111 
Figure 43. Flight Line Transition Comparison: Aircraft Operating Cost .............................112 
Figure 44. Sustainable Energy Management Value Chain ...................................................118 
Figure 45. NAS Lemoore Airfield Diagram (After DoD, 2012) ..........................................120 
Figure 46. Flight Composition ..............................................................................................122 
Figure 47. F/A-18 Planned Flight Time ................................................................................124 
Figure 48. Variation in Aircraft Arrival Rates (August 2012)..............................................132 
Figure 49. Sortie Smoothing Technique to De-peak High Demand .....................................133 
Figure 50. Wave 1 Arrival Variation ....................................................................................137 
Figure 51. Arrival Variation When Launching on Time ......................................................137 
Figure 52. Arrival Variation When Launching 1–5 Minutes Late ........................................138 
Figure 53. Arrival Variation When Launching 6–10 Minutes Late ......................................139 
Figure 54. Arrival Variation When Launching 11–15 Minutes Late ....................................139 
Figure 55. Arrival Variation When Launching 16–20 Minutes Late ....................................140 
Figure 56. Planned Ground Turnaround Time (Status Quo) ................................................141 
Figure 57. Planned Ground Turnaround Time (20% < 60 mins) ..........................................142 
Figure 58. Planned Ground Turnaround Time (10% < 60 mins) ..........................................142 
Figure 59. Planned Ground Turnaround Time (FCLP Only < 60 mins) ..............................143 
Figure 60. Planned Ground Turnaround Time (0% < 60 mins) ............................................145 
Figure 61. F/A-18C Truck Refuel Demand ..........................................................................147 
Figure 62. F/A-18D Truck Refuel Demand ..........................................................................147 
Figure 63. F/A-18E Truck Refuel Demand ..........................................................................148 
Figure 64. F/A-18F Truck Refuel Demand ..........................................................................148 
Figure 65. Fuel Truck Decision Criteria Algorithm .............................................................150 
Figure 66. Fuel Truck Fill Stand Demand ............................................................................151 
Figure 67. F/A-18C Hot Skid Refuel Demand .....................................................................154 
Figure 68. F/A-18D Hot Skid Refuel Demand .....................................................................154 
Figure 69. F/A-18E Hot Skid Refuel Demand......................................................................155 
Figure 70. F/A-18F Hot Skid Refuel Demand ......................................................................155 
Figure 71. Line Operations Logic .........................................................................................158 
Figure 72. Line Operations (Simio screenshot) ....................................................................159 
Figure 73. Hot Brake Check Logic .......................................................................................159 
Figure 74. Cost per Flight Hour Components .......................................................................161 
Figure 75. 8-Step Change Model (From Kotter & Cohen, 2002) .........................................175 
  
xiii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Aircraft Type Probability Table (August 2012) ....................................................57 
Table 2. NAS Lemoore F/A-18EF Only Flight line by 2016 ..............................................62 
Table 3. Time Varying Arrival Table ..................................................................................64 
Table 4. Squadron and Aircraft Ready for Tasking .............................................................64 
Table 5. Wave Timing Variables .........................................................................................66 
Table 6. Slot Management Model Input Table ....................................................................87 
Table 7. Slot Management Time Varying Arrival Table (Input Versus Output) ................87 
Table 8. Slot Management Variation Impacts on Time per Aircraft ...................................92 
Table 9. Slot Management Variation Impacts on Incremental Metrics ...............................94 
Table 10. Slot Management Variation Impacts on Cumulative Metrics ...............................94 
Table 11. Slot Management Variation Impacts on Fuel Truck Resourcing ..........................97 
Table 12. Flights Engaged in Field Carrier Landing Practice .............................................103 
Table 13. Ground Turnaround Time Impacts on Time per Aircraft ....................................105 
Table 14. Ground Turaround Timing Impacts on Incremental Metrics ..............................106 
Table 15. Ground Turnaround Impacts on Cumulative Metrics .........................................106 
Table 16. NAS Lemoore F/A-18EF Only Flight Line by 2016 ..........................................109 
Table 17. Aircraft Operating Cost per Minute ....................................................................112 
Table 18. Potential Impacts for NAE ..................................................................................115 
Table 19. Runway Arrival Patterns at NAS Lemoore (August 2012) .................................119 
Table 20. F/A-18 Engine Burn Rate ....................................................................................121 
Table 21. Fuel Flow Calculations ........................................................................................121 
Table 22. Flight Composition Table ....................................................................................123 
Table 23. Flight Time Table ................................................................................................123 
Table 24. Maximum Wave Cumulative Distributions.........................................................125 
Table 25. Maximum Wave Launch Windows .....................................................................125 
Table 26. Aircraft Type (Stratified by Type) ......................................................................126 
Table 27. Aircraft Type (Stratified by Hangar) ...................................................................126 
Table 28. Aircraft Type and Hangar Assignment (F/A-18EF Only) ...................................127 
Table 29. Current Squadron Table and Aircraft Ready for Tasking ...................................127 
Table 30. F/A-18EF Only Squadron Table and Aircraft Ready for Tasking ......................129 
Table 31. Aircraft Ready for Tasking ..................................................................................130 
Table 32. Planned Aircraft Arrival Matrix at NAS Lemoore (August 2012)......................131 
Table 33. Model Input Table for Aircraft Arrivals ..............................................................135 
Table 34. Time Varying Arrival Table (Simio Screenshot of s=4) .....................................136 
Table 35. Flights Engaged in Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) ................................144 
Table 36. Fuel Truck Demand Table ...................................................................................146 
Table 37. Fuel Truck Fill Stand Demand Table ..................................................................151 
Table 38. Hangar/Hot Skid Pairing .....................................................................................152 
Table 39. Hot Skid Demand Table ......................................................................................153 
Table 40. NAS Lemoore Fuels Division Monthly Summary (August 2012) ......................156 
Table 41. Flight Events Requiring Ordnance De-arm .........................................................157 
Table 42. F/A-18 Aircraft Maintenance Cost per Minute ...................................................160 
xiv 
Table 43. F/A-18 Fuel Cost per Minute ..............................................................................160 
Table 44. Primary and Secondary Timing Model Processes ...............................................161 
Table 45. Hot Brake Check Model Processes .....................................................................162 
Table 46. Hot Skid Model Processes ...................................................................................162 
Table 47. Fuel Truck Model Processes ...............................................................................163 
Table 48. Miscellaneous Model Processes ..........................................................................164 
Table 49. Model Objects .....................................................................................................165 
  
xv 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Air-ENCON  Naval Aviation Energy Conservation 
ATC   Air Traffic Control 
ATM   Air Traffic Managers 
AVDLR  Aviation Depot Level Repairable 
BUNO   Bureau Number 
CAASD  Center for Advanced Aviation System Development  
CDM   Collaborative Decision-Making 
CNAF   Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
CNO   Chief of Naval Operations 
CO   Commanding Officer 
CSFWP  Commander, Strike Fighter Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
CVW   Carrier Air Wing 
DECKPLATE Decision Knowledge Programming for Logistics Analysis and 
Technical Evaluation 
DoD   Department of Defense  
DON   Department of the Navy 
DSB   Defense Science Board 
DSS   Decision Support System 
EIA   Energy Information Administration 
Eurocontrol  European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation 
FAA   Federal Aviation Administration 
FBCF   Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel 
FHP   Flying Hour Program 
FIDS   Flight Information Display System 
FRTP   Fleet Readiness Training Plan 
FRS   Fleet Replacement Squadron 
GDP   Ground Delay Program 
GSA   General Services Administration 
IATA   International Air Transport Association 
I-ENCON  Incentivized Energy Conservation 
xvi 
IOC   Initial Operational Capability 
IRTC   Intuitive Research and Technology Corporation 
MIT   Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MO   Maintenance Officer 
NAF   Naval Air Facility  
NAS   National Airspace System 
NAS   Naval Air Station 
NASA   National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
NASL   Naval Air Station Lemoore 
NAVAIR  Naval Air Systems Command 
NAVFLIRS  Naval Aviation Flight Record Subsystem 
NEXTOR  National Center of Excellence for Aviation Operations Research 
NPS   Naval Postgraduate School 
OAG   Official Airline Guide 
ODSS   Operational Decision Support System  
OPNAV  Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
OPSO   Operations Officer 
RBS   Ration-by-Schedule 
RFT   Ready for Tasking 
SCS   Slot Credit Substitution 
SEMPCI  Shipboard Energy Management and Cold Iron Program 
SHARP  Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program 
SIMIO   Simulation Modeling Framework Based on Intelligent Objects 
SMA   Surface Movement Advisor 
SOA   System Operations Advisor 
SPADE  Supporting Platform for Airport Decision Making and Efficiency 
TACAIR  Tactical Air 
TFM   Traffic Flow Management 
TMR   Total Mission Requirement 
UAL   United Airlines  
UAV   Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
USD   Under Secretary of Defense 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We are operating in challenging fiscal and operational times, and we must 
take appropriate action now to ensure the current and future vitality of 
Naval Aviation.  To successfully achieve our missions today and in the 
future, all Naval Aviation stakeholders must be in sync and focused on the 
common goals of advancing readiness while reducing costs. 
VADM D. Buss, Commander, Naval Air Forces, April 30, 2013 
A. BACKGROUND 
According to the Department of the Navy’s (DON) Energy Vision for the 21st 
Century (2012), a combination of reducing fuel consumption and increasing fuel 
efficiency is necessary to improve energy security.  Furthermore, aligning fiscal policies 
with energy conservation initiatives and operational requirements is vital to achieving a 
positive and sustainable energy outlook for the Navy.  In this post-war environment, the 
Navy must address fiscal and energy problems propagated by strong cultures of 
inefficiency and waste.  The solutions proposed in this MBA project require no financial 
outlay.  However, what is necessary is strategic thinking in a new and creative way.  
Leveraging existing infrastructure, proven commercial and military best practices, and 
motivation for cultural change will ensure Naval Aviation is ready to execute.  
Until the Navy announced its new energy conservation platform in 2009, Naval 
Aviation has faced the challenge of managing both time and resources.  For decades, 
Naval Aviation’s policies, awards, metrics, and incentives focused on flight hour 
execution (time) with little regard to the amount of personnel, equipment, and fuel 
necessary to accomplish the mission.  Former Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), 
Vice Admiral Allen Myers, called for a philosophical change in operations by reducing 
fuel consumption measured in gallons without any change in the number of flight hours 
allocated (Commander, Naval Air Forces [CNAF], 2010).  Each organization within 
Naval Aviation is to critically evaluate all practices and processes in search of 
inefficiencies and waste. 
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In 2012, tactical aircraft accounted for 65 percent of all fuel consumed by Naval 
Aviation (M. Olszewski, personal communication, May 29, 2013).  Moreover, F/A-18 
strike fighter aircraft consumed over 52 percent of the total aviation budget in 2012 using 
334 million gallons of fuel alone (M. Olszewski, personal communication, May 29, 
2013).  Now, in concert with Admiral Myers’ direction, many fuel-conserving ideas are 
underway including addressing the overarching framework in which the Navy manages 
its flight and ground operations.  This framework must be designed from the ground up to 
incentivize and reward individual squadrons to conserve. 
Problems related to inefficiency and waste in ground and flight operations extend 
well beyond the F/A-18 community.  Rounding out the top ten fuel-consuming aircraft in 
the Navy include the P-3, AV-8B, H-60/H-1Y, C-130, EA-6B, CH-53, T-45, E-6, and V-
22 (M. Olszewski, personal communication, May 29, 2013).  Each community stands to 
benefit greatly from the solutions offered in this paper.  Although fuel consumption per 
sortie is an important metric to evaluate, one must also consider the volume of flight 
operations a particular community executes, the internal fuel capacity, sortie length, 
engine burn rate, and maintenance costs.  Regardless of the aircraft flown, all naval air 
installations can benefit from incremental process improvements in aircraft flow, both 
inflight and on the ground.  Even a small improvement in operational efficiency may 
have a profoundly positive impact.   
1. Department of Defense Energy Strategy 
The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force published a report on Department 
of Defense (DoD) energy strategy titled More Fight—Less Fuel (Under Secretary of 
Defense [USD], 2008).  This report provided an update to energy policies and 
recommendations from an earlier DSB in 2001 (USD, 2001).  Evident in both reports was 
that little had been done by way of reducing the military’s dependence on electrical grids 
and petroleum resources.  Furthermore, the board cited significant challenges remaining 
to our nation and military forces.  Specifically, the department still needed to identify 
barriers to achieving a reduction in energy demand and how it might leverage 
commercial best practices to fully realize the benefits (USD, 2008).  It is widely known 
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throughout the military that one of most significant threats to national security is energy 
dependence.  Effectively communicating the national objective of energy conservation all 
the way down the chain of command to the squadron level of operations is vital for any 
credible reduction in energy resource consumption (Intuitive Research and Technology 
Corporation [IRTC], 2005). 
The DSB (2008) report highlights two principal challenges to achieving a 
reduction in energy resources demanded.  First, “unnecessarily high and growing battle 
space fuel demand” has placed a greater focus on operational effectiveness than on 
energy conservation (USD, 2008).  Since September 11, 2001, the demand for energy in 
all facets of military operations has grown exponentially.  Second, military installations 
in the US and abroad are completely dependent on an aging and vulnerable commercial 
infrastructure for the delivery of fuel and electricity.  Given these two significant 
challenges, the military is placed at an “unacceptably high risk of extended interruption” 
(USD, 2008). 
For more than 10 years, the DoD has made efforts to modify existing business 
practices and procedures by incorporating energy consequences into everyday decision 
making (USD, 2008).  However, the results are mixed.  Decisions today, especially in 
aviation where success is measured in flying hours as opposed to gallons saved, 
operational effectiveness carries the day.  So long as readiness benchmarks are achieved, 
fuel reduction considerations are viewed as lost training opportunities.  This mindset is 
not sustainable and represents much of the motivation behind this MBA project’s 
research questions. 
In addition to practices and procedures, the DSB uncovered hundreds of mature 
technologies available for immediate implementation.  Unfortunately, the DoD lacks the 
tools necessary to weigh the operational and economic benefits (USD, 2008).  Although 
Naval Aviation has come a long way since 2008, leadership at the type wing and 
squadron level today is still not fully evaluated in its ability to conserve fuel.  Until 
energy conservation is tied to a leaders’ personal performance (fitness reports), this 
disconnect will likely remain.   
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A high-level, energy vision for the DoD suggests changes in operational practices 
and procedures affecting energy conservation are long overdue.  To date, much of this 
rhetoric has fallen on deaf ears.  Strong organizational culture, outdated performance 
metrics, and incongruence between operational effectiveness and fuel preservation have 
delayed aviation energy conservation initiatives.  This presents a unique gap in research 
that this study aims to address.  Managing the rate at which aircraft arrive to realize 
efficient ground resource utilization is an area absent in the literature.  Specifically, no 
study addresses how small planning changes at the squadron and type wing level could 
result in more ready and capable aircrews while simultaneously reducing total fuel 
consumed. 
At the GreenGov Symposium in 2011, Assistant Secretary of Defense Sharon 
Burke outlined a three-prong approach to reducing operational energy for the warfighter.  
Her vision provided a roadmap for increased capabilities while simultaneously reducing 
risk and cost to the force.  To do this, she proposed an approach to reduce the DoD’s 
energy demand (more fight, less fuel); secure the supply of fuel to our installations (more 
options, less risk); and build a culture of energy security (more capability, less cost) 
(Burke, 2011).  The right culture, willpower, and infrastructure to support energy 
conservation are all necessary to making Naval Aviation a leader in conservation. 
The U.S. is the world’s leading consumer of oil yet retains less than two percent 
of the world’s oil supply (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2012).  The energy 
markets have a choke hold on the U.S. and, more specifically, our military.  Secretary 
Burke highlights the strategic implications of failing to respond to the increasing 
geopolitical and fiscal pressure of energy dependence.  China and India make up the 
largest share of Asian energy growth through 2035 (EIA, 2012).  Couple this logistical 
pressure with a shrinking defense budget, in both real and nominal terms, and changes to 
current energy policy become paramount.  The National Military Strategy states it best, 
“...forces must become more expeditionary in nature and require a smaller logistical 
footprint in part by reducing large fuel and energy demands” (DoD, 2011). 
The symposium’s findings and recommendations provide a relevant vector for 
Naval Aviation to embrace.  Secretary Burke’s strategic approach could shape energy 
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policy at the type wing and squadron level.  This study fills a necessary gap in knowledge 
and information exchange to increase aviation readiness while reducing risk to scarce 
resources under an umbrella of fiscal restraint.  
2. Naval Aviation Energy Conservation (Air-ENCON) 
The Navy consumes 30 percent of the entire DoD’s petroleum budget (DON, 
2012).  Furthermore, the Navy uses 75 percent of its energy afloat and 25 percent ashore, 
where this study focuses its effort.  The Navy’s Energy Vision for the 21st Century 
(2012) is one that values energy as a strategic resource.  How this imperative is 
communicated, implemented, and measured at the squadron level is a noticeable gap in 
the Navy’s strategic vision. 
Record oil prices in 2008 forced the entire department to rethink their operational 
and strategic energy policies.  Admiral Roughhead, former Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO), stood up Task Force Energy to build energy conservation awareness as well as to 
develop a repository of energy efficient best practices (DON, 2012).  The desired end 
state is a Navy that fully commits to fostering a culture of energy awareness and decision 
making cognizant of energy consequences at every level. 
To achieve this vision, the Navy relies heavily upon its senior leadership to view 
energy efficiency as a force multiplier.  To that end, Naval Aviation has done a superb 
job educating its senior leadership, increasing its use of high-fidelity simulators, and 
moving from a “sortie-based” readiness matrix to one that is “capability-based” (DON, 
2012).  All of these measures are in line with Naval Aviation Vision 2020.  Specifically, 
the Navy expects the force to “operate, fight, and win more effectively, and more 
efficiently, making the most of precious resources” (DON, 2012).  However, these 
measures have fallen well short of the Navy’s goal of a seven percent weighted reduction 
in fuel consumption (CNAF, 2010).  The importance of energy conservation at the O-6 
level (i.e., type wing and CVW) is often overshadowed by operational necessity. 
Aviation operational policy and doctrine is quite possibly the most difficult 
element to implement.  Naval Aviation is rich in culture, standardization, and measured 
risk all of which are largely shaped by aircraft mishaps and personnel loss.  As with any 
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strong organizational culture, changes in policy appearing to threaten operational 
readiness are met with stiff resistance (Kotter & Cohen, 2002).  To ensure the Navy’s 
energy vision is achieved, Naval Aviation must capitalize on several key enablers 
including leadership, technology, policy, and cultural change (DON, 2012).  Failure in 
any one of these areas is counterproductive to achieving the Navy’s reduced fuel 
consumption goals.  This study bridges the gap between DON energy strategy and unit-
level implementation.  Furthermore, the approach proposed in this study is simple, 
incremental, and requires no financial outlay.   
Secretary of the Navy Raymond Mabus established several aggressive energy 
goals for the Navy to achieve by the year 2020 (DON, 2012).  The single largest user of 
the Navy’s fuel resources, Naval Aviation, stands most affected by any energy policy.  
To that end, they are directed to immediately adopt energy efficient practices, 
technologies, and operations.  Formed in 2009, the Navy Air Energy Conservation (Air-
ENCON) Program Integrated Project Team (IPT) facilitates collaboration throughout 
Naval Aviation by implementing Fleet best practices (CNAF, 2010).  The program has 
enjoyed several successes in the form of performance metrics, incentives for energy 
reduction, and operational efficiencies as highlighted in the Air-ENCON Charter (CNAF, 
2010).  Despite these successes, this program highlights a number of research shortfalls 
requiring further study. 
Aviation energy research in organizational behavior, ground and airborne 
resource optimization, and post-flight refueling policy is lacking.  To be successful in 
achieving a seven percent weighted reduction in aviation gallons of fuel consumed, this 
study and more is critical (CNAF, 2010).  An important tenet of Air-ENCON is that all 
fuel conserving measures must preserve total flying hours while simultaneously not 
compromising safety or readiness.  Therefore, this project presents a unique opportunity 
for leadership buy-in to foster a culture of energy conservation that not only improves 
operational readiness, but is sustainable. 
The Air-ENCON strategy combines easily measurable metrics with awards and 
incentives to promote best practices (CNAF, 2010).  Commander, Naval Air Force (N40 
Readiness) is interested in this project’s analysis and recommendations as it addresses 
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several key gaps in Naval Aviation’s energy strategy.  Furthermore, this project applies 
several commercial and military best practices to common aviation operational decisions 
made every day.  Regardless of aviation community (i.e., F/A-18, P-8, H-60, F-35) or air 
installation, all of the initiatives presented in this report may be applied to achieve 
operational efficiency and conserve fuel. 
3. Incentivized Energy Conservation (i-ENCON) 
The Center for Defense Management and Research (CDMR) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California (2009) conducted a study of strategic 
communication as a best practice in energy conservation.  Their research concluded the 
principal factors affecting conservation are personnel attitudes, understanding of energy 
objectives, motivation, and leadership (Salem, King, Fox, Haley, & Klotzbach, 2009).  
This study highlights success in the Surface community’s implementation of Incentivized 
Energy Conservation (i-ENCON) and Shipboard Energy Management and Cold Iron 
Program (SEMPCI).  Although the report covers the benefits of these programs at length, 
the drawbacks the Surface community encountered are of particular interest to our 
project.  Issues such as program awareness, easily understood and controllable metrics, a 
feedback mechanism, the explicit role of leadership, and persistent cultural and 
communication barriers are among the many barriers to performance (Salem et al., 2009). 
Interviews assessed aircrew perceptions of energy conservation.  CDMR’s 
analysis revealed a wide range of safety-related concerns from any measure changing 
existing operational policy or procedure (e.g., fuel loading, aircraft configuration).  
Therefore, CDMR recommended a broad-based approach to behavioral change through 
focused communication efforts in key stakeholders such as type wing commanders, 
commanding officers, aircrew, and maintenance professionals.  After all, the senior 
leadership is ultimately responsible for setting realistic goals for specific fuel reduction 
targets.  Furthermore, senior leadership is specifically tasked in the Navy Air-ENCON 
Charter (2010) to take charge of the energy conservation initiative. 
Another recommendation is to improve information exchange throughout the 
chain of command, especially among junior personnel.  Conservation awareness is 
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currently not a part of all operational decisions resulting in further delays in achieving the 
Navy’s energy goals.  This study found that aviators preferred face-to-face interactions to 
written policy statements and other media (Salem et al., 2009).  Therefore, training, 
program awareness, and personal responsibility require additional attention to improving 
communication and expectations. 
Ingrained beliefs impact conservation behavior as well (Salem et al., 2009).  For 
many of those interviewed in this study, mission goals and readiness often outweighed 
conservation goals.  A real opportunity exists to align the warfighter’s values with that of 
the Navy’s energy objectives.  If measured and incentivized correctly, it may be possible 
to reduce fuel consumption while holding total flying hours per crew constant.  To be 
successful, energy conservation messages must be packaged in a way that aircrew and 
maintenance professionals clearly understand.  Such metrics should include war fighting 
capability, battle space efficiency, force multiplier achievement, and provide competitive 
challenge to name a few (Salem et al., 2009). 
Most of the aviators interviewed were not motivated to conserve based on 
efficiencies alone.  Conversely, any conservation measure that resulted in improved 
readiness was seen as an incentive (Salem et al., 2009).  If savings in fuel could be 
partially retained at the unit level, such as the case with i-ENCON’s cash awards system, 
many would consider the efficiency a motivator.  Another reason uncovered to entice 
cultural change is in the form of personal awards and other targeted recognition.  This is a 
critical point that ties directly back to an effective system of performance metrics.  For 
any incentive program to be sustainable, it must be objective, challenging, attainable, and 
benefit one’s own organization in some tangible way (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012). 
The last CDMR recommendation was to leverage existing processes, 
technologies, and policies through a refocus on conservation.  Their analysis highlighted 
several conservation enablers for aviation including a more efficient use of runways, 
improved air traffic control systems, and better delay management (Salem et al., 2009).  
From an administrative policy perspective, some interviewees suggested tying energy 
conservation to an officer’s fitness report. 
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The Center for Defense Management Research identified several opportunities for 
further research.  This MBA professional report builds on CDMR’s findings by providing 
concrete solutions to many of their key tenets.  Effective collaborative tools to define and 
measure conservation performance can improve strategic communication at the type wing 
and squadron level.  One such initiative could be balancing the flight line by smoothing 
out variability in departures and arrivals to reduce ground and airborne delays.  This 
balanced approach may lead to improved fuel consumption without impacting readiness.   
A second order effect of improving predictability in aircraft arrival rates is in 
post-flight refueling.  A gap in many refueling studies is an assumption that sorties are 
evenly executed across the fly day.  Actually, most flight lines experience predictable 
patterns of sortie peaks and valleys resulting in the inefficient use of scarce refueling 
resources.  As CDMR eloquently points out, aircrew are far more prone to adopt fuel 
conserving strategies that do not impact flying hours, readiness, or safety.  Balancing the 
flight line’s operations, for example accomplishes all of this and more through 
incremental scheduling policy changes.  
B. CONTEXT 
1. Current Naval Aviation Organizational Structure 
There are 29 Active and Reserve Naval Air Stations (NAS) and Facilities (NAF) 
in operation.  Each airfield is host to a variety of aircraft types including fixed- and 
rotary-wing as well as manned and unmanned air vehicles (UAV).  At the unit, or 
organizational level, is the squadron.  When squadrons are grouped together, they form 
type wings (administrative) and carrier air wings (operational) (Figure 1).  Squadrons 
typically have a wide numerical range of aircraft assigned from as few as five to more 
than 100.  Wings, on the other hand, typically have but a few squadrons; often less than 
10.  Within every squadron is a department dedicated to operations and another to aircraft 
maintenance.  Beyond the squadron and wing is the ground and aviation support 
organizations of the parent airfield.  At this level are the supporting agencies including air 
traffic controllers (ATC) and managers (ATM), range controllers, ground electronics, 
fuel services, meteorology, and fire support to name a few. 
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Figure 1.  Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet Organizational Chart 
Flight operations are complex and dynamic requiring a variety of talents and 
experience to ensure aircraft operate in a smooth and efficient manner.  Safe and 
expeditious operations are of utmost importance.  To that end, a significant amount of 
planning, budgeting, executing, and evaluating occurs across the flight line from a variety 
of stakeholders and perspectives.  These stakeholders can be viewed from one of the 
three organizational levels introduced; squadron, wing, or airfield. 
Every military squadron has a mission statement or purpose to justify operations 
toward a common objective or requirement.  Typical operational purposes include 
combat readiness, cargo and/or personnel transport, and proficiency.  Given a host of 
unique and competing interests within each squadron, the Operations Officer (OpsO) is 
responsible for ensuring that their squadron is ready and able to provide services when 
called upon to do so.  He does this by orchestrating flight hour demands with 
maintenance requirements and administrative and safety necessities in the form of a daily 
flight schedule.  The Maintenance Officer (MO) references this schedule in developing 
the aircraft maintenance plan.  Each of these department heads works directly for their 
respective Commanding Officer (CO) who leads and directs the entire effort (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Naval Aviation Squadron Organizational Chart 
At the type wing level, one will find the senior, administrative leadership in any 
airfield complex.  Its purpose is to work with all squadrons assigned in matters pertaining 
to manning, training, and equipping.  The wing helps squadrons achieve their operational 
objectives by providing range and air space control services as well as brokering 
simulator scheduling and specific air traffic management issues.  The wing also makes 
critical resourcing decisions in order to ensure all squadrons achieve their training and 
readiness objectives. 
Finally, the airfield itself has a number of stakeholders ensuring the runway, 
control tower, terminal, refueling services and hangars are available and operating in a 
predictable and efficient manner.  ATC monitors ground and flight operations from a 
demand and capacity perspective and negotiates with the greater National Airspace 
System (NAS) in the launch and recovery of aircraft.  Working closely with their ground 
operations division, they ensure the runway is free from hazard, the aircraft refueling 
sources are operational, and navigational aids are calibrated for peak performance.  
Another principal stakeholder in any airfield operation is that of meteorology.  Every 
decision maker at the squadron, wing, and airfield level is influenced by weather 
observations and forecasts.   
Whether operating fixed or rotary-wing aircraft, the challenges for any Navy 
airfield is how best to align the behaviors of individual squadrons and wings with the 
greater objectives and goals required by Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF).  In the 
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current managerial framework, each individual command lays out their objectives in 
terms of CNAF established readiness, financial, social, and environmental goals.  Each 
CO in command at the squadron level is personally responsible for managing his own 
organization in achieving a unique set of operational, maintenance, safety, and 
administrative metrics.  This individual stakeholder approach has merits internal to the 
organization, but has some significant external drawbacks counter to CNAF’s energy 
strategy. 
Squadron performance is measured at the squadron level.  All predetermined 
training and readiness standards are measured first at the squadron level and subsequently 
aggregated at the wing level.  Should corrective action be necessary to address 
performance shortfalls, all are attributed to a specific squadron.  This organizational 
framework results in management controls at the squadron level (among departments) 
being highly proactive while controls interfacing with outside stakeholders (e.g., carrier 
air wing, type wing, airfield manager) being predominately reactive. 
There are a variety of results controls in place at the squadron level to ensure 
personnel within those organizations perform well.  Furthermore, personnel at the 
squadron level are empowered, challenged, and incentivized to take whatever actions 
deemed necessary to ensure the success of their own organization.  The current 
management control system framework also includes several action, personnel, and 
cultural controls.  As with the results controls, each are orchestrated at the squadron level, 
with squadron objectives, and squadron strategies to achieve them.  Here again, our 
research suggests that when individuals act in their own self-interest, the impact to the 
entire aviation enterprise may not necessarily be positive. 
2. Current Scheduling Process 
The Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) is a 27-month training cycle that 
allows CNAF to position fleet squadrons in a set readiness level based upon the current 
force structure requirements of the Navy.  The FRTP is a planning and programming 
framework tailoring each unit’s funding and readiness level incrementally throughout the 
27-month period.  Each operational squadron is responsible for meeting individual 
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training and readiness metrics based on the number of pilots they currently have on 
board, and where they are at in the FRTP cycle.  Figure 3 depicts a notional funding 
profile in percentage of total training and readiness as related to the number of flight 
hours allocated.  It is clear that during periods of maintenance and sustainment, the flight 
hours necessary for training and readiness are least.  On the other hand, the greatest 
demand for flight hours is in the integrated and deployment phase.  Figure 4 depicts the 
same notional funding profile with the percentage of Ready for Tasking (RFT) aircraft 
required in each month.  Here again, each metric shadows the other in each readiness 
peak and valley. 
  
Figure 3.  Notional FRTP Funding Profile and Total Flight Hours per Squadron 
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Figure 4.  Notional FRTP Funding Profile and Required RFT Aircraft 
Naval air installations have certain resources, which are limited for time, 
availability, manning and cost and are always a source of constant competition for 
squadrons.  These resources include the availability of fuel trucks for cold refueling 
operations and hot refueling skids, as well as the training ranges located within close 
proximity of the field.  The priority and scheduling for these resources are not currently 
regulated.  In fact, they are scheduled on a first come, first serve basis or, often times, 
sorted out on an individual basis as needed on the ground or airborne.  This leads to a 
highly variable demand for resources as each squadron operates in their own self-interest.  
Under the status quo, each operational squadron and the Fleet Replacement 
Squadron (FRS) are responsible for their own scheduling requirements.  This includes 
launch and recover times, as well as the ranges and the type of refueling required between 
each sortie.  Each squadron creates a monthly training plan indicating a rough estimate of 
the required sorties.  This monthly planning document is taken and refined on a weekly 
basis to create a squadron weekly training schedule.  This product is used for planning 
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purposes by the other departments within the squadron.  Then, due to the complexity and 
required flexibility of each unit, they refine the weekly plan further into what becomes 
the signed daily flight schedule upon which each squadron will operate from.  These 
schedules are uniquely formatted for that squadron’s needs.  The daily flight schedule is 
disseminated to the various departments within the squadron and base support activities 
for execution the following day.  This is the first time that stakeholders external to the 
squadron see the operational plan, in many cases this is less than 12 hours prior to the 
first launch. 
Much like the tragedy of the commons, the current scheduling systems do not 
allow for efficient utilization of limited resources such as refueling assets and training 
ranges.  High demand variability in the current system results in lost training, man-hours, 
and flight hours.  These losses in efficiency lead to critical delays in aircraft operations 
throughout flight schedule execution. 
3. Type Wing Leadership 
The U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College completed a study in 2009 
addressing the U.S. Air Force’s rising energy prices, aging aircraft, and stressed defense 
budgets (Spencer, 2009).  The report concluded that wing leaders “are positioned 
perfectly to establish a new paradigm and promote the cultural shift necessary to reduce 
the stress on the fleet” (Spencer, 2009).  This Air Force study applies in many ways to the 
research questions answered in this MBA professional report.  Naval Aviation is in a 
similar predicament in that it has invested in high fidelity simulators, reduced their flying 
hour program to the lowest acceptable level, and maximized maintenance quality 
assurance at the squadron level.  The Air Force’s stressed defense spending budget 
experiences are similar to the Navy’s today.  Therefore, as the cost to operate rises in the 
face of economic uncertainty, Naval Aviation leadership is well poised to lead a solution 
for a more efficient and effective flying force.  Furthermore, no one knows the manning, 
training, and equipping resource requirements better than the type wing commander.   
The Spencer study is appropriately titled The Precious Sortie (2009).  According 
to the Energy Conservation Charter endorsed by CNAF in 2010, the Navy’s objective is 
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not to reduce flying hours, but to reduce the gallons of fuel consumed while executing 
those flying hours (CNAF, 2010).  This project supports the Navy’s premise that flight 
hours should not be reduced further and that simulator usage is likely already maximized.  
A focus on flight operations, therefore, is the next step in the series of potential energy 
conservation measures.   
Optimizing the “low-hanging fruit” options of reducing flight hours and 
increasing simulator usage is complete.  Consequently, Naval Aviation ought to revisit 
and evaluate their existing cultural and procedural norms.  It is extremely important that 
every pilot realize that sorties are no longer “cheap” (Spencer, 2009).  This will take 
leadership from the top to accomplish.  For example, as the F-35 Lightning II’s initial 
operational capability (IOC) date continues to move into the future, operational pressures 
fall on legacy aircraft such as F/A-18C/D, EA-6B, and AV-8B, which are aging with 
considerably higher maintenance costs to keep them available (M. Angelopoulos, 
personal communication, January 30, 2013).  Regardless of aircraft type, type wing 
commanders should promulgate changes to the administrative portions of every flight 
with a focus on fuel consumption.  After all, the flying hour program (FHP) is about 
quality and readiness, not quantity (Spencer, 2009).  Unfortunately, squadron flight hour 
execution incentives emphasize quantity over quality. 
Defense spending in the future is highly uncertain.  Instead of reactively shaping 
Naval Aviation operations around the amount of resourcing allocated, type wing 
commanders ought to preemptively focus on efficiencies on their own flight line.  A 
creative and innovative type wing commander can easily address squadron short-term 
demands and buy time for the delivery of newer aircraft and a more predictable fiscal 
landscape (Spencer, 2009). 
The type wing has the authority, flexibility, and autonomy to have an immediate 
and positive impact on their flight line.  Furthermore, no one is in a better position to lead 
cultural change on his or her flight line than the wing commander (Spencer, 2009).  
Through leadership, an incremental change in the behavior of subordinate squadrons 
results in less timing delays (in-flight and on the ground), less fuel consumed (gallons), 
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and a greater understanding by all (through education).  Greater understanding and 
communication of energy conservation priorities pave the way to cultural change. 
C. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
From the evidence presented in government, commercial, and academic reports in 
this MBA project, Naval Aviation must evaluate their longstanding business processes.  
Failure to advance operational policies in the current fiscal environment, as well as align 
to the aircraft procurement strategy, leads to a senseless waste of scarce resources.  
Energy management is now an operational and strategic imperative (Myers, 2011).  
This project develops a model using advanced simulation software for the purpose 
of answering the following three research questions: 
1. What impact would decreasing variation in aircraft arrival rate per hour 
have on gallons of fuel consumed during post-flight ground operations? 
2. How much time between flight events should squadrons plan for when 
developing their daily flight schedule? 
3. What is the marginal impact in both gallons of fuel consumed and aircraft 
operating cost from continuing operations in similar fashion as today with 
an all F/A-18 Super Hornet flight line in 2016? 
While a Navy-wide aviation model would provide a good tool for top-level 
decision makers, a tool focusing on aircraft with the highest fuel burn rate is most 
efficient.  The F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet cost an average of $113 (FY12) per 
minute to operate on the ground during post-flight operations (M. Angelopoulos, personal 
communication, January 30, 2013).  The goal of any policy recommendation from this 
study is to decrease the amount of time an aircraft spends on the ground without any 
impact to operational effectiveness, readiness, or safety.  All recommendations shall be in 
the form of gallons of fuel consumed relative to the current baseline of operations. 
The F/A-18 is operationally employed across the Naval Aviation Enterprise from 
11 different air installations.  Although each base is configured differently, applying 
lessons learned from this report to the other major aviation installations would provide a 
more comprehensive cost savings estimate.  Figure 5 depicts annual flight hours flown in 
non-operational, land-based, flight operations. EA-18G Growler operations are included 
due to similarities in ground operations.  Land-based flight events excluded from Figure 5 
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include all flight operations supporting research, test, and evaluation as well as Navy 
Flight Demonstration Squadron (Blue Angels).  In total, the Navy flew nearly 131,000 
F/A-18 hours ashore.  NAS Lemoore, highlighted in red, represents just 28 percent of the 
operations captured by this study.   
  
Figure 5.  2012 F/A-18 Flight Hours  
The model developed for this project could be modified to answer many questions 
requested by top-level decision makers.  Other fuel conserving opportunities beyond the 
scope of this study, but worthy of further investigation include the following: 
1. Remove all midboard and outboard pylons from F/A-18EF aircraft when 
operating ashore; 
2. Avoid filling external fuel tanks in F/A-18EF aircraft when operating in 
local airspace ranges ashore to the maximum extent practicable; 
3. For routine flight operations, delay engine starts to no earlier than 25 
minutes prior to scheduled takeoff; 
4. Do not further investigate military power takeoffs in tactical aircraft as a 
method for fuel savings; 
5. Conduct a cost benefit analysis for repairing the Flight-line Electrical 
Distribution Systems (FLEDS) as a measure to further delay engine start; 
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6. Research fuel burn and capacity in F-35C Lightning II aircraft and 
promulgate an appropriate hot refueling policy; 
7. Research, develop, and promulgate a dedicated chapter in each aircraft 
NATOPS Flight Manual addressing energy conservation techniques, 
practices, and procedures. 
D. METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
Using Naval Air Station Lemoore as the base case, a discrete event simulation 
model was developed to support each of several experiments.  The use of a simulation 
suite is necessary given the complexity of airfield operations and stochastic elements 
therein.  The model design and implementation effectively simulates aircraft arrival rates, 
ground operations, fuel trucks, and the impact of aircraft type (F/A-18CD versus F/A-
18EF) on gallons of fuel consumed and aircraft operating cost.  Furthermore, the 
stochastic simulation approach utilized in this study models variation, both inherent and 
network effects, found throughout post-flight ground operations and the impact on both 
fuel consumption and operating cost. 
The dataset supporting the model consists of 21, land-based, fly days from NAS 
Lemoore during August 2012.  In total, there were nearly 2,600 flight events and more 
than 3,400 refueling events engaged in fuel truck and hot skid refueling.  Data from 16 
Lemoore-based F/A-18 squadrons adequately represents each of the training phases in the 
27-month FRTP cycle.  Moreover, NAS Lemoore air wings were returning from 
deployment, conducting final pre-deployment training, or involved in detachments to 
other air installations. 
Using actual operational flight and cost data, a simulation was developed using 
the Simio software suite.  The model is capable of evaluating numerous policy inputs by 
quantifying the results in both gallons of fuel consumed and aircraft operating costs 
(maintenance and fuel).  Although flight data was available for the entire operational day, 
this study focuses its research questions on the period of 0800 to 1759 daily.  It is during 
this period that the application of collaborative decision-making principles would likely 
yield the best results.   
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The first series of experiments evaluates aircraft arrivals through slot management 
techniques.  Widely used in the commercial industry, de-peaking arrivals during periods 
of high demand increases efficiency in ground operations (Ball, Vossen, & Hoffman, 
2001).  Understanding how cost responds to changes in arrival rate determines how much 
control top-level decision makers are willing to make to minimize cost.  This study 
provides 12 slot management policy options from which leadership may choose.   
On November 23, 2011, Commander, Naval Air Forces issued a mandate for all 
aircraft refueling to leverage the fuel trucks to the maximum extent practicable (Myers, 
2011).  The second experiment performed using the model is analysis of four different 
aircraft ground turnaround policies.  At each policy level, the marginal differences in 
both gallons of fuel consumed and aircraft operating cost are plotted.  Using sound 
statistical analysis of real world data, this study provides the leadership with several 
policy options from which to choose. 
The final experiment assesses the cost of inaction in adopting a slot management 
policy, a ground turnaround policy, or both.  Now through 2016, NAS Lemoore’s flight 
line will transition six F/A-18C squadrons to the newer F/A-18EF as well as receive two 
new squadrons from NAS Oceana, VA in support of the Navy’s “pivot to the Pacific” 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. AIRFIELD DEMAND MANAGEMENT 
Aircraft arrival rates have a critical role in resource allocation in high volume 
airfields.  Some of the principal limiting factors for civilian and military airports are the 
amount of turnaround time between flight events and aircraft servicing resources.  There 
are a limited number of aircraft and resources available in this equation and finding the 
correct balance should pave the way toward improved efficiencies and cost savings.  
Civilian airports experiencing high traffic volume have turned to the process of assigning 
specific arrival times, or slots to air carriers as a proven technique for reliving the 
uncertainty of aircraft arrival.  Furthermore, implementing slot management leads 
directly to a more uniform arrival pattern through de-peaking high utilization rates.  In 
turn, by providing a more level demand signal for ground-resources, airports decrease the 
effects of delay and queues that increase exponentially throughout the day’s flight 
operations.  
1. Slot Management and Compression Algorithms 
Much research over the past two decades is directed toward increasing airport 
capacity through the optimization of existing resources.  One of the leading research arms 
of the FAA is the National Center of Excellence for Aviation Operations Research 
(NEXTOR).  NEXTOR is a consortium of eight U.S. universities supporting research on 
a wide variety of aviation issues.  In 2004, Ravi Sankararaman published his University 
of Maryland NEXTOR thesis on slot exchange systems in air traffic management (ATM).  
The use of arrival slots during ground delay programs improves resource utilization and 
fully supports the collaborative decision-making (CDM) philosophy.  This thesis in 
particular discusses the benefits and performance metrics of two slot management 
mechanisms called compression and slot credit substitution (SCS).  The mechanisms 
differ in that the FAA manages compression slots external to the air carrier, while slot 
credits are internally managed by the individual airlines (Sankararaman, 2004). 
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Growth in air traffic demand in the U.S. has led to congestion at many airports.  
This congestion leads to significant delays and, in 2000, cost the airline industry a record 
$6.5 billon (Sankararaman, 2004).  Not surprisingly, there are a lot of initiatives 
underway to improve efficiency by alleviating congestion.  One such strategy is through 
ground delay programs (GDP).  When aircraft arrival rates exceed airport capacity, a 
GDP is initiated by the FAA to limit aircraft demand at that airport.  This in turn ensures 
the capacities of terminals, gates, taxiways, and other ground resources are not exceeded 
as well.  Implementation of GDPs and other CDM program elements benefit not one 
airline or airport but the entire air transportation network through impacts down-range 
(Sankararaman, 2004). 
Employing collaborative decision tools, airlines communicate real-time cancelled 
or delayed flight events to the FAA.  When enough airlines have reported cancellations or 
delays, the FAA runs a compression algorithm to move forward other delayed flights.  
The idea is that when the airlines work together to communicate vacated arrival slots, 
other airlines can take advantage of the slack capacity.  Compressions are problematic for 
the airlines when the FAA delays the algorithm or chooses not to execute at all 
(Sankararaman, 2004).  When the FAA does not execute a compression, those available 
slots from cancellations go unused and result in airline costs that could have been 
avoided.  The priority for flights pulled forward are based on their published arrival in the 
Official Airline Guide (OAG).  This ration-by-schedule (RBS) technique results in slots 
being assigned to airlines as opposed to specific flights (Sankararaman, 2004).  This 
important distinction serves to motivate airlines to report cancellations or delays in a 
timely manner thereby maintaining their priority in the system.   
In the case of slot credit substitution (SCS), instead of a “batch process” 
completed by the FAA, SCS is orchestrated through individual airline requests.  
Achieving the same objective of increasing airport utilization, SCS does it in a different 
way.  SCS is fairly new and responds to the growing concern by the airlines that they do 
not have enough input into the slot management system during GDPs.  Furthermore, SCS 
is considered a conditional request where “an airline is willing to cancel one of its earlier 
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flights only if it is able to get a replacement slot that it desires” (Sankararaman, 2004).  It 
is clear that SCS processes require more collaboration to achieve an optimal solution. 
The results of the NEXTOR study revealed airlines using SCS at a greater rate 
than compression algorithms.  This is significant because when the FAA chooses not to 
compress, the airlines lose the potential benefit.  Furtheremore, the incentive to cancel 
flights is weakened believing the FAA will not make use of the vacated slots in a timely 
manner.  SCS results in a smooth aircraft arrival rate and subsequent ground traffic flow.  
Although the onus for slot substitution is brokered by individual airlines, the flexibility 
they enjoy greatly outweighs the administrative burden (Sankararaman, 2004). 
The concepts highlighted in the NEXTOR study could be adapted to demand 
management solutions for Naval Aviation.  This MBA project has a goal of improving 
refueling truck utilization, at the expense of hot pit refueling, by balancing demand for 
fuel resources.  As variation in aircraft arrivals (demand) is reduced, so too is the demand 
for fuel trucks.  This reduces the potential for long delays in aircraft refueling thus 
ensuring follow-on flights proceed as scheduled.  Bottom-line, increased collaboration 
between squadrons for slot arrival times may yield improved benefits for all stakeholders 
involved. 
2. Managing Aircraft Arrival Uncertainty 
In 2001, Michael Ball, Thomas Vossen, and Robert Hoffman conducted a 
NEXTOR demand analysis project at the University of Maryland.  Their report 
investigated the impact of CDM on aircraft arrival time uncertainty during GDP and the 
consequences of performance.  Although the concepts and definitions support the 
commercial transportation industry, the analysis and recommendations proposed are 
directly applicable to a host of defense applications, including the implementation of an 
aircraft arrival slot management system at naval air installations. 
Two models were introduced in this report including a stochastic integer 
programming (IP) and a simulation model (Ball et al., 2001).  In both applications, actual 
historical flight data was utilized.  Using these models, the researchers were able to 
simulate the impacts of CDM on the implementation of GDPs.  The purpose of a GDP is 
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to align aircraft arrival demand with airport capacity.  For example, if reduced weather 
visibility at a destination airport is preventing aircraft from landing, that airfield’s 
capacity is necessarily reduced.  A GDP, therefore, may be initiated by air traffic control, 
under the oversight of the FAA, as a temporary demand management measure.  
Essentially, GDPs hold aircraft on the ground at the originating airport until the 
destination airport has the capacity, or capability, to safely recover the aircraft.   
There were three focus areas identified in the study (Ball et al., 2001).  The first 
uses a simulation model to show how uncertainty of demand affects airborne arrival 
queues that, in turn, affect airport utilization rates.  The authors showed how destination 
airports could increase their aircraft arrival rates if unexpected cancellations were known 
ahead of time (Ball et al., 2001).  One of the key tenets of CDM is improved 
communication and information exchange not only between the airfield and air traffic 
control, but among the airlines as well.  Furthermore, decentralized decision making 
speeds up communication and ensures the impact of delays and cancellations are 
minimized.  Knowledge of cancellations frees up resources in secondary and tertiary 
service sectors thus further improving GDPs (Ball et al., 2001).  To prove this assertion 
through simulation, the authors depicted the destination airfield as a single-server 
queuing system.  When a GDP is in effect, arriving aircraft are assigned a unique 
sequence number, or slot time.  When cancellations are not communicated, unexpected 
gaps, or unused slots, result in inefficiencies at the destination.  This simulation showed 
how timely flight cancellation notifications improved aircraft arrival rates at destination 
airfields (Ball et al., 2001). 
The second focus area uses a stochastic IP model to calculate the best aircraft 
arrival rates in the face of demand uncertainty.  The report focuses on three main sources 
for demand uncertainty and the marginal effect on GDP performance, including 
unexpected arrivals (“pop-ups”), aircraft arrival time (“drift”), and cancellations (Ball et 
al., 2001).  Each of these sources changes the number of aircraft expected at the 
destination airport.  As changes in destination airport utilization occur, GDP performance 
is weakened from lack of accurate aircraft arrival information.  Pop-ups are easily 
understood as general aviation aircraft, military aircraft, and add-on flights by airlines.  
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Pop-ups are problematic because they are not in the Official Airline Guide (OAG) at the 
start of flight operations.  Drift, on the other hand, is typically caused by enroute 
congestion and late departures from originating airports.  The results of their analysis 
showed that limiting unknown cancellations to less than 15 percent; ensuring pop-up 
rates are less than 10 per hour; and holding arrival time slot error to less than 10 minutes 
will go a long way toward improving effectiveness in ground delay programs (Ball et al., 
2001).   
The last focus area in this report showed how timely cancellation notices reduce 
the uncertainty of flight arrival time.  The result of their analysis showed that drift, time 
variance in planned arrival had the greatest impact on airborne delay time (Ball et al., 
2001).  As variance in arrival time increased, so too were adverse impacts on GDP.  For 
this reason, the authors proved that when airborne aircraft were very early or late from 
their assigned slot time, the impact was likely uneconomical for all involved as an aircraft 
is forced to remain airborne until it can be sequenced in for landing (Ball et al., 2001).  
Other demand uncertainty unknowns, namely pop-ups and add-ons, further compound the 
effect of drift on airborne delay.   
This MBA project uses the NEXTOR study as motivation for the implementation 
of an arrival slot management system at naval air installations.  Loosely applying the 
article’s GDP concepts to post-flight refueling resourcing may reduce ground delays, 
increase fuel truck utilization, and decrease aircraft turnaround time.  All of these benefits 
reduce manpower cost, gallons of fuel consumed, and aircraft operating costs overall.   
3. De-peaking through Slot Management 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) conducted highly relevant demand 
management research as a temporary means of relieving airport congestion (Fan & 
Odoni, 2001).  Prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the National Airspace 
System was experiencing rapid growth in traffic volume amid a highly static airport 
operating environment.  With demand exceeding the capacities of many U.S. airports, 
much research was, and still is, necessary to keep flight delays under control (Fan & 
Odoni, 2001).  Leading into this project, a significant gap in research was quantifying the 
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impact that managing aircraft demand can yield.  The analysis presented here contrasted 
three airports of varying demand levels to assess the impact of managing demand. 
The authors chose three airports to represent the two capacity extremes, high and 
low, as well as an airport with increasing capacity concerns (Fan & Odoni, 2001).  Over 
the past 40 years, U.S. airports have used arrival slot management systems to control 
capacity at the busiest airports.  Additionally, almost every major European airport limits 
arrivals to those aircraft holding slots (Fan & Odoni, 2001).  Therefore, in answering 
MIT’s primary research question, demand can be managed by simply shifting aircraft 
from periods of high demand to low (de-peaking).  The author’s found that, in the near 
term, well-designed demand management systems can be far more effective than many 
other alternatives at controlling congestion for scarce resources (Fan & Odoni, 2001). 
The MIT queuing model used data from the OAG, or commercial airline flight 
schedule, to represent demand.  On the supply side, runway capacity limits as published 
with the FAA were captured in the model.  Analysis performed on the model’s outputs 
revealed that very small changes in runway capacity had a significant impact on airport 
congestion (Fan & Odoni, 2001).  The model showed an 80 percent reduction in total 
aircraft-hours whenever the slot management system was in use (Fan & Odoni, 2001).     
Another option presented by the authors for managing airport capacity was by 
leveling demand peaks through time-of-day shifting.  The model implemented a use case 
by level loading flight operations across the entire day without variance (Fan & Odoni, 
2001).  Although an extreme situation, the authors were attempting to show the 
significance of managing demand peaks.  The results showed total aircraft delays were 
reduced 40 percent further during peak periods (Fan & Odoni, 2001).  Therefore, it is 
clear that a combination of managing both arrival time and level loading demand results 
had the most significant impact increasing airport efficiency.   
Where the MIT study precisely managed runway resources through slot 
management and de-peaking, this MBA project applies the same two-fold combination to 
the demand for refueling resources.  Fan and Odoni made clear that merely implementing 
a slot management system without level loading total demand would not be particularly 
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effective (2001).  This project will simulate the combined effects of fuel consumption on 
the ground by implementing a slot management system and de-peaking aircraft arrivals 
across the period in the fly day having the greatest demand variation. 
4. Delay Propagation 
Many decisions require cost data to truly understand outcome magnitude and risk.  
After years of data collection and analysis, Andrew Cook, Graham Tanner, and Stephen 
Anderson published their findings in support of the Performance Review Unit at 
Eurocontrol in Brussels, Belgium (2004).  The authors conducted the study while 
attending the University of Westminster in London with the objective of quantifying the 
true cost of aircraft delays both airborne and on the ground.  Most cost benefit analysts 
focus purely on aircraft operating costs, such as fuel, when determining the cost per 
minute of flight and ground operations (Cook, Tanner, & Anderson, 2004).  This study 
expands the discussion to include direct and indirect operating costs such as maintenance 
parts support, airport facilities and infrastructure, air traffic control services, crew 
salaries, and fixed staff costs.   
Data in support of the researchers’ analysis came from 12 airports operating 12 
different aircraft types.  Delay costs were captured from day to day operations and 
subsequently broken down into their fixed and variable components to ultimately 
determine the true direct and indirect operating cost (Cook et al., 2004).  Not surprisingly, 
the cost to operating an aircraft airborne was significantly greater than on the ground.  
Furthermore, as delay increases in magnitude, so too does total cost to the airlines (Cook 
et al., 2004).  Another lesson learned in their findings was the impact of delay 
predictability on the bottom-line.  Specifically, the lack of information regarding a 
particular delay and the anticipated length of it is the primary cause of financial losses 
suffered (Cook et al., 2004).  When the length of a delay is known, subsequent flight 
events can be adjusted to compensate and minimize its impact.  The final conclusion of 
the study was with respect to delay propagation.  Flight operations form a network of 
arrivals and departures and, therefore, a delay in any one “leg” has a cascading effect  
 
28 
until the end of the same operational day (Cook et al., 2004).  This “reactionary” or 
propagating effect was captured in the authors’ research filling a significant gap in the 
current literature. 
Minimizing variability in the length of known delays and monitoring the 
reactionary impacts of delays are two techniques to further reduce operating costs to the 
airlines (Cook et al., 2004).  The first component could be satisfied with increased 
communication through collaborative decision-making (CDM).  Although delay timing 
will likely be refined over time, premature information is proven to be better than no 
information at all.  The second component, delay propagation, should motivate earlier 
flight events to perform precisely as scheduled.  The longer the daily fly window is, the 
longer a delay on the first flight of the day has to impact total aircraft operations.  The 
simulation developed to support this project must also capture both types of delay, 
inherent and network effects.   
Specific direct and indirect costs to F/A-18 operations were captured in the NAS 
Lemoore study (Hicks, Santos, Cook, & Lassen, 2004).  This MBA project developed an 
airport simulation to explore the impacts of various demand, delay, and queuing 
characteristics.  Knowledge of delay propagation coupled with explicit costing data is a 
recognized gap in the literature being advanced by our project. 
The rising costs of airport operations have increased awareness to energy 
conservation initiatives and an appreciation for managing unnecessary delays in ground 
operations.  In 2009, Vikrant Vaze of MIT evaluated airport delays and the effects on 
demand using a stochastic model.  The model simulated the effects of multiple variables 
including weather, traffic volume, equipment readiness, and runway closure (Vaze, 
2009).  Taken one step further, this model was robust enough to show the impact of each 
variable on delays in the greater National Airspace System.  The ability to hold one or 
more variables constant while changing another offered great insights into those 
attributes having the greatest impact on managing delays and demand for scarce 
resources.   
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The MIT study examined the dynamic aspects of delay queuing from a cost 
perspective of marginal changes in demand (Vaze, 2009).  He found the addition of a 
single user on the margins could not be evaluated independently.  Given the complexity 
of airport operations, incremental costs by any one stakeholder has a cascading cost 
impact on the rest of the system.  Although delays are typical of airfields experiencing 
demand in excess of capacity, this is not always the case.  For example, most military 
airfields operate well below capacity thresholds but experience delays at the hold short 
for takeoff, delays in flight sequencing in for landing, and delays for cold truck and hot 
pit refueling.  Vaze revealed the same problem in his analysis as well (2009).  
Operational delays from high variability in demand for ground services such as refueling 
impacted the daily flight schedule (Vaze, 2009).  Perhaps the most significant conclusion 
by the MIT study was how small reductions in demand variability during critical times 
yield exponential reductions in aggregate aircraft delay. 
Naval Aviation can benefit from the analysis and conclusions in the Vaze article 
(2009).  It appears that incremental changes in the management of military flight 
operations could yield significant cost savings through delay reduction.  An area this 
MBA project aims to improve over the MIT study is with respect to incentivizing ground 
resource allocation.  Specifically, squadrons on the flight line must be willing to give up a 
small amount of control over their flight schedule to receive the benefits of better access 
to airspace, increased readiness, and reduced aircraft turnaround time between flight 
events. 
B. COLLABORATIVE DECISION-MAKING (CDM) 
Naval air installations have many ground operations decision makers.  These 
range from air traffic control to squadron operations and from fuel services division to 
meteorology.  Each stakeholder plays a vital role in the safe and expeditious of flow 
aircraft into and out of the airport.  However, our research shows that these stakeholders 
do not share a common understanding of current operations and therefore make decisions 
unaware of their impact to other parts of the airfield.  It is from this backdrop that 
collaborative decision-making (CDM) was first brought to light in the early 1990s.   
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The flow of information throughout an organization is necessary for improving 
aircraft traffic flow.  In this section, we highlight several studies showing the positive 
impact that CDM can have on fiscal and operational performance as well as the cultural 
challenges preventing their implementation.  When representatives from the squadron, 
wing, and airfield join together to collaborate, share in mutual understanding, and define 
their unique problems and opportunities, the entire operation stands to benefit.  Although 
the Navy’s current cadre of decision makers are extremely talented, the sheer volume and 
timeliness of such judgments may very well require the assistance of an automated 
system to reach their full potential. 
1. Traffic Flow Management  
In 2007, the National Center of Excellence for Aviation Operations Research 
(NEXTOR) released a report highlighting traffic flow management (TFM) delay costs of 
$31.2 billion per year in fuel, crew, and other costs (Ball et al., 2010).  Over 15 years 
earlier, Andrew Lacher and Gary Klein (1993) of the MITRE Corporation conducted a 
study of the U.S. airline industry and their application of CDM with the FAA.  Both of 
these studies highlight the amount of time required to effect cultural change and the total 
cost to the airline industry for failing to operate efficiently.  Although 20 years have 
passed in the commercial sector since the Larcher and Klein study was first assembled, 
many of the same issues they highlighted are commonplace in today’s military 
operational environment.   
TFM is the process by which the FAA balances capacity and demand for National 
Airspace System (NAS) resources, including traffic routes and military ranges (Lacher & 
Klein, 1993).  This study revealed the FAA was making decisions in support of the air 
carriers with very little information available (Lacher & Klein, 1993).  Improved 
communication, collaboration, and coordination are critical among stakeholders in 
achieving reduced congestion from delays, improved NAS resource utilization, and 
reduced overall fuel consumption (Lacher & Klein, 1993).   
MITRE Corporation collected data from seven airports of varying capacities with 
emphasis on air carrier operational decision-making (Lacher & Klein, 1993).  A thorough 
31 
understanding of each airfield’s operations was accomplished through observations, 
interviews, flight schedule analysis, and operational analysis.  Although the level of 
operations varied in each of the seven airfields, several collaboration problems were 
consistently noted (Lacher & Klein, 1993).   
Throughout daily flight operations, changes occur in physical and operational 
limits, weather, aircraft separation criteria, arrival sector configurations, and controller 
proficiency.  The dynamic operating environment was further complicated by the amount 
of arriving air traffic and real-time flight cancellations, delays, and add-ons by air carriers 
(Lacher & Klein, 1993).  The only operational element that appeared constant in the 
study was change itself.  Continuous change inherent in flight operations affected all 
stakeholders simultaneously yet, without a collaborative decision-making tool, left many 
to make critical decisions on their own with little regard to the other airline and airport 
managers. 
In a TFM decision-making environment, most decisions must be made in a timely 
manner.  Often, decisions delayed just one minute can have a devastating effect.  
Furthermore, since operational information necessary to make many decisions is 
dynamic, decisions must be made after monitoring trends over time (Lacher & Klein, 
1993).  Weather changes, runway and taxi configuration changes, airfield emergencies, 
and other variables are difficult to forecast accurately.  Therefore, the MITRE 
Corporation recommends a CDM decision support system be implemented to share data 
between the air carriers and the FAA in near real-time (Lacher & Klein, 1993). 
The TFM analysis in this study stops short of developing a stochastic model to 
simulate the operational environment and quantify improvement opportunities.  This 
shortfall represents a research gap that this MBA professional report aims to fill.  The 
gross lack of communication and collaboration between air carriers, air traffic controllers, 
and ground resource providers is well documented in the study.   
Larcher and Klein’s (1993) research found the following: 
It seems clear that whatever specific operational concept is implemented 
for TFM, a major improvement is needed in the match between the scope 
of decisions and the granularity of available information.  This 
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improvement is more one of policy and procedure than of technology.  
Communication, coordination, and collaboration technologies merely 
provide a means for implementing more effective organizational policies 
and procedures; implementation of new technologies without the 
associated organizational changes historically has not been shown to 
improve efficiency.  
Applying the recommendations outlined in the MITRE Corporation study to naval 
air installations is a best commercial practice that makes operational sense in land-based 
military operations.  To help illustrate, allow air carriers to represent squadrons and the 
FAA/NAS to represent base operations.  Changing the terms and applying them to the 
discussion above should reveal how MITRE’s arguments hold true today in Naval 
Aviation. 
The lack of communication and collaboration among squadrons, air traffic 
controllers, base operations, and fuel service providers is well known.  This MBA report 
explores the impact CDM policies and procedures have on aircraft delays and fuel 
consumption. 
2. Aviation Decision Support Systems 
An expert in the field of aviation decision support systems, Professor Kostantinos 
G. Zografos of Athens University, revealed SPADE DSS to the European Commission in 
2010.  Supporting Platform for Airport Decision-Making and Efficiency (SPADE) 
provides, for the first time, a decision support tool integrating both flight and ground 
operations offering solution recommendations complete with resource trade-off 
information (Zografos, Madas, & Salouras, 2010).  Until SPADE, several attempts were 
made to capture frequently asked questions and decisions made by aviation managers.  In 
each case, robust modeling and simulation of a particular subset of an airport’s total 
operation was completed.  SPADE, however, addressed the interdependencies of several 
airport and airspace systems as well as the trade-offs necessary to ensure the best total 
airport performance (Zografos et al., 2010).  The principal U.S. airport modeling software 
suites were developed by MITRE Corporation, Preston Aviation Solutions (Boeing 
Company), and International Air Transport Association (IATA).  These joint government 
and commercial air operations management suites are fast, accurate, and offer many of 
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same tools as SPADE.  However, the U.S. systems are not very adaptable, they are 
difficult to install, and are difficult for end users to interpret the results (Zografos et al., 
2010).  For these reasons, the European SPADE provides a well-integrated decision 
support solution to fill these modeling gaps and capabilities. 
The SPADE software suite addresses the efficiency of the entire airport complex 
while simultaneously evaluating the interdependencies between flight and ground 
operations.  This MBA project benefits from the motivation and underlying framework of 
SPADE.  Specifically, understanding how detailed, tactical decisions impact the larger, 
strategic airport operation is vital to improving efficiency and effectiveness overall.  
Every decision made by an airport or air carrier stakeholder results in trade-offs.  These 
trade-offs could be time, money, performance, or any combination of the three (Zografos 
et al., 2010).  Furthermore, the consequences of one decision may have both positive and 
negative impacts on one or more related processes.  The SPADE framework first captures 
supply-side metrics including runways, taxiways, apron (ramp) areas, and flow facilities 
(ground resources) (Zografos et al., 2010).  The second framework layer applies CDM to 
supply-side constraints in an attempt to optimize their ability to meet or exceed the air 
traffic demand signal.  Changes in the final layer, traffic volume (demand-side), from 
flight modifications, cancellations, and additions impact the supply of resources.  These 
impacts manifest in trade-offs such as reduced ground resource levels, delay queues, 
capacity limitations, and safety concerns (Zografos et al., 2010). 
Given the predictable nature of individual stakeholder decision-making inputs and 
processes, SPADE successfully developed “use cases” to package the operating 
environment (Zografos et al., 2010).  These encapsulated tools enabled an integrated 
approach to measuring airport effectiveness and their associated trade-offs.  In similar 
fashion, this MBA project brings together observed supply- and demand-side constraints 
in a simulation to analyze post-flight ground operations.  Focusing on SPADE’s third 
framework layer, our project introduces a variety of potential policy recommendations to 
the simulation to reform the imbalance between supply and demand.  Ensuring a 
predicable demand signal for airport and ground resources may yield a significant 
improvement in total air efficiency and effectiveness at military airfields. 
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3. United Airlines DSS Case Study 
The dynamic nature of flight operations and complexity of resourcing decisions is 
highly evident in the commercial airline industry.  United Airlines, for example, 
implemented the System Operations Advisor (SOA) system in 1992.  Although this 
system is 20 years old, the fiscal and administrative benefits are highly relevant today and 
even more so for a naval airfield that has never adopted such a system.  This system helps 
decision makers promulgate delay management solutions in near real-time to minimize 
total cost.  During a six-month beta test, UAL saved 27,000 delay minutes amounting to 
more than $900,000 (FY12) (Rakshit, Krishnamurthy, & Yu, 1992). 
United Airlines (UAL) is a good example from which to draw lessons learned for 
Naval Aviation.  First, UAL is a diverse airline operating seven different types of aircraft.  
Second, in 1992, UAL operated more than 2,000 flights daily.  Lastly, UAL launches and 
recovers at a wide variety of airports both domestically and internationally.  The Navy 
has more aircraft types and twice the number of daily sorties lending further credence to 
the potential savings from sound operational decisions.   
UAL’s SOA decision support system increased effectiveness by applying linear 
programming logic to a dynamic set of flight data in real-time.  These continuously 
computed, objective function, solutions ensure decisions are efficient from a total system 
perspective (Rakshit et al., 1992).  Additionally, many operational decisions are made 
and disseminated on very short timelines.  When decisions in this environment are made 
late, or not at all, the result can be profoundly negative on the bottom-line.  SOA arms 
stakeholders with information “to make decisions on manpower allocation, cancellations, 
delays, pilot and flight attendant staffing, as well as flight planning and dispatch to reduce 
deviation from the schedule and operation plans prepared in advance” (Rakshit et al., 
1992). 
There are five principal stakeholders involved in United’s system, including 
meteorology, flight dispatch, flight crew management, inflight crew management, and 
system operations control.  This MBA project proposes a similar subset of five 
stakeholders including meteorology, base operations (air traffic control and fuels 
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division), squadron operations, squadron maintenance control, and type wing operations.  
Although many more users within UAL’s operational hierarchy have access to SOA, only 
the five principal functional teams are authorized to take action on the solutions 
recommended.   
In a world of infinite resources, the airlines would have an unlimited number of 
spare aircraft to fill forward when problems with the flight schedule arises.  However, not 
only is it cost prohibitive to operate such a large fleet of aircraft but having them 
prepositioned at the right airport, at the right time, is unrealistic.  Furthermore, because of 
time constraints, stakeholders are under enormous stress to make the correct operational 
decision.  Mangers simply do not have the time to determine the most optimal cost 
solution for the airline with respect to flight cancellations or delays (Rakshit et al., 1992).  
Couple this challenge with as many as 15 such decisions simultaneously and the need for 
an automated decision support system is required.   
Prior to SOA, and in the current Naval Aviation operational environment, many 
stakeholders delay flights or forgo non-essential aircraft maintenance in an effort to meet 
the demands of the preplanned schedule.  The highest aircraft readiness rates are seen at 
the beginning of the day.  Then, as aircraft problems from weather and maintenance 
occur throughout the day, delays grow exponentially costing increasingly amounts of 
time, money, and resources.  The Navy continues to struggle from the same problems 
today making UAL’s SOA solution still relevant.  Knowing when to cancel or delay a 
particular sortie and what the impact of such a tactical change has on the greater 
operational environment (e.g., taxiways, post-flight refueling systems, operational ranges, 
and National Airspace System) is lost by many stakeholders (Rakshit et al., 1992). 
C. AVIATION ENERGY CONSERVATION RESEARCH 
Efforts to control rising energy costs through operational efficiencies and reduced 
fuel consumption are common Naval Aviation objectives.  Several quantitative and 
qualitative studies over the past decade provide valuable insights into aircraft post-flight 
operations.  However, in each case, there is a recommendation for further study to 
address aircraft arrival rates on the demand side.  Understanding the fully burdened cost 
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of fuel truck and hot skid refueling processes as well as the optimal ratio between the two 
is important, but fall short of the true reason behind ground operation inefficiencies.  This 
MBA project leverages all three of the following studies by taking them to the next level 
of understanding through an analysis of aircraft arrival variance. 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis of F/A-18 Refueling Operations 
All organizations must manage resource limitations in material, manpower, time 
and technology.  Referred to as capacity management, this literature review section 
considers a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) cost-benefit analysis attempting to remove 
bottlenecks in refueling resources to reduce fuel expenditures (Hicks et al., 2004).  
Although data was compiled from observations at a single naval air installation, the 
lessons learned provide a solid foundation from which to base this MBA project.  
A CNO directive for operational commands to find cost savings in all facets of 
their operations is what prompted the study (Hicks et al., 2004).  Hicks and his team 
analyzed the two principal methods to refuel an aircraft, cold (trucks) refueling or hot pit 
refueling.  The principal difference between the two refueling procedures is with respect 
to the aircraft’s engines.  When truck refueling, the engines are off-line and, when hot pit 
refueling, the engines are on-line.  The research team compared these two refueling 
methodologies on the basis of cost and determined that it was much cheaper from an 
enterprise perspective to refuel using trucks than with hot pits. This study resulted in the 
lease of several additional fuel trucks for this naval air installation in an effort to reduce 
the demand for hot pit refueling resources. 
From a capacity management perspective, this cost-benefit analysis highlights the 
demand for fuel greatly exceeded the base’s truck refueling capacity.  The authors discuss 
a host of limitations and cost drivers to include time, manpower (active duty and 
civilian), refueling truck contracts, and aircraft component wear and tear (avionics and 
engine) (Hicks et al., 2004).  When demand exceeds capacity, queues develop leading to 
further waste in these scarce resources (Fan & Odoni, 2001).  Losses in equipment, 
manpower, and time directly impact the operating budget, which could better be applied 
airborne in the form of additional training and proficiency. 
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This study was successful in that it led to the purchase of additional refueling 
trucks.  The additional refueling trucks reduced the usage dependence on hot refueling 
resources thereby reducing cost, unnecessary wear and tear on aircraft components, and 
led to increased preventative maintenance opportunities as no maintenance can be 
performed with the engines online (Hicks et al., 2004).  Although cost reduction was a 
key objective in the CNO’s directive, this research falls short in addressing variability in 
the demand for fuel resources.  For example, doubling the number of refueling trucks 
may increase capacity, but this is arbitrary in an environment where demand cannot be 
accurately predicted.  This MBA project attempts to fill this gap in research by building 
on the Hick’s study through an evaluation of the benefits of smoothing out fuel demand. 
Any policy or recommendation must be adaptable to meeting the demands of a 
rapidly changing flight line.  Many aviation communities in the Navy are in transition 
from older (legacy) aircraft to modern airframes.  Furthermore, these modern airframes 
have significantly larger internal fuel capacities than the fuel required of aircraft in the 
Hicks study (CNO, 2011a, 2012a; Hicks, 2004).  For example, in 2004, Hicks based his 
conclusions from the perspective of Naval Air Station Lemoore.  At that time, the airfield 
operated primarily F/A-18C/D Hornet aircraft.  By 2016, however, the airfield will 
exclusively operate the newer F/A-18E/F Super Hornet with a significantly larger fuel 
capacity (CNO, 2011a, 2012a).  Increased aircraft fuel capacity not only requires more 
fuel, but more time to refuel post-flight.  The decision to refuel an F/A-18E today using 
the hot pits requires much greater scrutiny than the study’s F/A-18C years ago.  Other 
emerging examples include the internal fuel capacities of F-35B Lightning II being 44 
percent larger than the AV-8B Harrier II and F-35C being 42 percent larger than F/A-18C 
(CNO, 2011b, 2013).   
2. Improving Refueling Operations Ashore 
Augmenting the 2004 NAS Lemoore study, Matthew Geiser of NPS addressed a 
critical gap in research related to ground refueling (2012).  In this follow-on study, the 
author approached the fuel demand problem through improvements in coordination, 
dispatch, and communication (Geiser, 2012).  He focused on the appropriate 
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communication flow between ground refueling truck operators and the squadron 
maintenance personnel calling for services.  Furthermore, this thesis explored ways to 
better anticipate the demand for aircraft fuel, minimize the number of truck refills 
between aircraft servicing, and thus decrease total refueling time (Geiser, 2012). 
Geiser found similar results to the Hicks study in that improved communication 
and collaboration alone did not provide the most efficient solution (2012).  Each study 
showed significant improvement, but both failed to address the underlying problem in 
balancing the fuel demand signal.  Geiser concluded that aircraft typically launched  
and recovered in clusters (2012).  These clusters created periods of demand peaks  
and valleys throughout the day.  These large fluctuations were further complicated by 
flight additions, cancellations, and modifications.  Therefore, policy and procedure 
recommendations are necessary to smooth out these peaks and valleys (Geiser, 2012).  A 
smooth demand signal for post-flight refueling resources will likely reduce the number of 
trucks necessary to have on hand, reduce existing wait times to be refueled, and greatly 
enhance efficiency across the flight line (Geiser, 2012).  This MBA project builds upon 
Geiser’s study by evaluating the benefits of level loading aircraft demand through 
implementing an aircraft arrival slot management system. 
Airfield capacity management problems are not unique to Naval Aviation within 
the DoD.  The Air Force has also analyzed the flow of aircraft into, and out of, its 
airfields. Heath Rushing wrote his thesis at the Air Force Institute of Technology 
addressing the effects of ground refueling capacity on airfield throughput (1997).  His 
analysis utilized a Markovian decision process to examine aircraft throughput in refueling 
operations (Rushing, 1997).  The models used in the study enabled the user to input a 
variety of variables affecting ground-refueling operations with a goal of balancing 
demand within capacity constraints (Rushing, 1997).  Furthermore, each model was 
programmed to minimize the average time each aircraft spends in the refueling system. 
The research deliverable was a series of linear programming models for 
operational planners to use in setting refueling policy to minimize wait queues and 
increase throughput (Rushing, 1997).  According to the study, setting an appropriate 
refueling policy for the resources available is critical.  He suggests that refueling policy 
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could be enhanced through an analysis of aircraft arrival rates and departure processes at 
each airfield (Rushing, 1997).  This study provides a solid basis for our MBA project.  
Several of the literature review articles covered herein offer tools to help decision makers 
manage refueling operations.  However, each falls short of addressing the underlying 
problem of balancing the demand-side of the equation.  This MBA project builds on the 
Rushing thesis by quantifying the impact of smoothing out the demand for post-flight 
refueling resources.  
3. Cold Truck and Hot Pit Refueling: Ratio Analysis 
The Navy contracted a commercial strategy and technology firm in 2012 to 
analyze ground-refueling operations at NAS Oceana.  Building on the Hicks study of 
2004, Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (BAH) identified the optimal ratio between truck and 
hot pit refueling (2012).  BAH concluded by recommending the optimal number of 
trucks, minimal fuel truck capacity, and further increases in operational efficiency (2012).  
This study provides expert insight into the management of refueling resources, 
but, again, fails to address the root cause of demand variability.  BAH contends that 
balancing the demand for fuel would significantly reduce cost and improve efficiency as 
a recommendation for further study (2012).  BAH did, however, maximize the use of 
existing infrastructure at NAS Oceana through refueling policy.  Although improvements 
were substantiated, more could be accomplished by way of reduced cost, reduced delay, 
and improved efficiency if the demand signal was balanced.  Maximizing the use of 
ground refueling resources is not an issue of efficiency as much as it is about managing 
demand to accurately use scarce resources.  
D. ADDITIONAL READING 
Appendix B is included at the end of this MBA project for those readers desiring 
additional CDM information.  We have included five successful applications of 
collaborative decision support systems as well as an introduction to working through 
many of the challenges associated with cultural change.  Although these articles are not 
critical to understanding the objectives of our project, each provide a foundation upon 
which a potential solution may lay.  It is likely that a non-material solution to managing 
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aircraft arrival variance resides in leveraging existing government systems such as 






A discrete event simulation model of Naval Air Station Lemoore was designed 
and implemented to support an extensive series of experiments.  A simulation is 
necessary given the complexity of airfield operations, non-linear relationships, stochastic 
elements, and high levels of dependency among system components.  The dynamic 
nature of simulation enabled experiments in aircraft arrival rates, ground turnaround 
policies, airfield refueling resources, and the impact of aircraft type (F/A-18CD versus 
F/A-18EF) to better understand time as a cost driver for gallons of fuel consumed during 
ground operations.  Furthermore, the stochastic simulation approach utilized in our 
analysis models variation, both inherent and network effects, found throughout the post-
flight ground operations phase. 
All data supporting this MBA Project stems from actual operational and aircraft 
maintenance cost data during August 2012.  The dataset supporting the model’s 
development consisted of nearly 2,600 flight events by 16 Lemoore based F/A-18 
squadrons.  This month was chosen for currency, complexity, and its reflection of 
squadrons in various phases of the 27-month FRTP training cycle.  During August, NAS 
Lemoore air wings were returning from deployment, going on deployment, or involved in 
detachments to other air installations.  There was even one squadron in transition from 
the F/A-18C to F/A-E Super Hornet (W. Straker, personal communication, May 2, 2013). 
Over the next two years, 2014 through 2016, two F/A-18EF squadrons will 
execute a homeport shift from NAS Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA to NAS Lemoore (W. 
Straker, personal communication, May 2, 2013).  Furthermore, six of the remaining F/A-
18C squadrons in Lemoore will also transition to the new Super Hornet and represents a 
completely new challenge for administrative and operational stakeholders.  The F/A-
18EF’s internal fuel capacity is 28 percent larger than the legacy Hornet, thus requiring 
additional servicing time between flight events (CNO, 2011a, 2012a). 
42 
A. SIMULATION 
Using actual operational and cost data, a simulation was developed using the 
Simio software suite.  Simio is a SIMulation modeling framework based on Intelligent 
Objects.  Simio is an industry leading, object-oriented modeling framework that supports 
both discrete and continuous distributions as well as event, monitoring, sub-processes, 
and agent modeling views.  Figure 6 depicts an overview of the graphical user interface 
as well as some of its basic functionality. 
 
Figure 6.  Simio Facility View of Airport Simulation 
The first step in developing a suitable model to answer our research questions is 
having a thorough understanding of the current system.  All data contained in this model 
originated from the staffs of Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), Commander, Strike 
Fighter Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CSFWP); and NAS Lemoore (NASL).  Once 
developed, the model was validated as an accurate representation of reality.  Although 
flight data was available for the entire operational day, this study focuses its efforts on the 
period of 0800 to 1759.  It is during this period that the application of collaborative 
decision-making principles would likely yield the best results.  After 1800, there are new 
operational planning factors to contend with, least of which are field hours, training range 
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availability, and solar/lunar implications.  Figure 7 depicts the number of aircraft arrivals 
by both day of the week and time of the day (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 
15, 2013).  Observe the hourly differences in the number of arriving aircraft exceeding 15 
aircraft in some cases.  This figure helped shape our assertion that the focus for this study 
be limited to the period from 0800 to 1759. 
 
Figure 7.  Daily Aircraft Arrival Patterns 
Variation in aircraft arrivals is best described by the standard deviation of the 
mean of arriving aircraft per hour.  Figure 8 depicts the range of standard deviations of 
arriving aircraft per hour during August 2012.  Of the 21 fly days in August, two-thirds of 
them had variation in excess of five (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 
2013).  Stated another way, the vast majority of flight operations at NAS Lemoore during 
August had differences in aircraft arrivals from one hour to the next, often in excess of 
10–20 aircraft.  It is this systemic attribute of military aviation operations ashore that the 
model is particularly optimized for study.  The functional specification is revealed in the 
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following subsections.  For a more detailed model description, refer to the model 
specification (Appendix A) and the Simio Documentation Report (Appendix C). 
 
 
Figure 8.  Variation in Aircraft Arrival Rates 
1. Objective 
Applying simulation and modeling techniques to our research questions facilitates 
the experimentation phase of the study.  Since simulations, by design, can efficiently 
replicate the real world, introducing changes in various parameters, properties, and states 
while holding all other variables constant isolates cause and effect relationships.  The 
scope of this model is from aircraft landing through engine shutdown and refueling.  
Although several factors influence the arrival rate of aircraft, this model abstracts from 
the impacts of weather, airfield emergency situations, and runway configuration changes.  
From the time an aircraft clears the runway until that same aircraft either launches again 
or shuts down in the line, statistics are recorded and analyzed.  A single model run 
represents a 10-hour period, from 0800 to 1759.  The Simio software suite is then capable 
of replicating a single day hundreds of times using random inputs of various seeds to 
produce a highly consistent and credible solution.  Figure 7 depicts considerable variation 
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in the daily arrival of aircraft.  There are typically two to three peaks during the day and 
another large peak after sunset.  Therefore, the first objective of the simulation is to better 
understand the impacts of aircraft fuel consumption and delay queuing from variation in 
aircraft arrival rate. 
A second objective of the simulation is to assess the current hot skid policies 
aircraft ground turnaround planning and determine the costs and benefits associated with 
each.  With an understanding of the way an airfield currently operates, we then introduce 
various new refueling and ground turnaround policies to determine which is best from a 
resourcing and planning perspective.  Using a simulation has the added benefit of tying 
together variation in aircraft arrival rate with its impact on ground turnaround policy from 
a fuel consumption and total aircraft cost perspective. 
The third objective of the simulation is to establish a baseline of fuel consumed in 
the current aircraft laydown and compare it with transitions to newer aircraft models and 
types in the coming years.  Newer aircraft, most notably the transition from F/A-18CD to 
F/A-18EF, have significantly larger fuel cells requiring more time for refueling, and more 
time at ground idle whenever the hot skids are utilized.  This model was constructed with 
the ability to easily change aircraft from one type to another thereby facilitating an 
understanding of the long-term impacts of adopting, or failing to adopt, the policy 
recommendations in this study. 
2. Level of Detail 
The constructed model was designed from the ground up to represent NAS 
Lemoore in central California.  This air installation, along with NAS Oceana, VA, NAS 
Whidbey Island, WA, MCAS Miramar, CA, MCAS Beaufort, SC, and NAS Fallon, NV, 
make up the most significant operators of F/A-18 aircraft.  In an effort to draw 
conclusions beneficial for all of Naval Aviation, this project’s model captures those 
elements common to all air installations.  Specifically, multiple runways, a complex 
taxiway structure, multiple hangars and location, multiple flight lines at each hangar, and 
several spots for each aircraft to park.  Additionally, each air installation is equipped with 
the ability to either truck or hot skid refuel.  Although the time and distance relationships 
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in the model are unique to NAS Lemoore, the model could easily be adapted to other air 
facilities to assess their unique challenges and opportunities.  Refer to Figure 9 for an 
overview of the modeled airfield and the main elements, infrastructure, and asset 
laydown.   
 
Figure 9.  NAS Lemoore Hangar, Line, and Spot Layout 
In answering three main research questions related to slot management, ground 
turnaround policy, and a look ahead to an all F/A-18EF flight line, this model captures all 
processes material to the decision without being overly complex.  The model efficiently 
and effectively demonstrates the costs and benefits of various competing alternatives 
enabling the leadership to make well-informed decisions in the management of our 
nation’s precious resources. 
47 
B. APPROACH 
1. Collecting Input Data 
Discrete event simulation involves many data inputs.  While the vast majority of 
inputs to the model are historical data distributions, some must be coded directly into the 
Simio software suite through structural decisions.  In both cases, the decisions made in 
during data collection, analysis, and model input have a significant impact on the results.   
This section presents the sources of all data input to the model.  Although most 
data was readily available, it was often in the wrong form thus requiring further 
processing (i.e., fuel flow rate).  In situations where no data existed, personal experience 
in F/A-18 operations was referenced (i.e., ordnance de-arm processing time).  Special 
thanks go to Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet (N8C1); Commander, 
Strike Fighter Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet (N3); Fleet Logistics Center San Diego Site 
Lemoore (NASL N44L); and NAS Lemoore, Air Traffic Control (N32) for making the 
following data accessible to our research effort. 
a. Planned Flight Data 
i.  Naval Air Station Lemoore Tower Traffic Count Report 
(FY2012).  This report provided the data necessary in determining the probability that an 
aircraft will land on Runway 32L, 32R, 14L, or 14R.  This data was vital in ensuring 
aircraft and fuel truck taxi distances were to scale and appropriate to traffic volume.  This 
report also captured the total number of aircraft landings to a full stop.  It was important 
to exclude FCLP (except for the final landing), touch and go, low approaches and various 
other types of approaches in our analysis as each of these is not considered a landing to a 
full stop.  Having done so would have a profoundly negative impact on the results.  
ii.  Naval Air Station Lemoore Daily Air Plan (August 2012).  
NAS Lemoore’s Air Traffic Facility provided a Daily Air Plan report for 19 of 21 fly 
days during August 2012.  These air plans served as the foundation of individual flight 
scheduling patterns and volume.  Individual squadrons provide a copy of their signed 
flight schedule to station Air Operations the day prior to execution.  Air Operations, in 
turn, aggregates each of the, potentially 16, individual flight schedules into a cohesive, 
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single document.  Contained in the final air plan is the total number of planned aircraft 
arrivals by the hour, total number of planned departures by the hour, number and duration 
of FCLP events, planned aircraft ground turnaround time, planned aircraft flight time, 
planned flight composition (1-, 2-, 3-, or 4-ship), and various other flight event 
information (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 2013).  It was this planned 
flight schedule information that was ultimately compared to actual flight information to 
determine variation metrics between planned and actual flight execution.  This document 
was critical in the development of the model to simulate flight operations in the air and 
on the ground.  
b. Actual Flight Data 
i.  Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), Decision Knowledge 
Programming for Logistics Analysis and Technical Evaluation (DECKPLATE), Aircraft 
Readiness/Tracking Indicator Hours (August 2012).  This report ensured that squadrons 
were only able to fly, operate, and maintain full or partial mission capable (FMC/PMC) 
aircraft.  Typically, a squadron has many more aircraft assigned than they are funded to 
operate.  In each case, the number of aircraft authorized to flow into a given flight 
schedule is determined by the squadron’s R-month (27-month FRTP).  Information 
utilized from this comprehensive report included aircraft assigned, aircraft utilization, and 
aircraft readiness rates to determine the probability that an arriving aircraft needs to be 
temporarily removed from service to repair a maintenance discrepancy (Naval Air 
Systems Command [NAVAIR], 2012a). 
ii.  NAVAIR DECKPLATE, Total Mission Requirements (TMR) 
Flight Report (August 2012).  This report provided the total number of flights logged into 
and out of NAS Lemoore during August 2012.  Each flight record provided the squadron 
name, aircraft bureau number, and, most importantly, the specific mission flown on that 
event (Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR], 2012c).  Knowing the squadron, 
aircraft, and mission code enabled the development of a pivot table to calculate the 
probability that a mission involved ordnance (air-to-air, air-to-ground, or other) or was a 
field carrier landing practice (FCLP) event.  In order for the model’s objects to behave 
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intelligently with each other as well as interface with the structure, awareness of ordnance 
de-arming requirements, and FCLP missions were essential. 
iii.  NAVAIR DECKPLATE, Naval Flight Record Subsystem 
(NAVFLIRS) (August 2012).  This all-inclusive report provided the actual flight 
information for every event flown into and out of NAS Lemoore during August 2012.  
Contained in the report was the number of actual aircraft arrivals, exact takeoff and 
recovery date and time, actual number of waves an aircraft flew on a given day, actual 
flight composition (1-, 2-, 3-, or 4-ship), actual flight time, and various other flight event 
information (Naval Air Systems Command [NAVAIR], 2012b).  It was this actual flight 
information recorded in the NAVFLIRS that was compared with the NAS Lemoore daily 
air plan.  Placing these two documents side-by-side and using software to collate flight 
events by date, time, and aircraft bureau number provided an immense amount of insight 
into variation.  Inherent variation in arrival and departure time as well as the network 
effects of delay as the day progresses through Wave 2, 3, and 4 was critical to building a 
credible and valid model. 
The NAVFLIRS report provided by NAVAIR DECKPLATE 
aided in the development of a frequency table for aircraft type, hangar assignment, and 
line assignment.  This analysis ensured the model routes aircraft from the runway on 
touchdown to their hangar/line assignment in a manner and likelihood replicating the real 
world. 
c. Cost Data 
i.  Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet Cost Data 
(FY2012).  This report provided the cost per flight hour (CPH) stratified by Atlantic and 
Pacific squadrons and was further broken down by activity type (Fleet or Fleet 
Replacement Squadron) and aircraft type.  Once the data was paired down to just U.S. 
Pacific Fleet F/A-18 squadrons, based in the continental U.S., the relevant CPH could be 
determined.  The report was extremely valuable as it broke out each aircraft CPH into its 
individual elements (Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR)), consumables, 
contracts, and fuel).  Removing fuel from the calculation of CPH left the total cost per 
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flight hour in maintenance costs.  Therefore, maintenance costs consist of aircraft 
components repaired and returned by the supply system (AVDLR); items used to sustain 
or repair the aircraft (consumables); and the fixed labor contracted to sustain the aircraft 
(contracts) (M. Angelopoulos, personal communication, January 30, 2013). 
ii.  General Services Administration (GSA) FY2013 Standard Fuel 
Prices (Effective October 1, 2012).  The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) sets the prices 
for jet fuel on a quarterly basis.  Figure 10 depicts a rising trend in aviation turbine fuel 
prices over the past three to four years.  Although the current price for fuel is $4.74 
(effective May 1, 2013), for the purposes of this model it is assumed that the cost per 
gallon of JP-5 fuel is $3.75 (M. Olszewski, personal communication, May 29, 2013; 
DLA, 2012).  According to research in estimating the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) 
for Naval Aviation fixed wing aircraft, this cost could be considerably higher 
(Truckenbrod, 2010).  FBCF calculations are beyond the scope of this project and 
therefore abstract from fuel truck leasing, fuel services labor, miscellaneous supplies and 
equipment, and facilities management.  Had the fully burdened cost of fuel been 
considered, the cost of idle operations in this report would be understated by as much as 
600–700 percent (Truckenbrod, 2010).  In the short run, all military and contractor 
personnel required to support both fuel truck and hot skid refueling operations are 
considered sunk and irrelevant to the policy decisions being proposed. 
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Figure 10.  Defense Logistics Agency Standard Fuel Price (JP-5) 
d. Airfield Data 
i.  Google Earth Software Output.  Using Google Earth software, 
an elaborate network of more than 1,200 paths and 450 connectors were added to the 
model to provide predictable routing for aircraft and fuel trucks in and around the airport.  
All aircraft arriving via Runway 32L clear at either Taxiway Alpha (Hangar 2) or Bravo 
(Hangars 1, 3, 4, and 5).  For aircraft arriving via Runway 32R, all will clear at Taxiway 
Foxtrot and taxi southeast toward their hangar assignment.  Figure 11 depicts the 
mechanics behind using Google Earth to calculate ground travel distances in feet.  In this 
example, the route depicted is for an aircraft clearing Runway 32L at Taxiway Bravo and 




Figure 11.  Google Earth Distance Calculator Screenshot (From Google, 2010) 
e. Refueling Data 
i.  Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (FLCSD) Site Lemoore, Fuels 
Manager Defense Dispatch Module (August 2012).  This descriptive report contains 
every fueling event during August 2012.  Included therein is fuel transferred to aircraft 
from fuel trucks and hot skids, fuel truck refills via fill stands, aircraft maintenance 
defuels, transient aircraft refueling, and ground support equipment refueling.  All 
transferred fuel quantities in the report were expressed in gallons and were identified by 
date and time requested, dispatched, and completed; activity, modex (three digit serial 
number on nose of aircraft), bureau number (BUNO), and aircraft type; and the unique 
identifier of the fuel truck or hot skids providing the service (G. Blocker, personal 
communication, January 16, 2013).  Cumulative probability tables were then created by 
aircraft type and refueling method.  Refer to Appendix A for those distributions.  
ii.  NAS Lemoore, Fuel Facilities, Monthly JP-5 Cost Accounting 
Report (August 2012).  This report identified specific squadron usage rates of fuel truck 
and hot skid refueling.  Although some squadrons tended to utilize the hot skids more 
than others during August, a cumulative distribution function was created for entry into 
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the model applying the same likelihood to all squadrons during the experimentation phase 
(S. Cotta, personal communication, January 25, 2013).  The model first determines the 
type of aircraft requesting fuel services and then applies the appropriate fuel demand 
distribution. 
2. Building the Model 
The goal of any simulation is to mimic the behavior of a real world system with a 
model that “thinks” and acts in similar fashion.  Developing a simulation to mimic the 
ground operations of Naval Air Station Lemoore provided the means with which to 
answer not only our research questions, but many more in the years to come in future 
academic projects.  The model was developed incrementally by focusing first on 
individual elements before bringing them all together.  Planning, analyzing, designing, 
implementing, and testing the model in smaller portions of the whole proved to be 
extremely efficient.  This methodology reduced the risk of rework, enhanced 
standardization in coding, and ensured only the best software development practices were 
integrated into the larger model.   
There were four phases of model development used in the construction of the 
airport model.  The first phase allowed aircraft to arrive at the airport, conduct hot skid 
refueling, and then takeoff again.  In this phase, there were no fuel trucks available, no 
aircraft aborts (maintenance, inability to takeoff within 20 minutes of planned departure, 
etc.), and no aircrew swaps.  The second phase added in aircrew swap functionality for 
subsequent waves yet still restricted the use of truck refueling and aircraft aborts.  In the 
third phase, fuel trucks were introduced along with the hot skids and aircrew swaps.  At 
this point the model was nearing completion.  The final phase allowed aircraft to abort for 
timing, maintenance, or insufficient refueling resources.   
For the model to be useful, it must accurately account for variation in all 
processes across the modeled airport.  Variation in any process has a much greater impact 
on the results than the average.  Therefore, at no time in the model’s development was a 
mean, or average, used in place of a distribution.  When no data existed, a triangular 
distribution was used to represent the dataset.  Triangular distributions use just three 
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parameters to define their shape; the minimum, mode (most common), and maximum 
values.  When data was readily available but in the wrong form, statistical analysis was 
performed to get the data into a format suitable for modeling. 
For the most part, a large volume of data was available paving the way in 
developing a theoretical distribution of the data.  Goodness of fit software was utilized 
including Stat::Fit by Geer Mountain Software Corporation and EasyFit by MathWave 
Technologies.  Both software applications simplified the process of finding the best fit by 
ensuring analysis errors were minimized and decisions about the best distribution to use 
were optimized. 
The main research question answered by the model is how fuel consumption is 
impacted by a reduction in aircraft arrival variation per hour.  Since flight event arrivals 
are independent and random, they are best modeled using a Poisson process distribution.  
An attractive feature of using Simio is that it fully supports changing arrival rates over 
time.  Also called a step-wise linear arrival rate, Simio is well equipped to handle aircraft 
arriving at differing Poisson distributions with each passing hour of the day. 
Simulating the operations at an airfield is similar to a host of related operations 
management problems including restaurant reservations, hotel capacity management, and 
checkout lines at the local grocer.  In each case there is a multiple-queue, multiple-server 
system.  All aircraft (customers) enter through one of two runways (82 percent Runway 
32L and 18 percent Runway 32R) leading to a series of processes (T. Atkins, personal 
communications, January 15, 2013).  Each process has a fixed service capacity and when 
taken in totality, the entire airport is only as capable at its slowest process.  When 
complete with the necessary ground operations processes, the aircraft departs the system 
through either the engine shutdown process or launches on a subsequent wave.  Refer to 
Figure 12 for an overview of the ground operations processes captured in the model.  
Simio’s robust statistical analysis toolbox enables metrics to be collected on every server, 
process, path, aircraft, and fuel truck.  In building the model, keen attention was paid to  
which metrics were most important (utilization, time in system, time in queue, number in 




Figure 12.  Ground Operations Process Overview 
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3. Validating the Model 
The model mimics a 10-hour fly window from 0800 to 1759, Monday through 
Friday, at a single air installation.  The first hour, 0800 to 0859 is considered the warm-
up period where the model accelerates to steady state.  All statistical calculations 
including standard variation, coefficient of variation, and average sorties per day were 
computed abstracting from the first hour.  In fact, all time varying arrival tables used a 
“0” for the number of aircraft arrivals in Hour 1.  Important to note is that each 
experiment was run using 250 replications (Figure 13), or 2,500 hours of ground 
operations.  This essentially reduced all of the potential negative impacts from not being 
a steady state to near zero. 
 
Figure 13.  Minimize Sampling Error through Replication 
4. Conducting Experiments 
a. Slot Management Policy 
Managing arrival slots is a technique widely used in the commercial 
aviation industry.  Under the philosophical veil of collaborative decision-making, slot 
management requires a shared view of the operational environment by several 
stakeholders and knowledge of the tradeoffs that decisions have on the system.  
Understanding how cost responds to changes in arrival rate will determine how much 
control on the flow of aircraft is required to minimize cost.   
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Using historical operational and cost data, the slot management 
experiment tests the impact of reducing variation in the arrival of aircraft at an airfield.  
There are 12 scenarios planned in support of slot management.  The simulation typically 
runs 250 replications at each of 12 different standard deviations of the mean of arriving 
aircraft per hour between 0 and 11.  All variables are held constant throughout the entire 
experiment including aircraft type (Table 1), ground turnaround timing policy (Figure 
14), and the number of fuel trucks in operation.  Aircraft type mimics the NAS Lemoore 
flight line during August 2012.  This particular month represents the dynamic nature of 
military airfield operations with squadrons departing on detachments to other air 
installations and entire air wings of three or four squadrons departing or returning from 
extended deployments (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 2013).  
 
Table 1.   Aircraft Type Probability Table (August 2012) 
In an effort to isolate the impact of reducing variation on gallons of fuel 
consumed and cost during post-flight ground operations, this experiment restricts ground 
turnaround time to a value greater than 60 minutes.  The hot skids are still operational, 
however, for pre-flight planning purposes, aircraft must plan to use the fuel trucks to the 
maximum extent practicable (Figure 14).  Fuel truck resources are also held fixed at 10 
fuel trucks throughout the experiment.  There are eight 10,000 gallon and two 8,000 
gallon fuel trucks in continuous daily service from 0800 to 1759.  Furthermore, each fuel 
truck is allowed to deplete its internal fuel capacity to 2,500 gallons before signaling to 
refill at a fill stand.  
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Figure 14.  Ground Turnaround Timing for Slot Management Experiments 
Reducing the standard deviations of the mean of arriving aircraft per hour 
in increments of one allows for both trend and marginal cost analysis.  The worst arrival 
variation during the month was 10.9 on August 20, 2012 (T. Atkins, personal 
communications, January 15, 2013).  This value serves as the limiting standard deviation 
in the extreme.  On the other end of the variation spectrum is when the standard deviation 
of the mean of a set of arriving aircraft per hour is 0.  This is also known as perfectly 
balanced.  Determining the number of aircraft arriving in any hour is a linear formulation 
between the worst-case scenario (standard deviation equals 10.9) and the theoretical best-
case scenario (standard deviation equals 0). 
This experiment reveals little in the form of total gallons of fuel consumed 
or aircraft maintenance cost expenditures due to inconsistencies in the number of aircraft 
generated per hour during model run.  The range of arriving aircraft from one replication 
to the next ranges from 102 to 110 aircraft.  For this reason, the focus of effort is on the 
average time, in minutes, an individual aircraft spends at ground idle during post-flight 
operations.  In calculating the total cost savings, the average time avoided per aircraft is 
multiplied by the annual number of sorties expected from 0800 to 1759.  It is during this 
phase of flight that we find no contribution to tactical proficiency and operational 
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readiness.  As such, the objective function of each slot management experiment is to 
minimize gallons of fuel consumed (Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15.  Slot Management Objective Function 
The deliverable from this experiment is a recommendation to leadership 
on the benefits of managing aircraft arrival rates through slot management.  If the data 
suggests implementing a policy forcing collaboration among individual squadrons is 
substantially beneficial in reducing fuel consumption, then a recommendation for the 
standard deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per hour will be provided.  On the 
other hand, if the solution to this experiment turns out to be unfavorable, a 
recommendation will be made to avoid such a policy. 
b. Ground Turnaround Time Policy 
On November 23, 2011, Commander, Naval Air Forces issued a mandate 
for all aircraft refueling to leverage the fuel trucks to the maximum extent practicable 
(Myers, 2011).  The normal time required to turn an aircraft around between flight events 
is two hours.  However, anytime a flight schedule is planned with a ground turnaround 
time of less than one hour, hot skid refueling is required (Figure 16).  There simply isn’t 
enough time to land, taxi back to the line, shutdown, dispatch a fuel truck, complete the 
required ground maintenance service requirements, and man up the aircraft for the next 
event in 60 minutes or less.  Analyzing over 2,600 flight events and 4,300 refueling 
events provided much insight into the operational and administrative behavioral patterns 
of F/A-18 squadrons. 
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Figure 16.  Ground Turnaround Timing Example 
The purpose of this experiment is to first baseline the entire airport’s fuel 
consumption during post-flight operations and then to systematically implement three 
additional ground turnaround time policies.  Each scenario will progressively restrict the 
use of hot skids during preflight planning and plot the resulting response curves.  
Scenarios include the current (baseline); a maximum of 20 percent of all missions have 
ground turns less than or equal to 60 minutes; a maximum of 10 percent of all missions 
have ground turns less than or equal to 60 minutes; and only those missions requiring a 
turn of less than or equal to 60 minutes (FCLP only). 
This experiment is tied directly to the results of the slot management 
experiment.  The recommended standard deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per 
hour in slot management will serve as the principal assumption in this experiment.  Even 
if leadership rejects the slot management recommendation, the marginal changes in 
gallons of fuel consumed and aircraft operating costs from changes in ground turnaround 
policy remains valid.  Holding the variation in arrival rate constant at the recommended 
level, each of the incremental changes in ground turnaround time are introduced, 
analyzed, and recorded for further analysis.  Other significant assumptions in this 
experiment were to hold the fuel trucks in service constant at 10 (eight 10,000 and two 
8,000 gallon trucks) and to have them refill when their internal fuel capacities reach 
2,500 gallons of fuel remaining. 
The true value in this experiment is from incremental changes in both 
gallons consumed and aircraft operating costs on a per aircraft basis as ground turnaround 
policies are introduced.  This experiment will show how sensitive the time spent per 
aircraft at idle during post-flight ground operations truly is to each policy.  If the time per 
aircraft is reduced by policy, there is also a reduction in gallons of fuel consumed.  Here 
61 
again, just as in the slot management experiment, there is no contribution to tactical 
proficiency or operational readiness in the post-flight phase.  As such, the objective 
function of each ground turnaround policy experiment is to minimize gallons of fuel 
consumed (Figure 15). 
c. F/A-18EF Transition 
The final experiment in this MBA project is to assess the cost of inaction 
in adopting a slot management policy or a ground turnaround policy, or both.  Strike 
Fighter Squadron 122, the West Coast Fleet Replacement Squadron, ceased F/A-18CD 
flight operations on September 30, 2012 (CNO, 2012b).  Their operational foot print is 
being replaced with two East Coast F/A-18EF squadrons changing their homeport to 
NAS Lemoore as well as six additional F/A-18C to F/A-18EF transition between now 
and 2016 (W. Straker, personal communication, May 2, 2013).  By 2016, the entire flight 
line will behave differently.  The current organizational behavior and culture must adapt 
to this reality and think critically about what this means for routine ground operations. 
In this experiment we adjust the model to an all F/A-18EF flight line.  All 
F/A-18C squadrons become F/A-18E or F and F/A-18D become F.  The new mix of 
aircraft type is depicted in Table 2.  Of note, precise hangar assignments of the two 
squadrons moving from NAS Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA was not known at the time of 
this project.  Therefore, it was assumed for the purposes of this model that they move into 
Hangar 1 by occupying the spaces vacated by VFA-122’s former F/A-18CD aircraft.  
This is the most conservative assignment possible.  Other assumptions critical to this 
experiment were holding the number of fuel trucks constant at 10 (eight 10,000 and two 




Table 2.   NAS Lemoore F/A-18EF Only Flight line by 2016 
In this experiment, a side-by-side comparison is made between the current 
(August 2012) flight line configuration and the future squadron laydown in 2016.  Each 
flight line composition, 2012 and 2016, is subjected to two arrival variations and two 
ground turnaround policies.  Upon completion of each scenario, the results are plotted in 
response curves highlighting gallons of fuel consumed and aircraft operating cost.  The 
two aircraft arrival variations leverage lessons learned in the slot management experiment 
and represent the most common and recommended slot policy.   
The first scenario uses the most common arrival variation at a standard 
deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per hour at 7.0.  This is the most likely variation 
threshold based on historical flight scheduling patterns.  This scenario will also use the 
current (baseline) or status quo ground turnaround policy where 36.9 percent of all 
planned ground turns are less than or equal to 60 minutes (G. Blocker, personal 
communication, January 16, 2013).   
The second scenario also used the most common arrival variation at a 
standard deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per hour at 7.0.  However, in this 
scenario, the ground turnaround policy is reduced from status quo (36.9 percent) to 10 
percent of all ground turns being less than or equal to 60 minutes between events.   
The third and final scenario in this experiment combines the recommended 
arrival variation from the slot management experiment with a 10 percent ground 
turnaround policy.  This combination should provide the greatest cost savings regardless 
of flight line composition. 
63 
C. MODEL SCOPE AND DEFINITION 
Aircraft destined for NAS Lemoore arrive at varying rates to one of two 
parallel runways.  The airfield’s theoretical capacity to launch and recover aircraft greatly 
exceeds its normal flight operations demand (T. Atkins, personal communication, 
January 15, 2013).  However, anytime a steady state process is subjected to high levels of 
variation, such as aircraft arrival rates, delay queues develop and propagate throughout 
the airfield in any of several ground operations processes.  The objective of this model is 
to quantitatively measure the effects of queuing on all aircraft and refueling processes 
from aircraft touchdown through engine shutdown.  This section outlines the most 
significant data inputs supporting the simulation’s construction.  Specific model attributes 
can be found in Appendix A of this report.  Furthermore, a complete software 
documentation report is available online.  Refer to Appendix C for details. 
1. Model Entry 
Aircraft arrive through one of two sources; primary and secondary.  All flight 
events are comprised of one or more flight members in one or more flight waves.  
Regardless of flight membership, one, two, three, or four flight members, the primary 
source is responsible for generating all Wave 1 sorties.  As flight schedules in an 
operational F/A-18 squadron are planned in a logical manner permitting a single aircraft 
to fly many times throughout the day, so too does the model built for this project.  
Considering the first flight of the day for a unique aircraft originates from the primary 
source, all subsequent waves (two, three, or four) originate from the secondary source. 
The primary source generates Wave 1 aircraft arrivals according to a non-
stationary, Poisson, time varying arrival rate (Table 3).  In this model, the airfield’s 
operations do not commence until 0800 and, although aircraft can arrive within the first 
hour of operations, the planned flight schedule does not have any arrivals until after 0900.  
The number of aircraft arriving in each flight depends on the result of a discrete random 
number between one and four aircraft based on historical data.  Once the model knows 
how many flight members there are, it must now determine the aircraft type by selecting 
an F/A-18C, D, E, or F from a squadron probability lookup table (Table 4).  This table 
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allocates a unique percentage of all sorties to a specific squadron.  For example, in the 
first row of Table 4, VFA-122 F/A-18C’s represent 3.4 percent of all daily sorties flown 
(NAVAIR, 2012b).  
 
Table 3.   Time Varying Arrival Table 
 
Table 4.   Squadron and Aircraft Ready for Tasking  
Assuming the number of aircraft arriving in the current hour does not exceed the 
maximum allowable per the time varying arrival table, the aircraft are allowed to enter 
the model.  The initial flight time was determined using historical data based on more 
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than 2,600 flight events by Lemoore based aircraft (NAVAIR, 2012b).  Considering the 
F/A-18CD has a significantly smaller internal and external fuel capacity, it is important 
for the model to be sensitive to aircraft type (CNO, 2011a, 2012a).  The planned flight 
time in the simulation behaves similarly to the real world in that aircraft rarely land at 
precisely their scheduled land time.  In fact, the general trend is to land later than planned 
by an increasing margin as the fly day progresses.   
Although the actual arrival time is normally distributed about the planned land 
time, the model ensures both the actual flight time and the actual ground turnaround 
times are adjusted for variation in arrival rate.  Variation in planned arrival time 
represents the inherent variation in every flight event.  The second type of variation is 
how the early or late arrival of an aircraft affects the availability of ground refueling 
resources and the timing for Waves 2, 3, and/or 4.  Ensuring both inherent variation in the 
arrival of aircraft and the effects of delay propagation throughout the fly day are very 
important attributes captured in this model. 
The variation in actual aircraft arrival could be either positive or negative.  If 
positive, the aircraft lands past its planned time of arrival, the actual flight time is longer 
than planned, and the time remaining on the ground to turnaround the aircraft before the 
next event, if applicable, is shortened.  On the other hand, whenever arrival variation is 
negative, the aircraft lands early resulting in a shortened actual flight time and more time 
to turn the aircraft around prior to the next wave, when appropriate.   In the rare case that 
the arrival variation so negative that the resulting arrival time is prior to the field opening, 
the aircraft simply arrives at the start of flight operations, or 0800. 
The primary source will continue to generate flight events throughout the day so 
long as the maximum number of aircraft in the time varying arrival table are not 
exceeded in any given hour.  Furthermore, the model also monitors the time of the day 
and its proximity to the airfield’s closure.  Just as a squadron would not plan a two-ship 
to fly four waves starting at 2200 in the evening, so too the model is sensitive to the time 
of day.  Our research analyzed 21 fly days in August 2012 and successfully patterned the 
maximum number of waves based on the time remaining in the airfield’s flight operations 
window.  If a squadron’s flight schedule calls for an aircraft to fly four waves, it must 
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takeoff prior to 1200; three waves, prior to 1500; two waves, prior to 1800; and one wave 
can launch at any time during the field’s normal hours of operation (T. Atkins, personal 
communication, January 15, 2013). 
The next step in the algorithm of introducing an aircraft at the primary source 
(Wave 1) is to ensure that Ready for Tasking (RFT) limits are not exceeded.  Each of the 
operational squadrons represented in this study were at different points in the 27-month 
FRTP.  Those squadrons closer to deployment were funded to fly and maintain a larger 
number of aircraft while those squadrons recently returning from deployment were 
authorized to fly and maintain just a few (NAVAIR, 2012a).  For example, a squadron 
may have 12 aircraft assigned to their unit and be authorized just five for their daily flight 
schedule.  This maximum aircraft availability number is captured in the column titled 
“Max Aircraft” of the squadron table (Table 4).  
2. Wave Timing Logic 
To better understand the model’s structure, organization, and implementation, an 
understanding of flight event wave timing is necessary.  Taken one step further, 
understanding wave timing ensures readers understand the effects of both inherent and 
systemic delay queuing problems.  Using the example provided in this section, Figure 17 
depicts the timing elements of a planned (“rough”) flight schedule in green and actual 
(“smooth”) timing variables in red.  Using Figure 17 along with Table 5, Wave Timing 
Variables, will aid the reader’s understanding of our wave timing algorithm.  
 
Table 5.   Wave Timing Variables 
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Figure 17.  Wave Timing Example 
The planned flight schedule is first developed by the primary source when an 
aircraft or flight is first initiated.  Since this model’s focus of effort is on controlling the 
arrival of aircraft (A1), this variable is the value from which all others are initially 
derived.  Using the current model time as the time an aircraft is scheduled to land from 
the primary source, deriving the planned takeoff time (D1) is simply the current time 
minus a randomly generated flight time (FT).  Should a specific aircraft be required in a 
subsequent wave, the planned departure time (D2) is simply A1 plus a randomly 
generated ground turnaround (GT) time.  At this point, all of the elements of a planned 
flight schedule are intact; takeoff time, flight time, land time, and ground turnaround time 
(if applicable).  The top half of Figure 17 shows the planned flight schedule.  Since 
aircraft rarely land exactly when they are supposed to, the actual arrival time must be 
updated to reflect the addition or subtraction of a randomly generated time offset and 
stored as A1’.  If the calculated arrival variation of an aircraft arriving in Wave 1 is a 
positive value, the aircraft will delay at the primary source until the updated (A1’) time of 
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arrival.  If the arrival variation is negative, the aircraft will enter immediately and 
experience a shortened actual FT and longer than planned GT. 
Once an aircraft clears the runway, the ground operational processes commence.  
The actual time remaining for a proper aircraft turnaround depends on the resulting A1’.  
If landing excessively late, an aircraft once scheduled to receive refueling via fuel truck 
may actually be required to route through the hot skids for fuel servicing.  The model is 
not only responsive to this unknown but also variation in the following: 
• Hot brake check process variation 
• Hot skid availability 
• Fuel truck availability 
• Fuel demand variability (by both aircraft type and method of refuel) 
• Post flight check process variation 
• Aircrew swap process variation (if hot skid refueled) 
• Engine shutdown process variation (if fuel truck refuel or last flight of the 
day) 
• Marshal timing variation (if launching on a subsequent wave) 
In the most optimal situation, an aircraft will complete hot brake checks, taxi to 
and shutdown in their respective flight line, and receive refueling via fuel truck.  Or, in 
the event there is insufficient fuel truck capacity forecasted prior to their next departure 
time (D2), the aircraft proceeds through the hot skids and then shuts down in their 
respective flight line.  In either case, the aircraft will delay in the line until D2.  At time 
D2, all flight members will taxi out together to marshal where they complete their 
remaining pre-flight checks and establish communications with one another.  If the 
current model time minus D2 is zero, the aircraft is launching on time.  Since the model 
is only concerned with capturing the time an aircraft spends on the ground, all of the 
timing variables are updated just prior to takeoff on the subsequent wave to reflect the 
next line in the planned flight schedule: 
• New D1 is set equal to the old D2 
• New A1 is set equal to new D1 plus new randomly generated FT 
• New D2 is set equal to the new A1 plus new randomly generated GT 
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The new D1 is then updated to reflect the current model time and stored as the 
actual takeoff time (D1’).  In this case, the aircraft is taking off in accordance with the 
planned flight schedule and therefore is experiencing no effects of variation from prior 
waves; A1 and A1’ are the same.  Important to note is the actual FT is simply the 
difference between D1’ and A1’ and bears no consequence on the model.  It is assumed 
that if an aircraft launches within 20 minutes of their planned takeoff time, the mission is 
executed as planned.  On the other hand, if the flight is unable to get airborne within 20 
minutes of their planned departure time, the flight is aborted, the aircraft taxi back to their 
respective line, and the aircraft are preserved in support of subsequent waves. 
In the rare event that an aircraft is scheduled to fly again and there is insufficient 
fuel truck capacity to ensure servicing prior to 30 minutes of D2, a hot skid is required to 
ensure success.  This assessment is made while in the hot brake check process.  Taken 
one step further, if there is no fuel truck or hot skid available, the entire flight is aborted, 
taxied back to the line and shutdown in order to preserve the aircraft for subsequent 
waves.  Assuming a fuel truck could not be guaranteed prior to 30 minutes of the planned 
next departure and the hot skid was available, the aircraft refuels in the hot skid and then 
proceeds to the line to shutdown where it awaits its next scheduled launch (D2). 
In extreme situations, the combined delays from A1’ and the various queues of 
the ground processes result in a departure attempt greater than 20 minutes past the 
planned departure.  When this occurs, the entire flight is flagged to abort.  At no time is a 
partial flight launched in the simulation.  Instead, the primary and secondary sources are 
monitoring aborting aircraft and respond accordingly in order to manage the maximum 
aircraft required by the time varying arrival table.  Therefore, an aborting aircraft and its 
wingman taxi back to their respective line from their current location on the airfield and 
shutdown regardless of the number of subsequent waves scheduled.  The primary and/or 
secondary sources of aircraft arrivals create or release aircraft thus ensuring a consistent 
and predictable aircraft arrival rate suitable for further analysis. 
Given the extreme situation outlined above, the more likely situation is that the 
flight attempts to launch within 20 minutes of its planned departure time.  Any attempt to 
launch within 20 minutes of D2 is considered acceptable to any scheduled mission.  The 
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flight and all of its members (Dash 2, 3, or 4) join in marshal, complete their pre-flight 
checks, establish communications with one another, and takeoff.   
In our research, however, it was determined that the time a flight lands on a 
subsequent flight is directly correlated to the time it launched.  For example, an aircraft 
launching five minutes late had a 47 percent chance of landing on time while an aircraft 
launching 15 minutes late a mere 10 percent chance of landing on time.  To simplify 
implementing this logic, we stratified the maximum of 20 minutes allowed for launching 
late into one of five categories (0, 1–5, 6–10, 11–15, and 16–20) and developed a 
randomly generated discrete distribution of when the actual land time would actually be 
relative to the plan.  This variation is simply added to Wave 2, 3, or 4’s planned arrival 
time (A1) and stored as A1’, the actual time of arrival.  Refer to Appendix A for variation 
distributions related to subsequent waves. 
Anytime a flight is scheduled to takeoff (D2) in less than or equal to 60 minutes 
of the actual arrival time (A1’), a hot skid is required first followed by an aircrew swap 
before the next wave.  In the rare event that the hot skids were occupied following 
completion of the hot brake check, the aircraft taxis back to the line for the aircrew swap 
and then returns to the hot skids for a second attempt.  If, on the second attempt, the hot 
skids were still unavailable, the aircraft waits in queue until capacity exists.  This model 
reflects reality in that a four-ship required to takeoff within the hour typically send the 
first two aircraft to the hot skids for fuel while the last two go to the line for an aircrew 
swap.  Since the hot skid refueling process and the aircrew swap process take 
approximately the same amount of time, by the time the two aircraft in the line are 
complete with their aircrew swap and taxi back out to the hot skid area, the original two 
aircraft are refueling complete. 
From the above narrative it should be clear the model continually assesses the 
probability that an aircraft will be able to takeoff within 20 minutes of the planned 
departure time.  The discrete event checkpoints evaluating abort criteria include leaving 
the hot brake check, following an aircrew swap, prior to leaving final checks (applies 
only if the aircrew swap occurred before hot skid refueling), and prior to departing  
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marshal for takeoff.  At any point, the aircraft and other members of the flight event taxi 
back to their respective line and shutdown in order to preserve the aircraft for subsequent 
waves.   
3. Operational Processes 
When a flight lands consisting of two or more aircraft in the flight event, they 
breakup and operate as a single aircraft during the entire ground operations sequence.  
Then, if flying in a subsequent wave, the flight will rejoin as a single flight in the marshal 
process prior to takeoff.  For this reason, anytime a member of a flight is required to abort 
(aircraft maintenance, inability to make scheduled takeoff time plus 20 minutes, or 
insufficient refueling resources), the model sends a signal to the other members of that 
same flight, regardless of location on the airfield, in order to maintain flight integrity.  
The first process after landing is the hot brake check.  Every aircraft landing at the 
airfield is required to receive a check of their brakes for overheating and have their 
canopy degaussed for static energy buildup.  There are five hangars at the modeled 
airport and one of the hangars, Hangar 5, has two hot brake check areas for a total of six 
processes.  All aircraft proceed to the hot brake check process nearest their squadron’s 
hangar assignment.  Upon arrival, each aircraft is required to wait in line until sufficient 
server capacity exists.  The processing time is represented by a continuous probability 
distribution (triangular) with a minimum time of one minute, a maximum time of three 
minutes, and a mode of two minutes.  According to our analysis, 65 percent of all 
arriving aircraft require the ordnance they are carrying to be de-armed (NAVAIR, 
2012c).  In these cases, one additional minute is added per aircraft to allow time for 
ordnance handling personnel to perform their duties.   
Prior to departing the hot brake check process, the aircraft must know whether or 
not hot skid refueling is required.  In all cases on the modeled airfield, the hot skids are 
entered from a location between the hot brake check process and the flight line.  If an 




automatically required.  However, a hot skid may also be required if it is determined that 
there is insufficient fuel truck capacity within 30 minutes of the aircraft’s planned takeoff 
time (D2 minus 30).  
 
Figure 18.  Hot Skid Refueling Operations (Simio screenshot) 
The next process following the mandatory hot brake check is hot skid refueling 
for aircraft taking off in less than or equal to 60 minutes or for one of several other 
reasons highlighted earlier in this section.  Each of the five hangars at the modeled airport 
has four hot skids, or lanes.  Therefore, there are a total of 20 hot skids modeled in this 
implementation.  The Simio screenshot provided in Figure 18 provides a visual 
representation of two aircraft receiving fuel from a hot skid with their engines online.  
This graphic was simplified by abstracting from significant manpower requirements and 
additional equipment and infrastructure—all of which are beyond the scope of the model.  
Important to note is servicing capacity in hot skid refueling is far greater than that of the 
fuel trucks.  Furthermore, the hot skids never require a fill stand for replenishment as the 
trucks do.   
Perhaps the most significant drawback of hot skid refueling is cost.  Cost can be 
expressed in terms of time, fuel, and the additional aircraft maintenance from engine and 




effectiveness while squandering the resources of time, fuel, manpower, and aircraft wear 
and tear.  The simulation developed for this MBA project was programmed to capture 
and accumulate all of these metrics. 
Assuming sufficient capacity exists in the hot skid, the aircraft enters the first 
available lane.  At this point, there is a one-minute delay to allow time for chocking, fuel 
cap removal, fuel hose attachment, and a safety assessment.  Then, using a random, 
cumulative probability distribution unique to that specific aircraft type (F/A-18C, D, E, or 
F), the aircraft delays in the hot skid process equal to that amount, in gallons, divided by 
the fuel flow from the hot skids.  Analysis was performed of over 4,300 successful 
refueling events involving fuel trucks, hot skids, local and transient aircraft, aircraft 
maintenance defueling, and various ground support equipment.  Once paired down to 
only those successfully completed events involving hot skids, 531 remained spanning all 
four aircraft types (G. Blocker, personal communication, January 16, 2013).  Refer to the 
supplementary information contained in Appendix A for more details related to fuel 
demand.  Then, upon exit, an additional delay equal to one minute is required allowing 
time for fuel hose removal, fuel cap replacement, chock removal, and aircraft taxi out of 
the hot skid lane.   
For those aircraft completing an aircrew swap prior to refueling by hot skid, a 
final check process is necessary.  All aircraft meeting these criteria will delay for a period 
of three minutes allowing time for ground maintenance personnel to perform their 
required duties.  Once complete with the short delay, the aircraft proceeds to marshal 
where it awaits the remaining members of its flight prior to takeoff.   
If refueling by hot skid is not required, the aircraft is routed directly from the hot 
brake check process to the line.  The model’s line operations sub-model is depicted in 
Figure 19.  This element of the model captures the post-flight check, aircrew swap, and 
engine shutdown processes, as well as seizure and release of truck refueling resources.   
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Figure 19.  Line Operations 
There are 188 total line operation sub-models located at various locations across 
the airport.  In each case, every aircraft entering the line is required to complete post-
flight checks.  These checks capture the necessary steps to either prepare the aircraft for 
engine shutdown or prepare the aircraft for the next aircrew taking custody of the aircraft.  
Either way, those steps common to both the aircrew swap and to the engine shutdown 
processes are combined in this new process, called post-flight checks.  The processing 
time is represented by a continuous probability distribution (triangular) with a minimum 
time of two minutes, a maximum time of four minutes, and a mode of three minutes.   
Following an appropriate delay in post-flight checks, the aircraft is logically 
routed to either the aircrew swap or engine shutdown process.  In order to enter the 
aircrew swap process, the aircraft must be scheduled for a subsequent wave, be required 
to launch in 60 minutes or less, and not be required to abort for one of several reasons 
highlighted in this chapter.  The processing time is represented by a continuous 
probability distribution (triangular) with a minimum time of four minutes, a maximum 
time of six minutes, and a mode of five minutes.  Once complete with the aircrew swap 
process, the aircraft either travels directly to marshal to await the other members of its 
flight, or to the hot skids for a second attempt at hot skid refueling.  
75 
The engine shutdown process is used anytime an aircraft is required to receive 
fuel via a fuel truck, the aircraft has more than 60 minutes before its next scheduled 
departure, the aircraft is entering the line from its last flight of the day, or the aircraft was 
flagged to abort for maintenance, or other.  In each case, the processing time is the same.  
The processing time is represented by a continuous probability distribution (triangular) 
with a minimum time of two minutes, a maximum time of seven minutes, and a mode of 
three minutes.  The maximum time seven minutes reflects the average amount of time 
spent talking to aircraft maintenance personnel during troubleshooting.  However, given 
the positive (right) skew of this triangular distribution, the far more likely delay in the 
engine shutdown process is three minutes. 
With the aircraft’s engines now offline, the next process the request for fuel truck 
services from the dispatcher.  There are two types of fuel trucks in this model, a 10,000 
gallon truck and an 8,000 gallon truck.  All experiments in this study were performed 
using eight 10,000 gallon and two 8,000 gallon fuel trucks.  Future studies using our 
model may wish to manipulate the number of fuel trucks available in order to determine 
the optimal number of trucks a particular air installation should have in service to support 
daily flight operations.  For our purposes, we have held this number constant at 10 fuel 
trucks in operation in each of 250 fly days per year.  Again, the only time a fuel truck is 
requested is when the aircraft is required to fly in a subsequent wave.  Aircraft landing 
from their final flight of the day do not request fuel services.  Instead, station fuel 
services personnel refuel them after hours, which is beyond the scope of the model.  
Truck refueling services are not requested of the dispatcher until the aircraft is in the line 
with the engines off since the fuel truck cannot transfer any fuel until its engines are 
shutdown.   
Using a random, cumulative probability distribution unique to that specific 
aircraft type (F/A-18C, D, E, or F), the aircraft retains the services of a fuel truck in time 
equal to its fuel demand, in gallons, divided by the fuel flow for the trucks.  Of the 4,300 
refueling events analyzed, 2,894 of them were used to construct the fuel distributions for 
all four aircraft types (G. Blocker, personal communication, January 16, 2013).  Refer to 
the supplementary information contained in Appendix A for additional fuel distributional 
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details.  Upon completion of the truck refueling process, the aircraft will delay in the line 
until its next schedule departure.  Furthermore, those aircraft that were required to use a 
hot skid due to insufficient truck servicing capacity also delay in the line with their 
engines off until their next scheduled departure.   
The final ground process captured in the model is the truck refill process.  The 
model assumes all fuel trucks are at maximum capacity when the simulation starts (when 
field operations commence).  As each aircraft receives fuel, both the fuel truck’s fuel 
remaining status as well as a global variable holding the total amount of fuel available for 
transfer across the airfield is updated.  For simplification, a fuel truck is removed from 
service anytime its fuel remaining decreased below 2,500 gallons.  If the now failed fuel 
truck had customers waiting in its queue for fuel, those aircraft are released and 
reassigned to other fuel trucks having capacity available.  The time the truck is removed 
from service varies depending on how much fuel it had remaining.  Since all fuel trucks 
are assumed to receive fuel at a rate of 475 gallons per minute, the maximum truck fuel 
capacity less fuel remaining divided by 475 is the length of time in delay minutes at the 
fill stand before returning to service (G. Blocker, personal communication, January 24, 
2013). 
4. Model Exit 
There are several ways an aircraft exits the modeled system.  The primary exit 
method is following engine shutdown and the end of the line operations process.  This 
occurs whenever an aircraft has completed its final flight of the day or has been flagged 
to abort for one of several reasons (aircraft maintenance cancellation, failure to make 
scheduled takeoff time plus 20 minutes, insufficient refueling resources available, or 
other).   
A second way an aircraft exits the system is following initial entry.  Whenever the 
total number of aircraft created in a given hour exceeds the maximum number of aircraft 
specified in the time varying arrival table (Table 3), the aircraft is routed through a 
destruction process prior to any time or cost statistics being recorded.  This ensures the 
model behaves in manner consistent with the intended level of operations.   
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The third and final method for managing aircraft in the system is through a 
destruction process following the secondary source.  Recall the secondary source is 
responsible for managing the timing for all aircraft flying in waves subsequent to the 
first.  Because the time of their landing is determined during the model’s run, there is a 
chance the number of aircraft arriving in a given hour from the secondary source exceeds 
the maximum allowable in accordance with the time varying arrival table.  Therefore, the 
model has logic to capture this rare event, destroy an appropriate number of aircraft, and 
reassign flight leadership responsibilities whenever necessary.   
5. Cost Drivers 
There are numerous cost drivers in any airfield operation.  Included therein are 
aircraft operating costs, material and parts support, military and contractor personnel, 
facilities, and utilities to name a few.  This model is responsible for capturing the total 
amount of time an aircraft spends in the system with its engines online from aircraft 
touchdown to engine shutdown.  Those simulation planning factors having the most 
significant fiscal impact on aircraft operations are fuel flow rate from hot skid refueling 
and truck refueling, ground turnaround timing policies forcing more hot skid refueling 
than necessary, and the mix of aircraft type at the host airfield. 
 
Figure 20.  Aircraft Ground Idle Timing Logic  
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When an aircraft actually lands at the modeled airfield, the aircraft’s ground idle 
clock is started and accumulates time until one of two events occur; one, the aircraft 
completes the engine shutdown process or, two, the aircraft takes off on a subsequent 
wave (Figure 20).  With respect to the engine shutdown process, recall this will only 
occur when the aircraft has landed from its last flight of the day, has a ground turnaround 
time of greater than 60 minutes, is experiencing an aircraft maintenance problem, or has 
to abort its follow-on mission for one of several reasons previously noted.  Furthermore, 
the model accumulates ground idle time first by aircraft type and then aggregates those 
amounts to determine the total time all aircraft spent at ground idle during a single day. 
Time at ground idle is accumulating both in the queues and processing nodes of 
various ground processes as well as in the taxiways and line ramp areas between each of 
those processes.  Since the model does not begin calculating statistics until the aircraft is 
clear of the runway on landing, the rates of travel are held constant across the entire 
airport in a network of nearly 1,700 paths and connectors.  Since all aircraft entering the 
system are required to land on one of two runways, statistics do not start recording until 
entering Taxiway Alpha (Hangar 2) or Bravo (Hangar 1, 3, 4, or 5) from Runway 32L or 
Taxiway Foxtrot (all hangars) from Runway 32R.  All aircraft then travel at a rate of 10 
miles per hour to their destination while the fuel trucks at five miles per hour.  Although 
aircraft and trucks can travel as fast as 15 miles per hour when on the taxiway, it is 
assumed for the purposes of the model that the average speed between taxiway and line 
ramp is 10 and 5 miles per hour respectively. 
The next cost driver is the rate at which fuel is transferred from the hot skids and 
fuel trucks as well as the rate of refill for the fuel trucks when necessary.  Since the rate 
of fuel flow determines time, and time determines both fuel and aircraft operating cost, it 
was very important that the model utilize the correct fuel flow rate.  According to the 
NAS Lemoore Fuel Facilities Manager, fuel flow from both the fuel truck and the hot 
skids is nearly the same (G. Blocker, personal communication, January 24, 2013).  The 
aircraft’s ability to receive fuel in its external fuel tanks is the limiting factor.  This model 
assumes that all aircraft are configured with a single external fuel tank.  For this tank, the 
flow rate of fuel is slowed to approximately 120 gallons per minute (gpm) when filling to 
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minimize the risks of damage to external fuel tank components.  The internal fuel tanks, 
however, can receive fuel at a rate of 200 gpm.  Since the external fuel capacity 
represents approximately 20 percent of total aircraft fuel capacity, a weighted average of 
185 gpm is utilized in fuel transferred to aircraft in the model regardless of aircraft type 
or refueling source.  The fuel trucks, on the other hand, refill at a fill stand (hot skid) 
using a fuel flow transfer rate between 450 and 500 gpm (G. Blocker, personal 
communication, January 24, 2013).  For the purposes of this model, we used the median 
fuel flow rate of 475 gpm in calculating the amount of time necessary to refill a truck 
after reaching a state below 2,500 gallons remaining. 
Another cost driver is aircraft type.  According to the respective aircraft’s 
NATOPS Flight Manual, the internal fuel capacity of an F/A-18C is 10,810 pounds 
(1,590 gallons) while an F/A-18E is 14,700 (2,160 gallons) (CNO, 2011a, 2012b).  This 
equates to a 26 percent larger internal fuel capacity in the F/A-18E over the C-variant.  In 
terms of time spent at ground idle in the hot skids, a minimum of three additional minutes 
over the F/A-18C is required at an average cost of $100.14 per minute in maintenance 
related costs and $12.83 in fuel (M. Angelopoulos, personal communication, January 30, 
2013; DLA, 2012).  This rule of thumb abstracts from the time spent refilling the E-
variant’s external fuel tank at 120 gpm, which is 33 percent larger than the C’s external 
fuel tank (CNO, 2011a, 2012a).  The cumulative fuel distributions by aircraft type are 
introduced in this section as Figures 21 and 22 representative of the F/A-18E.  Refer to 
Appendix A for the remaining fuel distributions, details, and analysis of the over 4,300 
actual refueling events throughout August 2012 (G. Blocker, personal communication, 
January 16, 2013). 
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Figure 21.  F/A-18E Hot Skid Refuel Demand 
 
Figure 22.  F/A-18E Truck Refuel Demand 
The final cost driver evaluated by the model is the length of time a squadron uses 
as a planning factor for turning an aircraft around between two flight events.  Each 
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planned daily flight schedule of 16 squadrons spanning 21 fly days were analyzed during 
August 2012 and are summarized in Figure 23.  Of the more than 2,600 flight events 
during the month, 539 launched and recovered during the day from 0800 to 1759 (T. 
Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 2013).  The bi-modal frequency distribution 
depicted in Figure 23 highlights the systemic problem associated with the current 
refueling policy.  Establishing a sound ground turnaround policy based on data, risk, cost, 
and operational readiness has the most significant impact on the post-flight gallons of 
fuel consumed and aircraft operating costs.   
 
Figure 23.  Pre-flight Planning of Aircraft Ground Turnaround Time 
Most of the savings potential revealed in this MBA report stems from the model’s 
output from one of four ground turnaround policies.  The first reflects the baseline, or 
status quo, and is how the airfield was operating during August.  During the time window 
of 0800 to 1759, 36.9 percent of all flight events involving subsequent waves planned for 
a ground turnaround time of 60 minutes or less (T. Atkins, personal communication, 
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January 15, 2013).  The second reflects an extreme in the opposite direction where only 
those missions requiring the use of a hot skid would be allowed to plan their flight 
schedules for it.  Our research suggests that, with few exceptions, only 6.5 percent of all 
missions involving field carrier landing practice (FCLP) actually required the use of hot 
skid refueling (NAVAIR, 2012c).  The third and fourth ground turnaround policies 
analyzed using the model’s flexible programming ability were intermediate thresholds at 
20 percent and 10 percent of all flights planned having ground turnaround of 60 minutes 







IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW 
From the evidence presented in government, commercial, and academic reports in 
this MBA project, Naval Aviation must evaluate their longstanding business processes 
for currency and relevancy.  Failure to advance operational policies in the current fiscal 
environment, and tailor to our aircraft procurement strategy may hinder the Navy’s 
ability to optimize the use of their scarce resources.  According to Vice Admiral Myers 
(former Commander, Naval Air Forces), energy management is now an operational and 
strategic imperative (Myers, 2011).  This section communicates the results of this project 
in terms of gallons of fuel conserved and total aircraft cost (maintenance and fuel) 
avoided by accepting or rejecting various policy inputs to the model. 
The analysis in this project was made possible through discrete event simulation 
using the Simio software suite.  This suite enabled the creation of a dynamic, three-
dimensional, animated simulation of NAS Lemoore ground operations during August 
2012.  All aircraft, refueling resources (fuel trucks and hot skids), and post-flight 
operational processes have their own custom behavior that respond to events at both the 
system level and each other.  Refer to Chapter III, as well as Appendix A, for a detailed 
functional specification of the model. 
While a Navy-wide aviation model would provide a good tool for top-level 
decision makers, a tool focusing on aircraft with the highest fuel burn rate is most 
efficient.  The F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet cost an average of $113 (FY12) per 
minute to operate on the ground during post-flight operations (M. Angelopoulos, personal 
communication, January 30, 2013).  The goal of any policy recommendation from this 
study is to decrease the amount of time an aircraft spends on the ground with engines 
online without any impact to operational effectiveness, readiness, or safety.  The results 
and findings in this chapter can be applied in a wide range of systems and military 
organizations, as the concepts of demand management are not unique to Naval Aviation.   
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Representing NAS Lemoore’s runways as a multiple-server, aircraft arrive 
according to a time varying arrival rate per hour.  As aircraft arrive, each proceeds 
through several different servers or stations in turn (hot brake checks, hot skids, aircrew 
swap, engine shutdown, and many others), and might have to wait in one or more queues 
for processing.  In most cases, when a server finishes processing an aircraft, the next 
aircraft in queue is selected according to first in, first out principles.  This dynamic 
interface between aircraft and model processes occur in approximately 100 aircraft per 
day between the hour of 0900 and 1759.  Then, the model is replicated 250 times 
(simulating the number of fly days per year) using a random number generator to increase 
confidence in the annual result. 
B. SLOT MANAGEMENT EXPERIMENTS 
1. Question 
What impact would decreasing variation in aircraft arrival rate per hour have on 
gallons of fuel consumed during post-flight ground operations? 
2. Setup 
Representing NAS Lemoore’s runways as a single server, aircraft arrive 
according to a non-stationary, Poisson distribution.  The average number of aircraft 
arrivals in any hour of the relevant timeframe is 11.9, or 12 in terms of whole aircraft.  A 
critical concept in understanding this section is standard deviation.  Standard deviation 
(represented by the letter “s”) is simply how much, on average, the number of aircraft 
arrivals per hour differs from the average number of aircraft arrivals during the period of 
0900 to 1759.  Stated another way, standard deviation measures the spread of each hour’s 
number of arrivals around the average over the entire period.  Refer to Figure 24 for a 
graphical depiction of standard deviation about the mean of arriving aircraft per hour in 
three of 12 planned experiment levels.  This data comes from actual flight data recorded 
during August 2012.  With each incremental decrease in the standard deviation of the 
mean, the number of aircraft arrivals per hour approaches the average. 
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Figure 24.  Reducing Standard Deviation of the Mean of Arriving Aircraft per Hour 
Figure 25 depicts our analysis of historical flight schedules from August 2012.  
The data captured in this figure is based entirely on flight schedule plans.  The actual, 
executed, flight schedules are not reflected.  The average, most common, standard 







Figure 25.  Planned Base-wide Flight Schedule Variation (August 2012) 
All aircraft and model properties, states, and parameters were held constant 
during the slot management experiments with the exception of the number of aircraft 
arrivals per hour.  Tables 6 and 7 depict the inputs to the model in each of 12 different 
experiments representing 12 different standard deviations of the mean of arriving aircraft 
per hour.  Table 7 shows how closely the model is able to simulate the data input over the 
course of one year (250 replications).  Of note, the term “Hour 1” is akin to the period of 




Table 6.   Slot Management Model Input Table 
 
Table 7.   Slot Management Time Varying Arrival Table (Input Versus Output) 
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Of the variables held constant, the most significant cost driver was the amount of 
time each aircraft had for servicing in between events.  In each of the slot management 
experiments, no aircraft was allowed to have a ground turnaround less than or equal to 60 
minutes in length.  Although this does not reflect the real world, it does prevent the hot 
skids from absorbing inefficiencies in the total system.  Isolating ground refueling to fuel 
trucks only, by virtue of scheduling aircraft ground turnaround greater than 60 minutes, 
ensured the effects of reducing standard deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per 
hour could be studied.  Figure 26 depicts the ground turnaround policy for the slot 
management experiments and the probability of each ground turn duration expressed in 
hours and minutes. 
 
Figure 26.  Slot Management Planned Ground Turnaround Time 
The remaining assumptions input to the model involved ground refueling 
resources.  Of all of the fuel trucks contracted and leased to NAS Lemoore, it is assumed 
the number of fuel trucks in service is 10.  Of the 10 trucks, eight have a 10,000 gallon 
fuel capacity and two an 8,000 gallon fuel capacity.  Furthermore, these fuel trucks are 
assumed to be 100 percent reliable in that, as trucks attrite for maintenance problems 
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during the course of the day, each truck is easily replaceable having no impact on the 
squadron’s flight schedule.  Hot skids, on the other hand, were restricted to zero during 
preflight planning of the squadron’s schedule by ensuring all ground turnarounds were 
planned in excess of 60 minutes (Figure 26).  However, in the course of the model run, if 
the demand for fuel trucks becomes too great, aircraft are permitted to cycle through the 
hot skids in order to make their next scheduled departure.   
An additional concept necessary in understanding what drives cost in flight 
schedule execution is the difference between inherent and systemic, or network, 
variation.  Figure 27 depicts the actual landing time distribution about the planned 
landing time (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 2013; NAVAIR, 2012b).  
Although the mode of arriving aircraft is at the prescribed landing time, approximately 20 
percent of aircraft land early and 45 percent land late from the planned time.  The 
variation noted in Figure 27 is from the first arrival of the day and reflects the inherent 
variation aircraft arrivals per hour.  All subsequent waves are impacted from the 
performance of the first arriving wave.  In this chart, the average land time is almost one 
minute late with a standard deviation of 12.8 minutes.  This means that 68 percent of all 
landings fall in the range of plus or minus 13 minutes of planned. 
 
Figure 27.  Wave 1 Arrival Variation 
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Inherent variation in the aircrew’s ability to execute the flight schedule as written 
has an exponentially negative impact on flight events.  Contrasting Figure 28 with Figure 
29 using actual flight data from August 2012, the concept of systemic variation is 
articulated best.  Observe the tendency to land late more than 35 percent of the time 
despite taking off exactly as prescribed (Figure 28).  Then, in Figure 29, launching 
between 11 and 15 minutes late leads to a late arrival in more than 70 percent of all cases 
(T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 2013; NAVAIR, 2012b).  Refer to 
Appendix A for a more comprehensive discussion of the network effects of variation in 
aircraft arrivals. 
 
Figure 28.  Arrival Variation When Launching on Time 
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Figure 29.  Arrival Variation When Launching 11–15 Minutes Late 
3. Results 
As variation in the arrival of aircraft per hour is reduced through 12 different 
levels (expressed as standard deviations of the mean), the average time an aircraft spent 
on the ground at idle was also reduced.  When the standard deviation of the mean was 11, 
worst-case scenario observed, the average time an aircraft was online from touchdown to 
engine shutdown was 21.46 minutes.  At the most commonly observed level, s = 7, the 
average time was 20.87 minutes.  Theoretically, given the constraints of the model, the 
best average idle time is 20.24 minutes per aircraft.  Table 8 and Figure 30 reflects the 
model’s output and summarizes the impact reducing variation in the arrival of aircraft has 
on ground idle operations after landing.  Of note, below a standard deviation of the mean 
of 3, there is insufficient evidence to suggest a benefit of reducing variation further. 
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Table 8.   Slot Management Variation Impacts on Time per Aircraft 
Figure 30 depicts an average decrease of more than one minute per aircraft by 
implementing a slot management policy reducing variation in aircraft arrivals from s = 7, 
most common, to s = 4, recommended. 
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Figure 30.  Slot Management Variation Impacts on Time per Aircraft 
Table 9, as well as Figures 31 and 32, summarize the incremental change in 
gallons of fuel consumed per year at the modeled airport.  Each step, from bottom to top, 
represents the amount of fuel and cost, on the margin, that can be avoided by adopting a 
slot management policy forcing a reduction in arrival variation. 
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Table 9.   Slot Management Variation Impacts on Incremental Metrics 
Table 10, as well as Figures 31 and 32, summarize the cumulative change in 
gallons of fuel consumed per year at the modeled airport.  Each step, from bottom to top, 
represents the amount of fuel and cost, in cumulative terms, which can be avoided by 
adopting a slot management policy forcing a reduction in arrival variation. 
 
Table 10.   Slot Management Variation Impacts on Cumulative Metrics 
As standard deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per hour is incrementally 
reduced from 7 to 4 there is a substantial fuel and cost avoidance opportunity.  Figure 31 
depicts the change (decrease) in gallons of fuel consumed per year by reducing variation 
in arrivals.  Our research suggests a savings of 41,745 gallons of fuel is realized by 
implementing control activities capable of reducing the standard deviation of the mean of  
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arriving aircraft per hour from 7, the most common case in August 2012, to 4.  Of note, 
below a standard deviation of the mean of 3, there is insufficient evidence to suggest a 
benefit of reducing variation further. 
 
Figure 31.  Incremental Change in Total Fuel Consumed (Slot Management Policy) 
Figure 32 depicts the change (decrease) in total aircraft operating cost per year by 
reducing variation in arrivals.  Using the worst-case standard deviation observed during 
August as the base, aircraft maintenance (AVDLR, consumables, and contracts) and fuel 
costs are avoided simply by balancing the arrival rate of aircraft.  Our research suggests a 
savings of $1,222,559 (FY12) are possible by implementing control activities capable of 
reducing the standard deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per hour from 7, the most 
common case in August 2012, to 4. 
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Figure 32.  Incremental Change in Total Aircraft Operating Cost 
 (Slot Management Policy) 
Introducing a slot management policy to any tactical air (TACAIR) base would 
likely yield other, unintended, benefits.  Table 11 shows one such advantage for the 
average time it takes a fuel truck to complete servicing once requested.  As variation 
about the mean of arriving aircraft is reduced, so too is the average response time from 
requisition to completion.  Furthermore, the maximum observed wait time by reducing 
the variation in aircraft arrival rate from 7 to 4 was reduced from 42.6 to 37.1 minutes. 
97 
 
Table 11.   Slot Management Variation Impacts on Fuel Truck Resourcing 
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C. GROUND TURNAROUND TIMING EXPERIMENTS 
1. Question 
How much time between flight events should squadrons plan for when developing 
their daily flight schedule? 
2. Setup 
“Truck refueling should be used to the max extent practicable” (Myers, 2011).  
This quote by the former commander, Naval Air Forces, suggests he and his staff have 
completed a risk assessment and accepted challenges and opportunities in decreasing hot 
skid usage.  Establishing a more concrete policy at the type wing level is now necessary 
given the squadron’s inability to affect the desired paradigm shift unilaterally.  If 
leadership is serious about cost-wise readiness, promulgating a ground turnaround or hot 
skid refueling policy is the next logical step.   
This experiment follows a history of hot skid refueling studies spanning 33 years 
(NADC, 1980).  Much progress has been made at NAS Lemoore from the days when A-7 
Corsair’s were hot refueled 85 percent of the time.  With each new aircraft that joins the 
Fleet, commanders must validate existing polices for their appropriateness.  The Navy’s 
strike-fighter complement is once again in transition to the newer F/A-18EF Super 
Hornet.  Although NAS Lemoore is nearing completion, NAS Oceana and NAS Whidbey 
Island may seriously consider the recommendations contained in this report, as they are 
both earlier in the transition.   
The following experiments represent four possible ground turnaround (GT) 
policies spanning the full spectrum of alternatives.  In each case, the standard deviation of 
the mean of arriving aircraft per hour is held constant at 4.  Furthermore, all aircraft and 
model properties, states, and parameters were held constant during each of the four GT 
policy options.  In addition to holding variation in arrival rate constant, the number of 
fuel trucks in service as well as hot skid availability during the model run is unchanged 
from the slot management experiments. 
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Driving changes in gallons of fuel consumed and aircraft operating cost is the 
amount of time an aircraft has to turnaround between events.  The calculation for this 
time is simply the difference between the time an aircraft lands until the time that same 
aircraft is scheduled to take off again.  As GT decreases below 60 minutes, the hot skids 
are assumed to be the only viable refueling option (Figure 33).  Conversely, as GT 
exceeds 60 minutes, there is assumed to be ample time to shut the engines down in the 
line and dispatch a fuel truck for refueling. 
 
Figure 33.  Flight Profile Relationships 
The ground turnaround policy options in this section are addressed from a pre-
flight planning perspective.  The first experiment titled “GT Status Quo,” places no 
restriction on the percentage of aircraft authorized a ground turnaround of less than or 
equal to 60 minutes.  The next two scenarios further restrict the percentage of sorties 
scheduled with a ground turnaround 60 minutes or less to 20 percent and 10 percent 
respectively.  The final scenario authorizes use of the hot skids for refueling only when 
absolutely necessary for the mission’s success. 
Every squadron flight schedule during August 2012 at NAS Lemoore was 
examined.  From a planning perspective, the flow of aircraft from one event to the next 
was determined under the premise that each operational squadron would want to operate 
the least number of aircraft possible.  For example, squadrons flowing a 4-ship followed 
by another 4-ship with a two hour ground turnaround in between would be counted as 
four aircraft planning to use the fuel trucks for post-flight refueling, not eight different 
aircraft.  The planned refueling events considered relevant to this study were further 
restricted to only those flights that arrive during the period of 0800 and 1759 and were 
required to fly again in a subsequent wave.  Recall that aircraft landing on their last flight 
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of the day can receive fuel at any time prior to the next fly day and therefore are excluded 
from the allocation queue for fuel.  The result of this analysis showed 199 flights planned 
a ground turnaround of 60 minutes or less during August while 340 were planned to be 
something greater (S. Cotta, personal communication, January 25, 2013).  Figure 34 
represents this fact and was used in establishing the ground turnaround distribution in the 
first scenario (GT Status Quo). 
 
Figure 34.  Planned Ground Turnaround Time (Status Quo) 
Figures 35 and 36 represent the ground turnaround distributions used in the 
second and third scenarios respectively and are based on actual flight data that was 
recorded in August 2012. 
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Figure 35.  Planned Ground Turnaround Time (20% < 60 mins) 
 
Figure 36.  Planned Ground Turnaround Time (10% < 60 mins) 
Of all the flights successfully flown and logged during August 2012, 6.5 percent 
of them had a Total Mission Requirement (TMR) code of “1A3” indicating Field Carrier 
Landing Practice (FCLP) (see Table 12) (NAVAIR, 2012c).  FCLP is a special mission 
103 
performed at the airfield itself and of typically very short duration, often less than 45 
minutes.  It would create a significant and senseless burden on squadron aircrew and 
maintenance personnel to shut the aircraft down following events of such a short 
duration.  Therefore, this mission is considered by our study to require hot skid refueling. 
For efficiency and operational effectiveness, the hot skids are necessary in support 
of the FCLP mission representing 6.5 percent of the total training continuum (Table 12).  
Figure 37 depicts a GT timing distribution supporting only FCLP missions using an 
aircraft turn of less than or equal to 60 minutes. 
 
Table 12.   Flights Engaged in Field Carrier Landing Practice  
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Figure 37.  Planned Ground Turnaround Time (FCLP Only < 60 mins) 
3. Results 
As the percentage of total aircraft planned with ground turnarounds less than or 
equal to 60 minutes is reduced, the average amount of time an aircraft spends at ground 
idle is also reduced.  Table 13 summarizes the model’s output.  The only change in this 
analysis from one policy option to another is the probability that an aircraft will have a 
ground turnaround of 60 minutes or less. Despite flight schedule planning in the status 
quo scenario approaching 37 percent, the model’s output after 250 replications suggests 
hot skid usage fell short at 29 percent from primarily flight aborts for insufficient 
turnaround time.  Moreover, hot skid execution usage rates were less than planned at each 
policy level tested.  The remaining scenarios yielded 15.9 percent, 7.6 percent, and 5.2 
percent respectively.  
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Table 13.   Ground Turnaround Time Impacts on Time per Aircraft 
Figure 38 depicts an average decrease of more than two minutes by restricting 
aircraft authorized a ground turnaround of 60 minutes or less to 10 percent.  Moreover, 
should leadership find this policy too aggressive, moving from status quo to a 20 percent 
policy would yield nearly a minute and a half and go a long way toward avoiding non-
value added fuel consumption and aircraft operating cost. 
 
Figure 38.  Ground Turnaround Timing Impacts on Time per Aircraft 
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Table 14, as well as Figures 39 and 40, summarize the incremental change in 
gallons of fuel consumed per year at the modeled airport.  Each scenario, from bottom to 
top, represents the amount of fuel and cost, on the margin, that can be avoided by 
adopting a more aggressive ground turnaround policy. 
 
Table 14.   Ground Turaround Timing Impacts on Incremental Metrics 
Table 15, as well as Figures 39 and 40, summarize the cumulative change in 
gallons of fuel consumed per year at the modeled airport.  Each scenario, from bottom to 
top, represents the amount of fuel and cost, in cumulative terms, which can be avoided by 
adopting a more aggressive ground turnaround policy.   
 
Table 15.   Ground Turnaround Impacts on Cumulative Metrics 
As the percentage of aircraft planned to have ground turnarounds less than or 
equal to 60 minutes is decreased, there is a substantial fuel and cost avoidance 
opportunity.  Figure 39 depicts the change (decrease) in gallons of fuel consumed per 
year by adopting one of several ground turnaround timing policies.  Using an average of 
nearly 37 percent of all flights scheduled with a short aircraft turnaround as the base, the 
gallons of fuel avoided by instituting a 20 percent ground turnaround policy is 127,917 
gallons.  That is enough fuel to refill 80 F/A-18Es an average of 11,000 pounds (1,600 
gallons) each.  Our recommendation is to restrict this policy further to 10 percent where 
an additional 60,044 gallons can be avoided.  Of note, further restricting the number of 
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aircraft authorized in planning to have a ground turnaround of less than or equal to 60 
minutes below 10 percent is not recommend.  There is insufficient evidence to suggest a 
benefit of reducing this constraint further. 
 
Figure 39.  Incremental Change in Total Fuel Consumed (Ground Turn Policy) 
Figure 40 depicts the change (decrease) in total aircraft operating cost per year by 
adopting a more aggressive ground turnaround policy.  Using an average of nearly 37 
percent of all flights scheduled with a short aircraft turnaround as the base, the aircraft 
maintenance and fuel costs avoided by adopting a 20 percent ground turnaround policy is 
$3,746,182 (FY12) per year.  Our recommendation is to further restrict this policy to 10 
percent where a total of $5,984,329 (FY12) in aircraft maintenance and fuel costs can be 
avoided.  Of note, further restricting the number of aircraft authorized in planning to have 
a ground turnaround of less than or equal to 60 minutes below 10 percent is not 




Figure 40.  Incremental Change in Total Aircraft Operating Cost (Ground Turn Policy) 
D. F/A-18EF TRANSITION IMPACTS 
1. Question 
What is the marginal impact in both gallons of fuel consumed and aircraft 
operating cost from continuing operations in similar fashion as today with an all F/A-18 
Super Hornet flight line in 2016? 
2. Setup 
The final experiment in this MBA project is to assess the cost of inaction in 
adopting a slot management policy, a ground turnaround policy, or both.  Over the next 
two years, NAS Lemoore’s flight line will increase by eight F/A-18EF squadrons and 
sundown all remaining Legacy F/A-18C squadrons (W. Straker, personal communication, 
May 2, 2013).  Now is the time to question all processes, practices, and procedures in use 
and ensure the criteria that first established each remains valid in an all Super Hornet 
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flight line.  By 2016, the entire flight line will behave differently.  The current 
organizational behavior and culture must adapt to this reality and think critically about 
what this means for routine ground operations. 
In this experiment the model was updated to reflect an all F/A-18EF flight line. 
The new mix of aircraft type is depicted in Table 16.  It was assumed for the purposes of 
this experiment that the two new squadrons joining NAS Lemoore from NAS Oceana 
will move into Hangar 1 by occupying the spaces vacated by VFA-122’s former F/A-
18CD aircraft.  This was the most conservative assignment possible.  Another assumption 
critical to this experiment was holding the number of fuel trucks constant at 10 (eight 
10,000 and two 8,000 gallon trucks). 
 
Table 16.   NAS Lemoore F/A-18EF Only Flight Line by 2016 
In this experiment, a side-by-side comparison was made between the current, 
August 2012, flight line configuration and the future squadron laydown expected by 
2016.  Each flight line composition was subjected to two arrival variations and two 
ground turnaround policies. The results are plotted in response curves highlighting 
gallons of fuel consumed and aircraft operating cost in the next section. 
3. Results 
Three scenarios of this experiment are presented in Figures 41, 42, and 43.  The 
first two scenarios were similar in that each used a standard deviation of the mean of 
arriving aircraft per hour of seven.  Recall from the slot management experiment that 
during August, the most common planned schedule variation in aircraft arrival was 7.  
The difference between the first two scenarios was in the adopted ground turnaround 
policy, either status quo or the recommended 10 percent ground turn policy.  The final 
110 
side-by-side comparison between the two flight line compositions brings together the 
recommended standard deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per hour of 4 with a 10 
percent ground turn policy.  Each of these three scenarios is presented in both the current, 
August 2012, flight line configuration and an all F/A-18EF flight line expected by early 
2016.   
Figure 41 shows the average time each aircraft spends at ground idle during post-
flight operations.  Contrasting the F/A-18EF flight line with and without accepting any 
polices in this report results in nearly a two-minute opportunity forgone.  The error bars 
atop each bar indicate the 95 percent confidence interval about the mean and suggest 
there is no statistical difference between the time spent at ground idle in the current flight 
line with that of the line forecasted in 2016. 
 
Figure 41.  Flight Line Transition Comparison: Average Time per Aircraft 
Figure 42 presents an opportunity to avoid 189,245 gallons of fuel in ground 
operations post-flight.  Statistically speaking, this is less than a one percent increase over 
the current flight line configuration despite having an internal fuel capacity 28 percent 
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larger than the C-variant.  Given a 95 percent confidence interval about the mean, there is 
no statistical difference in gallons of fuel avoided between the current flight line 
configuration and the all F/A-18EF flight line expected in 2016. 
 
Figure 42.  Flight Line Transition Comparison: Fuel Consumption 
Figure 43 presents an opportunity to avoid $5,541,273 (FY12) in aircraft 
maintenance and fuel costs.  Relative to the current flight line configuration, this is an 8.0 
percent decrease in cost stemming from a significantly cheaper operating cost in the 
newer F/A-18EF aircraft (Table 17).  
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Figure 43.  Flight Line Transition Comparison: Aircraft Operating Cost 
 




V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER STUDY 
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this MBA project was to research existing energy conservation 
commercial and military best practices, evaluate post-ground operations for additional 
efficiencies, and develop metrics to measure performance at the squadron level.  All 
policies recommended by this study have no impact to operational effectiveness, 
readiness benchmarks, or safety.  Furthermore, because all policy opportunities apply to 
post-flight ground operations, aircrew should be more prone to adopt these strategies, as 
they do not reduce flying hours.   
Several policy recommendations were identified and analyzed using actual flight 
data from operations at NAS Lemoore.  The results of this study suggest organizational 
cultural changes are overdue.  Moreover, a new approach to cost-wise readiness is 
necessary to better align the flight line with the energy goals of senior Navy leadership. 
Following an exhaustive statistical analysis, we conclude by recommending the 
following policy changes with respect to post-flight ground operations: 
1. Decrease variation in aircraft arrivals during peak periods by establishing 
a culture of squadron collaboration at the type-wing level through slot 
management; 
2. Promulgate a flight scheduling policy restricting ground turnaround time 
less than or equal to 60 minutes to 10 percent of all missions flown; 
3. Do not increase the number of fuel trucks in service above 10 at NAS 
Lemoore; 
4. Ensure truck and hot skid fuel transfer rates are functioning at peak 
performance; 
5. Minimize tasks performed in hot brake checks to the maximum extent 
practicable. 
Adopting recommendations 1 and 2 outlined above presents a fuel and cost 
avoidance opportunity extending well beyond NAS Lemoore.  Table 18 displays all 
domestic, land-based, F/A-18 flight hours in 2012.  Abstracting from specific post-flight 
refueling options at each facility and using only flight hours at each air installation as the 
cost driver, inferences were made.  Furthermore, excluded from this table are all flight 
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hours accrued in 2012 from Fleet Readiness Centers (FRC), Naval Test Pilot School 
(NTPS), Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron (NFDS), as well as VX-23 and VX-31.  
Assuming both recommendations 1 and 2 are accepted, the total reduction in fuel 
consumed by F/A-18 aircraft in the DON is 785,775 gallons.  Stated another way, 











Table 18.   Potential Impacts for NAE
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The benefits of slot management and the establishment of a sound aircraft 
turnaround policy extend beyond refueling efficiencies.  Further ground idle time per 
aircraft is reduced through decreased time spent at the hold short awaiting clearance for 
takeoff.  Then, when in the local training range (i.e., R-2508), there are fewer aircraft 
from which to deconflict.  When aircraft arrivals per hour at an airfield are balanced, 
aircraft in the respective training ranges are also de-peaked.  Backing this notion up one 
step further suggests the time an aircraft spends at the hold short is also reduced.  We 
assert that any time conserved during preflight ground operations directly enhance 
inflight training and readiness through increased flight hours.  
B. FURTHER STUDY  
Our analysis represents only one F/A-18 master jet base and the flight and fuel 
data from a single month’s operations.  Applying lessons learned from this report to the 
other major aviation installations would provide a more comprehensive cost savings 
estimate across the Naval Aviation enterprise.   
The model developed for this project is extremely robust and, although not a 
deliverable in this report, it could be used to answer many more policy considerations by 
top-level decision makers.  Beyond the scope of our project, but shown in our analysis to 
offer additional fuel conservation and cost avoidance are the following: 
1. Remove all midboard and outboard pylons from F/A-18EF aircraft when 
operating ashore; 
2. Avoid filling external fuel tanks in F/A-18EF aircraft when operating in 
local airspace ranges ashore to the maximum extent practicable; 
3. For routine flight operations, delay engine starts to no earlier than 25 
minutes prior to scheduled takeoff; 
4. Do not further investigate military power takeoffs in tactical aircraft as a 
method for fuel savings; 
5. Conduct a cost benefit analysis for repairing the Flight-line Electrical 
Distribution Systems (FLEDS) as a measure to further delay engine start; 
6. Research fuel burn and capacity in F-35C Lightning II aircraft and 
promulgate an appropriate hot refueling policy; 
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7. Research, develop, and promulgate a dedicated chapter in each aircraft 
NATOPS Flight Manual addressing energy conservation techniques, 
practices, and procedures. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Naval Aviation must adapt to a rapidly changing fiscal and resource environment.  
Nearly a dozen squadrons are operating at the “tactical hard deck” by flying 40-50 
percent of their typical flight hour allocation (T. Branch, personal communication, May 
6, 2013).  Furthermore, simulator utilization over the past four years has risen 
significantly suggesting aircrews are augmenting their training and readiness 
requirements in other ways (Spencer, 2009).  From Secretary Mabus to Admiral Greenert 
and on to Vice Admiral Buss, the direction is clear.  Each organization within Naval 
Aviation is to critically evaluate all practices and processes in search of inefficiencies and 
waste.  Our research shows how this can be done without further reducing flight hours or 
impacting operational effectiveness.   
Naval Aviation’s policies, metrics, and incentives are slowly migrating away from 
flight hour execution (time) and are now focused on personnel, equipment, and fuel 
necessary to meet readiness objectives.  There are only two metrics for aviation managers 
to monitor in this study (Figure 44): 
1. The ratio between fuel truck and hot skid refueling during peak periods of 
demand.  Maintaining hot skid utilization near 10 percent yields the most 
significant impact.  Establishing periodic communications between the 
fuel facilities manager and various operational stakeholders enhances 
awareness and provides the necessary feedback for continued compliance. 
2. The actual standard deviation of the mean arrivals per hour (or coefficient 
of variation) is a good metric for assessing the effectiveness of any slot 
management initiative. The type wing or air operations staff has this 
information readily available and can provide periodic feedback to 
operational stakeholders.  
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Figure 44.  Sustainable Energy Management Value Chain 
Figure 44 highlights the value chain introduced in this MBA project.  Aligning 
Naval Aviation’s objectives with its goals is an imperative for any lasting solution to its 
energy challenges.  The metrics are explicit and provide a necessary control activity for 
management to monitor over time.  As was noted in the introduction, the i-ENCON 
program provides cash awards to those ships having the greatest fuel burn reductions 
from a known baseline without sacrificing days at sea.  Naval Aviation would likely see 
this same cash award program as motivational (Salem et al., 2009).  As Air-ENCON 
matures, increased emphasis on the efficient use of assets can manifest in the 
Commanding Officer’s professional evaluation.  Lastly, beyond cash awards and 
benchmarking among peer squadrons is the opportunity to enhance flight execution 
through safer ranges as well as more efficient scheduling and stakeholder awareness 
across the flight line. 
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APPENDIX A. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A. AIRFIELD 
1. Runway 
Table 19 establishes the probability of landing on Runway 32L or 32R.  Since 
landings on Runway 14L and 14R occur less than five percent of the time, those values 
are aggregated in Runway 32L and 32R respectively (T. Atkins, personal communication, 
January 15, 2013).  
 
Table 19.   Runway Arrival Patterns at NAS Lemoore (August 2012) 
2. Taxiways 
Figure 45 is an annotated NAS Lemoore airfield diagram.  Upon landing, all 
aircraft exit the runway from the same point in an effort to ensure consistence across all 
experiments.  If landing on Runway 32L and proceeding to either Hangar 1, 3, 4, or 5, the 
aircraft will exit at Taxiway Bravo.  For those aircraft landing on Runway 32L and 
proceeding to Hangar 2, the exiting intersection is Taxiway Alpha.  All aircraft landing 
on Runway 32R clear the runway at Taxiway Foxtrot and taxi southeast toward their 
respective hangar (DoD, 2012). 




Figure 45.  NAS Lemoore Airfield Diagram (After DoD, 2012) 
B. AIRCRAFT 
1. Engine Burn Rate 




Table 20.   F/A-18 Engine Burn Rate 
F/A-18CD 2.941 gallons per minute 
Calculation:  [[(600 pph)(2 engines)] / (6.8 ppg JP-5) / 60] = 2.941 gpm 
F/A-18EF 3.676 gallons per minute 
Calculation:  [[(750 pph)(2 engines)] / (6.8 ppg JP-5) / 60] = 3.676 gpm 
2. Fuel Flow 
All aircraft are refueled at a weighted average rate of 185 gallons per minute 
(Table 21) (CNO, 2011a, 2012a).  The F/A-18D makes up less than five percent of all 
sorties flown and therefore has been omitted from the weighted average calculation. 
 
Table 21.   Fuel Flow Calculations 
Average External Fuel Capacity:   18% 
Average Internal Fuel Capacity:   82% 
Weighted Average Fuel Flow Transfer Rate:  185.58 gpm 
Calculation:  (18% ext)(120 gpm) + (82% int)(200 gpm)  
3. Average Fly Days per Year 
This model assumes the average number of fly days per year is 250.  This number 
reflects allowances for 104 weekend days and 10 federal holidays. 
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4. Flight Composition 
When the model creates a new aircraft it creates them in flights of one, two, three, 
or four aircraft per flight events to simulate how the real world operates.  Analysis was 
performed of more than 2,600 flight events to determine the probability that a flight event 
would consist of a single ship, 2-, 3-, or 4-ship (T. Atkins, personal communications, 
January 15, 2015). 
Assuming the number of aircraft arriving at the airport during a given hour is less 
than the maximum authorized per the time varying arrival table, a random discrete 
number of aircraft is created per the distribution outlined in Figure 46 and Table 22. 
 
Figure 46.  Flight Composition 
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Table 22.   Flight Composition Table 
5. Flight Time 
Two flight time distributions were required by the model in order to simulate the 
actual flight time profile.  Flight time is the amount of time, in minutes, from takeoff to 
landing.  Using NAS Lemoore’s daily air plan reports for the entire month of August 
2012, a frequency of each planned flight time was made (T. Atkins, personal 
communication, January 15, 2012).  The information was further stratified by aircraft 
type in observance of the longer equivalent sortie length in F/A-18EF aircraft.  Table 23 
summarizes the results. 
 
Table 23.   Flight Time Table 
Figure 47 graphically displays the analysis of flight time and compares the F/A-




hour and a half while the EF comfortably flies in excess of one hour and 45 minutes.  
This difference affects the model as resources per squadron are restricted to where they 
are in the readiness cycle. 
 
Figure 47.  F/A-18 Planned Flight Time 
6. Maximum Number of Waves 
A single airplane often flies more than once per day.  Table 24 depicts the 
cumulative probability distributions used in the model to mimic an aircraft’s likelihood of 
flying one, two, three, or four waves.  Five or more waves occurred less than percent one 
of the time during August 2012 and, therefore, are omitted (T. Atkins, personal 
communication, January 15, 2012).  Referencing Table 24, the probability that an aircraft 
will fly two waves is 66 percent.  Ensuring steady state conditions, this table was 
generated using only flights from mid-week sorties. 
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Table 24.   Maximum Wave Cumulative Distributions 
An aircraft must be constrained in the number of waves permitted in a given day.  
The time of an aircraft’s first launch must also be considered.  Table 25 shows the 
additional restrictions placed on the maximum number of waves through one of four 
“launch windows.”  When an aircraft launches in one of these “launch windows,” it is 
aware of the time of day and adjusts its maximum wave accordingly.  For example, an 
aircraft launching between 0800 and 1459 can fly one, two, or three waves.  Scheduling a 




Table 25.   Maximum Wave Launch Windows 
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7. Aircraft Mix 
This model was constructed in a way to enable rapid modification to aircraft type.  
Specifically, we transitioned the flight line from the current aircraft laydown depicted in 
Table 26 to what the flight line will look like in the year 2016 (Table 28).  Tables 26 and 
27 were created to transform real world data to a format suitable for simulation.  These 
tables provide two different views of the same dataset.  The first shows the laydown of 
aircraft per hangar based on aircraft type.  For example, of the total volume of aircraft at 
NAS Lemoore, 7.1 percent of them are F/A-18E’s residing in Hangar 5 (NAVAIR, 
2012b).  Table 27 takes a slightly different view by stratifying according to hangar 
assignment.  For example, of the total F/A-18E population at NAS Lemoore, 26.8 percent 
of them reside in Hangar 5 (NAVAIR, 2012b). 
 
Table 26.   Aircraft Type (Stratified by Type) 
 
Table 27.   Aircraft Type (Stratified by Hangar) 
Looking ahead to 2016 and in support of this project’s third research question, the 
precise laydown of an all F/A-18EF flight line is necessary in ensuring accurate results.  
Of note, there are currently two squadrons identified to move from NAS Oceana, VA to 
NAS Lemoore, CA prior to 2016.  Their exact hangar assignment was unknown at the 
time of this writing so the most conservative assignment was made so as to not skew the 
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results.  Both of these squadrons were placed in Hangar 1 occupying spaces vacated by 
former VFA-125 assets (W. Straker, personal communication, May 2, 2013). 
 
Table 28.   Aircraft Type and Hangar Assignment (F/A-18EF Only) 
8. Squadron Execution 
Two tables were developed for reference during the model run.  The first is the a 
squadron table representing each squadron, aircraft type, probability of flight, hangar and 
line location, as well as the maximum allowable Ready For Training (RFT) aircraft 
(Tables 29 and 30) (NAVAIR, 2012b). 
 
Table 29.   Current Squadron Table and Aircraft Ready for Tasking 
The current squadron laydown (Table 29) reflects the NAS Lemoore flight line as 
of August 2012 (NAVAIR, 2012b).  At that time, VFA-122, Fleet Readiness Squadron 
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(FRS), was still training in the F/A-18CD as well as transitioning one squadron from the 
C- to E-variant.  Table 29 provides the model a wealth of information necessary in 
creating, routing, and constraining aircraft in the model.  The following is an example 
using row one’s data: 
Squadron  VFA-1, flying F/A-18C, and parking at Hangar 1, Line 1 
Aircraft Type  “1” = F/A-18C 
   “2” = F/A-18D 
   “3” = F/A-18E 
   “4” = F/A-18F 
Squadron Prob Proportion of the entire flight line population 
Hangar Select Node Identifies the hot brake check location  
Line Select Node Identifies the line number of the hangar for parking 
Max Aircraft  Restricts the number of squadron aircraft funded to that  
    defined by the VFA Readiness Standard (CNAF, 2011) 
Table 30 was created in support of measuring the marginal cost in both gallons of 
fuel consumed and additional maintenance required once the NAS Lemoore flight line 
transitions to an all F/A-18EF Super Hornet laydown.  To create this table, all six F/A-
18C squadrons were transitioned to F/A-18E or F (W. Straker, personal communication, 
May 2, 2013).  Furthermore, in the vacated F/A-18CD lines in VFA-122 at Hangar 1, the 
two new squadrons were then populated.   
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Table 30.   F/A-18EF Only Squadron Table and Aircraft Ready for Tasking  
9. Aircraft Ready for Tasking Limitations 
Table 31 summarizes differences between aircraft assigned and aircraft available 
for the flight schedule, Ready for Tasking (RFT).  The later a squadron is in the 27-month 
Fleet Readiness Training Plan, the more funding and support they receive.  A squadron 
on deployment is funded at a much higher level than a squadron who has recently 
returned.  The far right column in Table 31 has been rounded up to the next whole 
aircraft, as the model cannot process a fraction of an aircraft.  In row 1, for example, 
VFA-122 is assigned 20 F/A-18Cs and is funded to operate just 9.2 of them, or 10 for 
purposes of the model (CNAF, 2011). 
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Table 31.   Aircraft Ready for Tasking  
C. VARIATION IN AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL RATE 
Table 32 is the planned aircraft arrival data compiled from 19 daily air plans at 
NAS Lemoore during August 2012 (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 
2013).  Each cell contains the number of aircraft scheduled to arriving during each hour.  
Then, the standard deviation of the mean of each day was calculated for the period of 
0800 to 1759 as well as the time beyond 1800. 
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Table 32.   Planned Aircraft Arrival Matrix at NAS Lemoore (August 2012) 
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Figure 48 is a histogram of the standard deviation of arriving aircraft per hour 
during August 2012 (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 2013).  The 
frequency at each variation level provides great insight into scheduling patterns at NAS 
Lemoore. 
 
Figure 48.  Variation in Aircraft Arrival Rates (August 2012) 
The worst-case standard deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per hour 
observed was 10.9 on August 20, 2012 (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 
2013).  Knowing the least variation is at the mean, or average of all arriving aircraft 
during the period of 0800 to 1759, the extremes were de-peaked in linear fashion from a 
standard deviation of 11 down to 0 in increments of 1 (Figure 49). 
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Figure 49.  Sortie Smoothing Technique to De-peak High Demand 
The model input table for aircraft arrivals (Table 33), is perhaps the most 
important data input to the model.  Using concepts introduced in Table 32 and Figure 49, 
this table captures the relationship between time and arrival variation in order to specify 
the number of aircraft required to arrive in a given hour of time.  Each dataset, read 
vertically along the time axis, can be described using the standard deviation of the mean 
of arriving aircraft per hour.  The standard deviation is an appropriate measure of 
variation because it is a measure of how spread out a series of numbers is.  In this case, 
how spread out the number of arrivals are per hour throughout the day at an air 
installation.  Moving from left to right across the table, the standard deviation of the 
mean number of arriving aircraft is reduced incrementally by one.  In the far right column 
is a dataset presenting a standard deviation of 0 indicating a perfectly balanced arrival 
pattern of aircraft per hour during a 10-hour period.  Unique to NAS Lemoore is the 
field’s daily operations do not commence until 0800.  For simplification, this model uses 
the period of 0800 to 0859 as a “warm-up” period to get the simulator functioning at 
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steady state.  Therefore, all analysis performed in this project addresses variation in 
aircraft arrival rates from 0900 to 1759.  A screenshot from the Simio implementation is 











Table 33.   Model Input Table for Aircraft Arrivals 
136 
 
Table 34.   Time Varying Arrival Table (Simio Screenshot of s=4) 
Figure 50 depicts the actual landing time distribution about the planned landing 
time (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 2013; NAVAIR, 2012b).  
Although the mode of arriving aircraft is at the prescribed landing time, most aircraft land 
early or very late from their intended, scheduled, landing time.  This variation noted on 
the first arrival of the day is the inherent variation in the arrival of aircraft per hour.  All 
subsequent waves are impacted from the performance of the first arriving wave.  In this 
chart, the average land time is almost one minute late with a standard deviation of 12.8.  
This means that 68 percent of all landings fall between approximately 12 minutes early to 
14 minutes late. 
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Figure 50.  Wave 1 Arrival Variation 
In general, when an aircraft takes off on time, it lands on time.  Figure 51 depicts 
the relationship between takeoff and landing.  Observe the tendency to land late more 
than 35 percent of the time despite taking off on time (T. Atkins, personal 
communication, January 15, 2013; NAVAIR, 2012b). 
 
Figure 51.  Arrival Variation When Launching on Time 
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When an aircraft takes off between one and five minutes late, it generally lands on 
time.  However, Figure 52 shows a growing trend to land late more than 45 percent of the 
time (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 2013; NAVAIR, 2012b). 
 
Figure 52.  Arrival Variation When Launching 1–5 Minutes Late 
Figure 53 highlights aircraft taking off between six and 10 minutes late landing 
late in nearly all cases (T. Atkins, personal communication, January 15, 2013; NAVAIR, 
2012b).  This creates planning and resource programming problems for various station 
stakeholders such as air traffic control, fuel services, and even squadron operations and 
maintenance since they almost exclusively make decisions based on the planned flight 
schedule.  Any real-time changes to the plan in the form of additions, cancellations, and 
modifications do not get communicated to all stakeholders in a timely manner, if at all.  
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Figure 53.  Arrival Variation When Launching 6–10 Minutes Late 
In similar fashion to the arrival patterns in launching six to 10 minutes late, Figure 
54 depicts a slightly worse condition in launching 11 to 15 minutes late.  The key 
takeaway from this analysis is launching late means landing late (T. Atkins, personal 
communication, January 15, 2013; NAVAIR, 2012b). 
 
Figure 54.  Arrival Variation When Launching 11–15 Minutes Late 
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The worst arrival patterns were noted when an aircraft launches between 16 and 
20 minutes late from their planned departure (T. Atkins, personal communication, 
January 15, 2013; NAVAIR, 2012b).  Almost 80 percent of all missions launching this 
late will land late (Figure 55). 
 
Figure 55.  Arrival Variation When Launching 16–20 Minutes Late 
D. GROUND TURNAROUND TIMING 
The amount of time specified on a squadron’s planned flight schedule from the 
landing of one wave until launching on the next is referred to as ground turnaround.  A 
rule of thumb, and well established business rule on the flight line is any ground 
turnaround of 60 minutes of less will require hot skid refueling.  On the other hand, any 
planned ground turn of greater than 60 minutes can be satisfied with a fuel truck.  All 
logic implemented in the model is based on this explicit threshold.   
Four different ground turnaround policies were explored in this MBA project.  
The first, status quo, reflects how NAS Lemoore operated during August 2012 between 
the hours of 0800 to 1759 (Figure 56).  The second reflects a modified distribution of the 
first where only 20 percent of all missions may be planned with a ground turnaround of 
less than or equal to 60 minutes (Figure 57).  This does not restrict the hot skid usage to 
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something less than 20 percent.  This constraint is applied in the planning stages only.  
During execution, a number of real-time events may trigger an aircraft once schedule for 
a fuel truck to require a hot skid in order to make the launch time of a subsequent wave.  
The third restricts planned ground turnaround time to 10 percent of all missions 
scheduled (Figure 58) and the fourth to only those missions absolutely requiring a hot 
skid to be successful (Figure 59).  The only mission determined by this study to require 
hot skid refueling is that of field carrier landing practice (FCLP) (T. Atkins, personal 
communication, January 15, 2013).  This mission involves numerous flights of short 
during focusing on a singular task at the local airfield.  For efficiency and operational 
effectiveness, the hot skids are necessary in support of FCLP mission (TMR code 1A3) 
representing 6.5% of the total training continuum (Table 35). 
 
Figure 56.  Planned Ground Turnaround Time (Status Quo) 
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Figure 57.  Planned Ground Turnaround Time (20% < 60 mins) 
 




















Table 35.   Flights Engaged in Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) 
Figure 60 introduces a special ground turnaround policy used during the slot 
management experiment.  In order to isolate the affects from reducing the standard 
deviation of the mean of arriving aircraft per hour, hot skid usage during the planning 
phase was restricted to zero.  During the model run, the hot skids were available to those 
aircraft experiencing a shorter than planned (less than or equal to 60 minutes) ground 
turnaround due to unforeseen circumstances.   
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Figure 60.  Planned Ground Turnaround Time (0% < 60 mins) 
E. TRUCK REFUELING 
1. Level of Service 
There are ten total trucks assumed in service each fly day without fail.  Of the 10 
operational trucks, eight were 10,000 gallon and two 8,000 gallon trucks. Interviews with 
the NAS Lemoore Fuel Facilities Manager, revealed two to three fuel trucks out of 
service on any given day (G. Blocker, personal communication, January 24, 2013).  
These trucks are above the ten fuel trucks in service.   
Fuel trucks transfer fuel at a rate of 120 gallons per minute (gpm) when filling the 
external fuel tanks and 200 gpm when filling the internal fuel tanks.  For modeling 
purposes, this equates to a weighted average of 185 gpm.  The fuel trucks, on the other 
hand, refill at a fill stand using a rate of fuel transfer between 450 and 500 gallons per 
minutes (G. Blocker, personal communication, January 24, 2013).  The model uses the 
median fuel flow rate of 475 in calculating the amount of time necessary to refill a truck 
after reaching a state below 2,500 gallons remaining. 
All fuel trucks in service are assumed to be 100 percent reliable.  The only time 
during model run that a truck is in a failed status is during the refill process at a fill stand 
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(hot skid).  In addition, all fuel trucks refill when their internal fuel capacity reaches 
2,500 gallons of fuel remaining.  Crossing that threshold negatively triggers a process 
that sidelines the truck to receive fuel from a fill stand. 
2. Truck Refuel Demand 
Analysis of over 4,300 refueling events at NAS Lemoore during August 2012 led 
to the development of a fuel demand profile for each aircraft (G. Blocker, personal 
communication, January 16, 2013).  Of all refueling events, fuel trucks successfully 
completed 2,894 refueling events.  Furthermore, transient aircraft (e.g., C-40, F-16, F/A-
18s from other airbases), ground support equipment (fire trucks, forklifts, sweepers), and 
defuels for maintenance were excluded in preparing Table 36. 
 
Table 36.   Fuel Truck Demand Table 
Figures 61 through 64 reflect the discrete frequency distributions of the F/A-18C, 
D, E, and F respectively.  There were 864 F/A-18C refueling events, 115 F/A-18D 
events, 800 F/A-18D events, and 1,115 F/A-18F events (G. Blocker, personal 
communication, January 16, 2013). 
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Figure 61.  F/A-18C Truck Refuel Demand 
 
Figure 62.  F/A-18D Truck Refuel Demand 
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Figure 63.  F/A-18E Truck Refuel Demand 
 
Figure 64.  F/A-18F Truck Refuel Demand 
3. Fuel Truck Decision Criteria 
As an aircraft approaches the hot brake check process after clearing the runway 
on landing, a decision must be made as to whether there is sufficient fuel truck capacity 
available.  If the aircraft has a ground turnaround time less than or equal to 60 minutes, 
the aircraft is flagged for hot skid refueling.  On the other hand, if the aircraft has a 
ground turnaround greater than 60 minutes, it now must determine the likelihood that a 
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fuel truck is available to provide servicing no later than 30 minutes prior to the next 
departure.  In the real world, there are many variables affecting a squadron’s decision to 
wait for a fuel truck, or cycle the aircraft through the hot skids based.  It’s a risk 
assessment performed when the aircraft recovers.  This model uses a very simple 
algorithm to make a decision to use the hot skids or continue to the line for a fuel truck 
(Figure 65).   
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Figure 65.  Fuel Truck Decision Criteria Algorithm 
4. Fuel Truck Fill Stand Demand 
Whenever a truck’s fuel remaining decreases below 2,500 gallons remaining, it 
will finish its current refueling event and then proceed direct to a fill stand for refill.  
Table 37 and Figure 66 summarize 603 fill stand events during August 2012 (G. Blocker, 
personal communication, January 16, 2013). 
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Table 37.   Fuel Truck Fill Stand Demand Table 
 
Figure 66.  Fuel Truck Fill Stand Demand 
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F. HOT SKID REFUELING 
1. Level of Service 
There are 10 hot skids consisting of two lanes each at NAS Lemoore.  Each hot 
skid has an unlimited capacity to provide fuel to both aircraft and fuel trucks when 
refilling and is assumed 100 percent reliable.  The hangar and hot skid pairing is depicted 
in Table 38. 
 
Table 38.   Hangar/Hot Skid Pairing 
The hot skids transfer fuel at a rate of 120 gallons per minute (gpm) when filling 
the external fuel tanks and 200 gpm when filling the internal fuel tanks.  For modeling 
purposes, this equates to a weighted average of 185 gpm.  On the other hand, if a fuel 
truck requires a refill, the transfer rate used is 475 gpm (G. Blocker, personal 
communication, January 24, 2013). 
2. Hot Skid Refuel Demand 
Analysis of over 4,300 refueling events at NAS Lemoore during August 2012 led 
to the development of a fuel demand profile for each aircraft (G. Blocker, personal 
communication, January 16, 2013).  Of all refueling events, hot skids successfully 
completed 531 refueling events.  Furthermore, transient aircraft (e.g., C-40, F-16, F/A-
18s from other bases), ground support equipment (fire trucks, forklifts, sweepers), and 
defuels for maintenance were excluded in preparing Table 39.  
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Table 39.   Hot Skid Demand Table 
Figures 67 through 70 reflect the discrete frequency distributions of the F/A-18C, 
D, E, and F respectively.  There were 197 F/A-18C refueling events, 39 F/A-18D events, 
162 F/A-18D events, and 131 F/A-18F events (G. Blocker, personal communication, 
January 16, 2013). 
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Figure 67.  F/A-18C Hot Skid Refuel Demand 
 
Figure 68.  F/A-18D Hot Skid Refuel Demand 
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Figure 69.  F/A-18E Hot Skid Refuel Demand 
 
Figure 70.  F/A-18F Hot Skid Refuel Demand 
3. Historical Usage 
Table 40 provides a summary of all successful refueling events during August 
2012.  Of the 4,300 refueling events in August, only 3,562 of them successfully 
transferred fuel via fuel truck or hot skid to or from aircraft (S. Cotta, personal 
communication, January 25, 2013).  Table 40 abstracts from unsuccessful refueling 
attempts as well as ground service equipment refueling events.  Our analysis suggests the 
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ratio of fuel truck to hot skid is significantly higher than depicted when constrained to the 
period of 0800 to 1759.  When looking only at refueling events during this 10-hour 
period, NAS Lemoore based aircraft planned (via flight schedule) the hot skids at an 
average rate of 36.9 percent (G. Blocker, personal communication, January 16, 2013).  
When average across the entire fly day, however, the rate drops back into the 10–25 
percent range. 
 
Table 40.   NAS Lemoore Fuels Division Monthly Summary (August 2012) 
G. HOT BRAKE CHECK 
Once clear of the runway on landing, all aircraft proceed directly to one of six hot 
brake check processes depending on hangar assignment.  The processing time in the hot 
brake check is standardized, however, for those aircraft identified as having ordnance 
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onboard (average of 65 percent), their hot brake check procedure is extended one minute 
for de-arming by maintenance ground crew.  Table 41 depicts those missions postulated 
to require ordnance de-arming (NAVAIR, 2012c).  
 
Table 41.   Flight Events Requiring Ordnance De-arm 
H. LINE OPERATIONS 
The line operations process is a model in and of itself.  Contained within are the 
sub-processes responsible for post-flight checks, aircrew swap, engine shutdown, and 
aircraft sink (used on last flight of the day).  Figure 71 depicts the major elements of the 
line operations process.  Every aircraft entering the line flows through the post-flight 
check process and delays for two to four minutes (typically three minutes).  Then, 
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depending on satisfying one of two Boolean logic sequences, routes to either aircrew 
swap or engine shutdown for additional processing.  The aircrew swap process time is 
between four and six minutes (typically five minutes) and the engine shutdown process is 
two to seven minutes (typically three minutes).  Following aircrew swap, the aircraft 
flows without restriction to the marshal process where it awaits the other members of the 
flight.  For those aircraft flowing through the engine shutdown process, either a fuel truck 
is requested (if scheduled to fly again) or it proceeds directly to the sink (if the last flight 
of the day).  Figure 72 shows the line operations process as it appears in Simio. 
 
Figure 71.  Line Operations Logic 
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Figure 72.  Line Operations (Simio screenshot) 
I. HOT BRAKE CHECK 
Figure 73 depicts the major elements of the hot brake check process. 
 
Figure 73.  Hot Brake Check Logic 
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J. COST 
Aircraft maintenance costs per minute are contained in Table 42.  In calculating 
maintenance cost, Aviation Depot Level Repairable, consumables, and contracts are 
considered.  Refer to Figure 74 for details of each component (M. Angelopoulos, 
personal communication, January 30, 2013). 
 
Table 42.   F/A-18 Aircraft Maintenance Cost per Minute 
Table 43 reflects fuel costs per minute per aircraft using JP-5 and the Defense 
Logistics Agency Standard Fuel Price dated October 1, 2012 (M. Angelopoulos, personal 
communication, January 30, 2013; CNO, 2011a, 2012a; DLA, 2012). 
 
Table 43.   F/A-18 Fuel Cost per Minute 
161 
 
Figure 74.  Cost per Flight Hour Components 
K. SIMIO MODEL PROCESSES AND OBJECTS 
1. Processes 
Processes are used to either customize the behavior of an instantiated object 
(FuelTruck and ModelEntity), or to create new object definitions (HotSkidOps, LineOps, 
and FlightJoin).  More than 50 processes were designed, implemented, and validated.  Of 
those, most significant contributors to the model’s success in mimicking the real world 
are included in Tables 44 through 48.  
 
Table 44.   Primary and Secondary Timing Model Processes 
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Table 45.   Hot Brake Check Model Processes 
 
Table 46.   Hot Skid Model Processes 
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Table 47.   Fuel Truck Model Processes 
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Table 48.   Miscellaneous Model Processes 
2. Objects 
SIMIO is an object-oriented approach to modeling.  In modeling NAS Lemoore’s 
airport operations, several sub-models were combined to form a larger model 
representing the physical components of the systems.  Each object, or model, created has 
its own properties, states, behavior, and relationship with other objects. 
Each object outlined in Tables 49 and 50 has its own behavior customized to meet 
the requirements of this implementation.  For example, each flight line is built by placing 
165 
objects that represent post-flight checks, aircrew swaps, engine shutdowns, while each 
hot skid consists of objects representing JP-5 fuel, the fuel hose and nozzle, as well as 
fuel container.  
 




Table 49. Model Objects (continued) 
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APPENDIX B. CDM TOOLBOX 
A. CDM APPLICATIONS 
1. SHARP: An Operational DSS 
In 1992, Warren E. Walker of RAND Corporation published a journal article 
outlining changes in organizational structure through enhancements in information 
technology.  In both the commercial and military sector, many large organizations are 
transitioning from highly centralized decision-making to networks of distributed centers 
of excellence (Walker, 1992).  Advances in computer technology have made it possible 
to rapidly communicate across wide geographical area in support of mutually defined 
organizational goals and objectives.  What was once a single decision maker at a 
standalone computer is now benefiting from the rapid exchange of information using a 
common set of network tools in an operational decision support system (ODSS) (Walker, 
1992).  
The benefits of decentralized decision making are widely accepted in 
organizational behavior literature and in industry (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012).  
Specifically, decentralization empowers employees in a way that leads to increased job 
satisfaction and productivity and lower rates of job turnover.  From an efficiency 
perspective, decentralized decision authority significantly decreases the time it takes a 
particular decision to be executed.  Furthermore, decentralization improves the quality of 
the final decision by embracing stakeholder innovation, creativity, and flexibility 
necessary at lower levels in the operational hierarchy (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012). 
According to Walker, operational decision support systems facilitate centralized 
support for decentralized organizations (1992).  To be successful, organizations must 
fully support ODSS implementation.  Political interference is one of the main reasons 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness are slowed.  Other barriers to reach fruition 
include data consistency (data format), organizational structure, and model output 
appropriate for the decision being made (Walker, 1992). 
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The ODSS Walker recommends consists of five key elements:  users, models, 
data, network, and use cases.  Fortunately for Naval Aviation, this elaborate information 
technology already exists in the form of SHARP (Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness 
Program).  SHARP is a web-based application used by all aviation squadrons to track 
readiness, flight scheduling, budget data (Flying Hour Program) and generate summary 
reports.  Therefore, no new management information system requires development.  
SHARP is capable of providing a unified organizational approach to solving capacity and 
demand management problems across a given flight line.  However, current squadron 
scheduling processes do not take advantage of this functionality thus leading to a myopic 
approach to flight operations.  All five elements Walker recommends of an ODSS are 
available in SHARP.  What is lacking, however, is the political willingness to change 
existing flight scheduling techniques and procedures.  Doing so would enhance 
information exchange not only between individual squadrons, but also with base 
operations (air traffic control and fuel services) and range management offices.  
2. Aircraft Carrier Air Plan Model 
In 1992, Robert Stammer studied DSS implementation afloat.  His research 
efforts responded to a CNO directed tactics development and evaluation (TAC D&E) 
with a database approach to aircraft carrier air plan production (Stammer, 1992).  The air 
plan is a collaborative planning and execution document for daily flight operations.  
Every aircraft carrier operating at sea today is responsible for producing a daily air plan.  
Until the mid-1990s, however, each aircraft carrier used a different technique in doing so 
(Stammer, 1992).   
Stammer’s research addressed a significant problem in the Navy’s aircraft carrier 
community.  Inefficiencies in the daily air plan production process resulted in decreased 
productivity and combat effectiveness (Stammer, 1992).  Embarked in an aircraft carrier 
are hundreds of principal aviation stakeholders, each of whose voice must be reflected in 
the daily air plan.  The TAC D&E highlighted three main objectives for Stammer 
address: 1) develop a strategy for analyzing the current process; 2) identify quantitative 
metrics for objective plan development; and 3) automate the process (Stammer, 1992).   
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In response to the TAC D&E objectives, Stammer analyzed afloat air operations 
and the interactions between the ship and embarked air wing.  He concluded four basic 
variables frame a day’s flight operations: number of day cycles, number of night cycles, 
total number of sorties, and the time flight operations will commence and terminate 
(1992).  These attributes form the foundation for the daily air plan.  Stammer also 
established a system of priorities among the various stakeholders.  This system ensures 
the operational objectives of individual stakeholders are captured and compliant with the 
greater carrier strike group’s objectives. 
With a thorough understanding of the process and performance metrics, Stammer 
then addressed the final TAC D&E objective by creating an automated system to 
standardize daily air plan production.  This thesis developed a prototype system using a 
multi-purpose, commercially available, off the shelf program that was already in use in 
aircraft carriers (Stammer, 1992).  This approach significantly reduced the cost of 
implementation and leveraged the knowledge that end users already possessed.  
Stammer’s understanding of metrics, stakeholder priorities, and operational constraints 
led to the creation of a functional database prototype.  This prototype was successfully 
tested in an operational environment onboard USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72).   
A significant gap in Stammer’s research was cultural change.  In his final 
analysis, he concedes the majority of air plan production problems were not with 
development, but rather stakeholder’s failing to communicate effectively throughout the 
ship (Stammer, 1992).  Therefore, technology can go a long way toward improving 
efficiency and synergy, but without leadership buy-in and incentives to work toward a 
common vision, no DSS will succeed (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012).  
Although this thesis concentrated entirely on air plan production afloat, these 
concepts can easily apply to the land-based flight scheduling process.  As many 
differences as there are in flight operations afloat and ashore, there are an equal number 
of similarities.  The aircraft carrier uses predictable aircraft launch and arrival times 
orchestrate hundreds of activities from logistics and navigation to engineering and 
maintenance.  The keyword is predictability.  When these same squadrons operate 
ashore, they operate whenever they desire within the constraints of the field hours.  
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Furthermore, with minimal collaboration between squadrons and no concern for delays in 
takeoff, landing, and post-flight refueling resources, the Navy’s vision to foster a culture 
of fuel conservation cannot be realized.  Implementing a similar wing-wide scheduling 
process ashore would be one way of implementing an airfield slot management system 
for arriving aircraft. 
3. Surface Movement Advisor 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) commissioned an integrated product 
team in 1998 to develop a decision support system proof-of-concept capable of managing 
aircraft ground delays (Lawson, 1998).  During periods of high traffic volume, the so-
called “Surface Movement Advisor” (SMA), would share large amounts of relevant 
information among airlines, airport operators, and air traffic controllers thus increasing 
both speed and quality of operational decisions.  Furthermore, this information enhances 
the situational awareness of decision makers to better respond to airfield capacity 
limitations and lead-turn excessive aircraft ground delays before they manifest (Lawson, 
1998).   
The integrated product team was led by the FAA and collaborated with the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and MITRE Corporation’s 
Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD).  This highly capable 
team aggressively pursued a host of collaborative decision making tools to reduce ground 
delays in response to increased airfield congestion (Lawson, 1998).  SMA is the result of 
their research and analysis.  SMA brings together the principal stakeholders responsible 
for managing aircraft from touchdown to “gate-in” (engine shutdown).  As queues 
develop from aircraft clearing the runway on taxi-in and at terminal gates, decisions made 
to change runway utilization, taxiway routing, and aircraft departure procedures alleviates 
congestion to reduce delays (Lawson, 1998).  The SMA proof-of-concept was an 
overwhelming success.  One of the objectives was to reduce taxi time by one minute per 
aircraft.  The results of the 90-day beta test at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International 
Airport revealed a taxi time reduction of over two minutes per aircraft. 
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The integrated product team developed the SMA software suite using existing 
commercial off the shelf hardware and software packages.  This architecture then 
interfaced with the “National Airspace System (RADAR tracks, flight information), 
airline data (Flight Information Display System (FIDS)), electronic Official Airline 
Guide (OAG), and airport/ramp tower” taxi, takeoff, and landing data (Lawson, 1998).  
In total, there were 19 SMA displays installed at the Atlanta test site.  All users, 
regardless of station, saw the same information, on the same screens, in the same 
format—they all literally played from the same sheet of music (Lawson, 1998).   
SMA’s graphical user interface divided data into three main categories:  air traffic 
control tower data, airport/ramp management data, and airline data.  The requisite data 
was captured in real-time by the various stakeholders and presented by the SMA software 
suite.  In similar fashion, the U.S. Navy could benefit greatly from the sharing of such 
information.  Currently, there is no such management information system linking 
together ATC, base operations, wing operations, and squadrons.  Furthermore, each 
airfield stakeholder collects data in a variety of independent databases, most of which 
could easily be migrated to a web-based application for collaboration and sharing.  It is 
from this backdrop that SMA provides valuable insight into the successes realized by the 
airline industry.  These same efficiencies could also benefit Naval Aviation in one form 
or another. 
4. Implications of Military DSS 
In 2005, the RAND Corporation published Implications of Modern Decision 
Science for Military Decision-Support Systems, an objective analysis of modern 
collaborative information systems within the DoD (Davis, Kulick, & Egner, 2005).  Their 
research provides a brief overview of decision support systems (DSS) as well as insight 
to the complexities of higher-level decision-making.  Furthermore, the article solidifies 
the requirement for increased collaboration between higher-level and operational decision 
makers in achieving efficient operations. 
According to the RAND study, when individual decision makers understand how 
their actions fit into the larger process, there is increased synergy between management at 
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all levels (Davis et al., 2005).  Furthermore, evaluating a system from an individual’s 
perspective reveals structural and communication barriers that impede performance and 
efficiency.  Removing organizational barriers, as viewed from the individual, results in 
goal alignment and congruence throughout an organization (Davis et al., 2005). 
The main attributes working for or against any decision maker are inputs, 
strategy, and policy (Davis et al., 2005).  Understanding how each of these components 
affects the ultimate decision made is necessary for process improvement.  Therefore, with 
a thorough understanding of a system and the policies that support it, an organization can 
begin to develop and implement a DSS (Davis et al., 2005).  This RAND study provides 
a system framework outlining the necessary data that must be considered in any DSS 
implementation.  Of particular interest is the recommendation to flatten an organization’s 
operational decision structure to more rapidly get critical information in the hands of the 
decision maker.  Moving from a bureaucratic (vertical) structure to a flat (horizontal) 
structure is well known to improve communication and information exchange (Merchant 
& Van der Stede, 2012).  
The RAND study provided a sound framework with emphasis on implementation 
in a DoD environment.  This MBA project applies RAND’s three decision components 
(inputs, strategies, and policies) to naval air installations in the form of a collaborative 
decision-making tool, or DSS.  Any proposed DSS system must be easy to configure, 
navigate, and tailor to maximize interactivity all under a veil of a common language, 
terminology, and objectives (Davis et al., 2005).  Increasing efficiency through 
collaboration, mutual understanding of each stakeholder’s strengths and weaknesses, and 
operational synergy across the flight line may yield significant fuel and cost reductions.  
Focusing on the efficient use of ground resources through air operations management in a 
collaborative environment is the goal of this research. 
5. Range Scheduling DSS 
Decision support systems (DSS) are increasingly commonplace among military 
organizations.  Resource managers today benefit greatly from having immediate access to 
a large amount of information necessary in making informed operational decisions.  In 
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2001, the RAND Corporation performed a study for the U.S. Air Force on managing 
airspace and training range usage through the use of a DSS.  Their comprehensive 
analysis of range usage included operational requirements, training tasks, required 
airspace characteristics, and minimum time required to achieve training objectives 
(Robbert, Carrillo, Kerchner, & Williams, 2001).   
According to the RAND study, end user requirements are best satisfied when 
range parameters are linked in a relational database (Robbert et al., 2001).  Prior to 
implementing the database, the Air Force took a deficiency-based approach to range 
prioritization.  This approach simply matched training requirements with range 
capabilities (Robbert et al., 2001).  Unlike the former approach, this relational database 
greatly enhanced decision making by speeding requirements-range pairing and ensuring 
ranges were not double-scheduled.  
Collaborative decision-making tools such as this relational database are becoming 
increasingly common.  As this 2001 RAND study shows, the sharing of information and 
standardizing training requirements and range capabilities led to increased Air Force 
training and readiness.  Furthermore, the information technology solution in this case was 
not only easy to install and operate, but it was built using existing Air Force hardware 
and software infrastructure thus keeping costs low.  This MBA research project also 
seeks an IT solution to share critical operational information in near real-time using 
existing computing infrastructure within the Navy.  Bringing together a host of 
geographically separated stakeholders in a common framework may lead to similar 
increases in situational awareness and operational efficiency across the flight line. 
B. CULTURAL CHANGE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Secretary of the Navy Raymond Mabus established several aggressive energy 
goals for the Navy to achieve by the year 2020 (DON, 2012).  The single largest user of 
the Navy’s fuel resources, Naval Aviation, stands most affected by any energy policy.  
To that end, the aviation community is directed to adopt energy efficient practices, 
technologies, and operations.  A critical element in changing the way Naval Aviation 
operates is support from senior military leaders to foster a culture of energy conservation.  
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The best energy policies from a research point of view often fail in practical 
application because of the inability to garner support both up and down the chain of 
command.  Naval Aviation in particular has a very strong organizational culture making 
it resistant to change (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2012).  Dr. John Kotter, a former 
Harvard professor and current Chief Innovation Officer at Kotter International, is a leader 
in the field of change management.  Kotter claims that 70 percent of all major change 
initiatives fail (2013).  In response to this assertion, he developed a highly successful 8-
Step Change Model to help organizations survive and prosper in a rapidly changing 
environment (Kotter, 2013).   
In 2012, a team of MIT graduate students from Sloan School of Management 
formed at the request of the Navy (Alexeyev, de Frutos, Finicane, & Shimazu, 2012).  
These researchers developed a roadmap to assist Naval Aviation in the implementation of 
improved energy practices.  Naval Aviation is deeply rooted in tradition making any 
organizational or structural change difficult to realize.  Their study incorporated surveys 
and interviews of both maintenance and operations personnel.  The results revealed a 
greater resistance to change among operations personnel than maintenance technicians 
(Alexeyev et al., 2012).  The most significant claim by those in operations was the belief 
that energy conservation could only come at the expense of readiness and tactical 
proficiency (Alexeyev et al., 2012).  Furthermore, many operators interviewed felt as 
though Naval Aviation is already minimizing fuel resources.  Unfortunately, perception 
management is yet another leadership challenge. 
As fiscal and operational pressures intensify, the leadership should anticipate an 
increase in resistance cultural and procedural change.  This MBA project focuses 
explicitly on the ground operations occurring post-flight.  The event landing time 
represents the end of the tactical or administrative mission.  Therefore, by focusing 
entirely on the process between touchdown and engine shutdown, operational personnel 
should be more inclined to adopt energy efficient policies.  The proposed slot 




Figure 75.  8-Step Change Model (From Kotter & Cohen, 2002) 
To combat resistance to change, the MIT study proposed a solution using the 
eight-step framework outlined in The Heart of Change (Kotter & Cohen, 2002).  Where 
the MIT study addresses the first five steps, our MBA project offers solutions 
commencing from that point forward (Figure 75).  A key to enabling action is breaking 
down barriers to communication that prevents people from carrying out the vision.  In the 
Navy’s case, that vision is improved energy conservation.  The largest barrier to 
overcome is in flight scheduling.  Each commanding officer orchestrating his schedule 
without regard to operations across the airfield introduces unwanted variability in the 
arrival of aircraft.  This variability, in turn, creates ground delays, which increases fuel 
consumption and generates waste.  Finding ways to create “short-term wins” to pave the 
way toward permanent change is a necessary step to ensuring the health of the Fleet. 
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APPENDIX C. SIMIO DOCUMENTATION REPORT 
For a complete Simio documentation report of the model, please visit the 
following links to the online supplement.  Two file formats are provided. 
Online Supplement (HTML format) 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/2ejpj2a4qvns0k1/Appendix%20C%20-
%20Simio%20Documentation%20Report.html 
Size:  8.12MB 
 
Online Supplement (PDF format) 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/3usj7n2b8s1rez9/Appendix%20C%20-
%20Simio%20Documentation%20Report.pdf 
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